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Attorney for Plaintiff 
CLERK DISTRiCT COURr \S " 
~~ DEi'VI r 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KO@TENAI 
! 




THE HARTFORD F1RE INSURANCE 
COMPANY. a Connecticut corporation, 
Defendant. 
ase No.: No. CV-OB-7069 
i 
LAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
A. Consequential Damages are Foreseeable Under the Policy 
Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract unduly delaying payment of the claim and 
for refusing to pay sums which were properly due pursuant to the contract of insurance. I The 
damages for breach of contract are those which arise naturally from t1~e breach and are 
reasonably foreseeable. Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Inc., 136 Idaho 879, 884, 42 P.3d 
672,677 (2002). The question of foreseeability constitutes a question of fact. Appel v. 
LePage, 135 Idaho 133, 137, 15 P.3d 1141, 1145 (2000), citing Davis v. McDougall, 94 Idaho 
61,480 P.2d 907 (1971). 
I Amended Complaint at 7. 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE - I 
____________________________________________ 2 ()65 
Feb 16 10 03:40p BI NE LAW 12 57290 
The insurance policy specifically contemplates the payment 6r lost profits because it is a 
i 
policy that pays lost profits when the insured business is not in operation.2 Furthermore, the 
policy provides that it will pay the money it takes to get the businessre-opened so the insured 
can again generate the profit that it was before the catastrophe.3 It pays for the damage to the 
contents of the store, which includes inventory and the fixtures and equipment needed to sell that 
inventory.4 It is foreseeable that failing to payor unreasonably deJaying payment under the 
policy would cause the damages that Lakeland seeks in this lawsuit. 
B. Streamline Capital, LLC v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Company is distinguishable and 
frivolously cited. 
Reliance on this case is frivolous. This is an unpublished federal ,case interpreting New York 
law in 2003 and the interpretation is not a correct statement of current New York law on the 
subject. In Bi-Economy Market, Inc. v. Harleysville Ins. Co. of New York, 10 N.Y.3d 187, 194, 
886 N.E.2d 127,856 N.Y.S.2d 505 (N.Y.2008), the insurance poJicywas almost identical to the 
policy in this case. The insured in that case suffered a fire and submitted a claim. The insurance 
company did not timely pay under the policy and the insured went out of business. The 
insurance company argued that the policy had an exclusion for "consequential damages" and the 
Court responded that the damages suffered were recoverable because those damages were 
foreseeable. 
Thus, the very purpose of business interruption coverage would 
have made Harleysville aware that if it breached its obligations 
under the contract to investigate in good faith and pay:covered 
claims it would have to respond in damages to Bi-Economy for the 
loss of its business as a result of the breach 
Furthermore, contrary to the dissent's view, the purpose of the 
contract was not just to receive money, but to receive it promptly 
2 Policy, Special Property Coverage Form, p. 10, para. o. 
3 Policy, Special Property Coverage Form, p. 11, para. T. 
4 Pol icy, Special Coverage Form, p. I, Paras A.I.a & b. 
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I 
so that in the aftermath of a calamitous event, as Bi-Economy 
experienced here, the business could avoid collapse and get 
back on its feet as soon as possible. 
Bi-Economy Market, inc. v. Harleysville ins. 
Co. o/New York 10 N.Y.3d 187, 195,886 
N.E.2d 127, 132,856 N.Y.S.2d 505, 
510 (N.Y.,2008), (emphasis supplied). 
As a matter of law, the damages suffered by Plaintiff in this case were foreseeable by the 
parties and this Court should allow the jury to consider al1 of Dan Harper's report. 
C. The Hartford's Cited Cases Are inapplicable 
1. Brown's Tie & Lumber Co. v. Chicago Title Co. o/Ida/lO, 115 
Idaho 56, 764 P.2d 423 (1988). 
The Brown's case involves a policy of title insurance that specifically set forth the losses 
it covered. "The insurer has agreed to compensate for actual loss incuu'ed in clearing or 
removing unexpected encumbrances not to exceed the amount stated in Schedule A." 115 Idaho 
56,61-62, 764 P.2d 423,428 - 429 (1988). By contrast, in this case, the insurer has agreed to 
pay lost business profits during the time the store is not operating and has agreed to pay sums for 
personal property losses that will al10w the store to re-open. By its very terms, the policy 
contemplates the loss of profits . 
. 2. Blis Day Spa, LLC v. The HarVord Insurance Group. 
This is not on point because it involved a dispute as to the amount properly due under the 
policy. In the present case, there was no dispute as to what was due under the policy at the time 
that the Hartford was withholding payments. As of May 20th, 2008, the Hartford had the 
information it needed to calculate the calculated the business interruption claim up October 
2008.5 The Hartford made a business interruption payment in July 2008, and then did not again 
5 Bates Stamped Affidavit of Dan Harper at bates 23. 
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pay until November 2008. There is no evidence in tbe record whJtsoever to explain this 
I 
failure to pay. Unlike the BUs case, The Hartford has at no point alleged that it was relying on 
any provision of the policy which would have allowed it to withhold payment. 
DATED this ME- day February, 2010. 
ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTR T OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KO 'TENAI 
I 
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE, Case No: CV -08-7069 
i 
L.L.C., I 
MORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
Plaintiff, OTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
V!\. 
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation, 
Defendant. 
Defendant's motion for a protective order is based on this Court's ruling that there are no 
bad faith c1aims. This Court bas not dismissed the contract based claims. Likewise, this Court 
has not ruled that damages beyond the 12 month policy limitation are not recoverable, which is 
the suhject of other motions pending before this Court. 
Dated this 161h day of February, 2010. 
--" 
, 
ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER. I 
-------------------2 ()69 
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Plaintiff, REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION IN LIMINE RE: EXPEItT DAN 
VS. HARPER ' : 
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation, 
Defendant. 
, , 
COMES NOW Defendant, the Hartford Fire Insurance Company ( .. Hartford~'), by and 
i 
through its counsel, Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton. P.A.. and hereby submits ~s reply in 
I 
support of Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Expert Dan Hazper ("Hartford' s Motion~'). For the 
reasons stated herein. Hartford's Motion should be granted. 
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As an initial matter, plaintiff's attempt to frame the issue for trial as a question of 
i 
reasonableness of the actions of Hartford's adjusters'is incorrect Rather, as this Court has 
, , 
previously stated, the only remaining claim at issue in ,this matter is "plaintiff's claim ~r breach 
I 
of contract as relating to Hartford's determination of the dates of the 'Period of Restoration' at 
I 
issue in this matter." MSJ Order at 2. What plai~ti:ff seeks to do, however, is expand the 
I 
question of the determination of the October 31,2008 end-date for the Period ofRestor~tion (and 
I 
I 
the bases therefor) to a broad-ranging attack on Hartford and the various' adjusters h~d1ing of 
i 
I 
the claim - whether or not the actions related to the selection of the October 31, 2008 1 date, and 
I , 
whether or not that adjuster was even involved in making that decision. TIlis, howev:er, would 
simply be a bad faith claim, which this Coun bas already dismissed. The narure of !me actual 
I 
remaining issue for trial- selection of the October 3',1, 2008 - does not pennit a wide-ranging 
I ' 
I I 
attack on document requests. payment timing, etc., as those claims have already been :dismissed 
i 
by the Court, and any such OpiniOIlB purporting to ~dre5s those areas should be excluded, as 
they would not bear on any issue aotually set for trial. : 
I 
Further, Mr. Harper is not an adjuster; Mr. H~er is an accountant. Despite ~s, plaintiff 
, I 
argues in Phrintiff's Response to Defendant'S MQtion in Limine Concerning Dan Harper 
I 
, I 
("Response"). Dan Harper can and will testify ~at - from the perspective of ~ forensic 
I 
accountant whose job it is to properly detennine the amount of the claim - it was not ~easonable 
I 
or necessary to withhold payment under the schedules to properly determine the :final! amount of 
I 
I 
the claim." (Response at 2.) This argument disregards a critical points - fust. Hartfrrd, not its 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION~lN LIMINE RE: EXPERT 




accountant (MD&D), detennines payments under the policy, based upon the proof provi1ed to it, 
I 
, I 
and the lansuage and limitations on the Policy. It is Hartford - not its accountant (Mp&D) -
, ' , ' 
that issues payments under the Policy. Plaintiff's ~laim that Mr. Harper will address the 
, , 
, 1 
reasonableness the timing of payments to Lakeland ;would be an opinion on the a~tions of 
adjuster, not on another accountant (Mr. Harper's a~~al area of expertise). Again, Mt. HarPer 
, 
himselfhas expressly testified that he cannot testify ab~ut this Mr. Harper testified as foilows: t 
1 ' 
I' 
25 Q And based on that, I would assume th~n that you have 
19 : 
1 not served as an expert for any client, whether itls 
2 Lakeland or any other client that you and y~ur company have 
3 assisted since 1993, with respect to provi<Wt,g an opinion as 
4 to whether a olaim was appropriately adjhsied and handled, 
5 is that fair? , ~ 
6 A. Yes, we wouldn't have opiDions as to the adjusters' 
7 actions or inactions. 
, 
13,6 :' 
13 Q In providing these opinions, though, ';you certainly 
14 acknowledge that you do not feel comf0~b1e testifying as 
15 to what the insured's obligations are undef.the insurance 
16 policy, correct? , ' 
17 A Yes, that's probably getting more ~to the policy 
18 interpretation arena. ' i: 
19 Q And you cenainly, again, in the p~li¢y 
20 interpretation arena. you certainly do ndt f~el you're 
21 qualified to render any opinions as to ~ether the Fritzs 
22 actually complied with the terms of the in~urance policy? 
23 A I would agree tbat that' & beyon~ my scope. 
: ' 1 
, 1 i 
(Counsel Aff., Exh. A, 11. 18;5-19:7; 136:13-23)(efi:lphases added), Thus, Mr. Harper cannot 
testify on this subject area. 
1 ! , I 
It is unclear why plaintiff contends that "Dan Harper ... does not have any authority to agree to limit bis testimony 
in any way." Response at I. Mr. Harper's deposition makes clear that he is unqualified to Tendor :lOme opinions. 
and has not fonnulated some opinions on omer subjects. Plaintiff'a bald assertion cannot change that. : 
, ;, ! 
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i 
Moreover, plaintiff reiterates its insurance irtterpretation position that Hartford! had no 
I 
I I 
basis to dela.y payments. but this has no bearing on J.,hat Mr. Harper can testify about. Not only 
! , 
I I 
would testimony on this particular point require an: ~pinion on an adjusters' actions, butb in turn, 
I • 
would require MI. Harper to offer expert opinion od interpretation of provisions of an i.hsuranoe 
I . 
policy. Thus, any such opinion on what the POli~Y required by timing of paymentt is, too, 
I : . . 
I 
beyond Mr. Hatper's area of expertise, and should b~ ~c1udcd. 




be barred from providing any opinion regarding th~ reasonableness of Hartford's adjuStment of 
i I 
the claim, and any opinion rega.rding interpretation pi the policy at issue, especially wiih respect 
, , 
I I 
to whether or not certain claimed damages are cove~ed. i 
I 
B. Mr. Harper cannot testify abQut damages betond the scope of the Policy. 
! 
In responding to Hartford's argument that Mr. Harper cannot testify about an~ damages 
I • 
I ' I I 
beyond the 12-month maximum Business Inco~'e coverage under the Policy, plaintiff only 
! I 
references to its opposition to Hartford's motion/in limine regarding consequential: d.a.:rn.ages. 
I 
I : 
Plaintiff offers no substantive response to this secllon. Plaintiff also fails to address !defects in 
I 
I ' 
the damages calculated by Mr. Harper for his stated timc period of November 1, 2008 through 
I 
! ! 
December 31, 2009, such as the failure to include a $23,313 Extended Business Income payment 
I I 
already made by Hartford, and the inclusion ofth~ Extended Business Income period!of August 
.j ; 
20,2009 through December 18, 2009, which wo~(i thereby render anot·insignificant1portion of 
I . 
Mr. Harper's opined value an improper and inacmiissible double-recovery. In any ev~nt, should 
I I 
the Court grant Hartford's Motion in Limine ~e: Damages - as addresses the ~uestion of 
I i 
consequential damages - this Court should alsQ bar Mr. Harper from offering ~y damage 
I ' 
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c. . b' '. I 
I 
as he has not calculated any such 
I 
Dan Hamer cannot opme a out mventory lssues. 
In its Response, plaintiff obliquely !arJs that Mr. Hmper can offer t~stimony 
"buttressing Lakeland's allegation pertaining t~ the ttal value of the inventory at the ti~e of the 
I ; 
collapse." Response at 3. Plamtiff does !!!U disPute, however, that Mr. Harper's ~roposed 
, 1 ' 
methodology - the use of taX return.s and industry [averages - has no bearing on the Inventory 
I 
proof requirements under the Policy. I 
I 
I 
Further, plaintiff fails to expi';ll reievaru:e_/ Any question of the total inven~ value of 
the store (which is contained in the 874-page comylete inventory report, which LakeUmd failed 
to provide until November 2008. and which ~. aarper himself relies upon) does nJt bear on 
I : 
any issue for trial. as the only issue set for trial is a breach of contract claim on "Hartford' s 
, I , 
determination of the dates oftbe 'Period ofR~stora1on' at issue in this matter." MSJ cirder at 2. 
, I ~ 




Mr. Harper cmmot opine on the November 1. 2008 to January 28, 2009. 
Mr. HalPer has not opined as to the'Valul of the Business Income claim fo~ the time 
: I I 
period of November 1, 2008 to January 28. 2009,. Cryptically, however, plaintiff argues that 
I ' 
! ' 
"there is no basis to claim that you oan exclude an eJ'pert witness because you don't like the form , I I 
used with which he presents his reports." ~s1se at 3. Whether or not Hartforrs cOWlse! 
likes or dislikes the form of Mr. Harper's reports has nothing to do with Hartford's N1otion, nor 
does the question of whether other .individuals ~inCIUding those retained by H~Ord) could 
I 
calculate that figure. Rather, the question, is whether OJ' not Dan Harper has fortnulated an 
I I 
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El<h. A, 11. 84:7-85:8.) Thus, Mr. Harper is, in -1 an expert without an opinion (a ~Oint tIu: 




E. The Court is fully empowered to exclude Mr.IHamer. 1 
Plaintiff's final argument is that the COlm l~ks the power to exclude Mr. Harp,~r unless 
Hartford puts on its own expert testimony to attack ~undatiOn and methodology. P~ cites 
no authority for this proposed rul~, and wholly di6l'egards the fact that it is the Court. not the 
I; . 
opposing party's own experts, that is the gatekeeper .of expert testimony. More specifically, Rule 
, I 
; I 
702 requires this Court to act as a gatekeeper to eep from the jury expert testimony that is 
: ' 
, I 
scientifically or medically untrustworthy or that rests on an unreliable basis or methodology. 
, I: i 
:at~:. p~~::; ~: ::::: ;:~:)44 P.2d 691 '1;94 (1992); State v, Parkinson, 128 ; Idaho 29, 
Plaintiff cites to only one example, the val :e of extant inventory that had beel stored in 
the trailers, Response at 4. In making thai argtnent, plaintiff apparcndy suggesti that Mr. 
Harper will be rendering an opinion as to wbeth! or not the Btore was capable of ~eopening. 
. : ,Ir· ; 
despIte the fact that Mr. HEUper has already tcsti~r;d that "1 haven't fonnulated an op~on as to 
specifically when they would be able to reoperi yet." (Counsel Aff., Exh, A, n: 133:8.9.) 
Despite Hartfotd'. lengthy discussion of Mr. ~'S improper opinions, iack of opinions, 
speculation, II1S.th errors, etc. (see generall; De1endant's Motion in Limine Re: ~xpert Dan 
~ , 1, I 
Harper, and Memorandum in Support. at pp. 17- :8) - all demonstrating the unreliability of Mr. 
: r ! 
Harper's opinions. and areas beyond his expertise ~dlor the remaining issue for trial-- Lakeland 
" 
t. 
otherwise opts to not to respond or otherwise ad : ess any of those arguments. Thus! other than 
t ' 
, t ' 
its contention that the Court cannot exclude the t )timony of Mr. Harper at this juncture and the 
t 
I 
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brief mention of potential testimony regarding the s : re reopening, Lakeland otherwise (toes not 
I 
, ~ , 
addr." the deficiencies discussed by Hartford. 1 Court should, thus, find that Mr. Hmpcr's 
testimony is excludable. f i 
In any event, plaintiff suggests that any con~ms that Hartford has with Mr. HaJer could 
I' ; 
be addressed in voir dire. Obviously, voir dire is' tthe incorrect avenue to challenge In expert" 
I ' 
( I 
but, to the extent plaintiff .intends to refer to questiJ' ning of Mr. Harper outside the presence of 
,! : 
r ' , 
the juzy, plaintiff's argument does not provide ': appropriate remedy. What Hartford bas 
presented to the Coun is the scope ofM!. Harper's ipinions, and demonstrated that Mr.! Harper's 
testimony is inadmissible, based on a number of tundS, including relevancy and uJeliability. 
'~ I 
Mr. Harper has already been questioned (at depos":'on), and Hartford is now presentfug that to 
i ; 
the Court for the Court's gatekeeper detenninatit as to whether or not Mr. Harpf will be 
allowed to testify at trial. Plaintiff's preference ould accomplish little more than'mire Mr. 
'I : 
Harper's presentation of testimony in repeated i' erruptions to that testimony, to ~scnt the 
\ 
If , I 
arguments warranting exclusion of his testimony,:~ hich Hanford is now already doi:ng. Thus, 
,\ 
I , 
the appropriate remedy is for the Court to act as e gatekeeper, and exclude Mr. HarPer for the 
,I, ' 
reasons outlined in Hartford's Motion. 
In short, plaintiff cites ztrrO authority fo~ 'its position that the Court is pd,werless to 
exclude an expert before the time of trial based i; on, Daubert and/or Rule 702 con~ms. This 
, 
I 
argument is nonsensical, ignores the Rules, an should be rejected by the Court.: As such, 
I : , 
Hartford's Motion should be granted. 
I 
Accordingly, for the reasons above, De' ~ndant' s Motion in Limine Re: Expert Dan 
, ~ 
, Harper should be granted. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Jt ,o~February, 2010. 
HALL~RLEY' OBERRECHT & 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST runICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE. 
L.L.C .• 





SURREPLY IN SUPPORT Olf 
VB. 
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR PROTECTm 
ORDER I 
COMES NOW the defendant The Hartford Fire Insurance Company ~ereinafter 
I 
I 
"Hartford"), by and through it.~ counsel of record. Hall, Farley. Oberrecht & Blanton; P.A., and 
i 
hereby submits this surreply in support of its Motion for Protective Order. and Mem~randum in 
Support. 
ARGUMENT 
Hartford previously filed its Motion for Protective Order on December :29, 2009. 
I 
Plaintiff filed a response on January 6, 2010, simply arguing that the Court "hat not been 
SURREPL Y IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 1 
2011) 





presented "With or ruled on whether or not losses sustained after the period of restoration would 
I . i 
be tort or contract damages." Hartford subsequently rued its reply on January 11, 201~. Thus, 
Hartford's Motion for Protective Order has previously been briefed by the ·parties. , 
I 
Nevertheless, plaintiff has now filed a surresponse, its Memorandum in Opp~sition to 
I 
Motion for Protective Order ("Surresponse"). In it. plaintiff' asserts, with no aPditional 
I 
i 
responsive argument, that the Court has not dismissed Lakeland's breac~ of contract claim, and 
I 
. j 
has not ruled that damages beyond the 12-month maximum Business Inc~me coverage period are 
unrecoverable at the time ofma!. 
Plaintiff raises no issues not previously raised or otherwise addressed in Hartfo~d' s prior 
I 
briefing. Thus, by way of surreply, Hartford references and incorporates its prior briefing on its 
, I : ) 
Merion for Protective Order as if fully set forth herein. For those reasons stated in 1uch prior 
briefing. Hartford's Motion for Protective Order should be granted. 
I 
CONCLUSION 
F or these above reasons, Hartford's motion for protective order should be grant~d. 
. ' , 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of February, 2010. I 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & 
BLANTON, P.A. 
By ~~=-==~~f-:-t"-i'h!:::-:-':"'----r--:--­
Keely E. ilke 
Bryan A. Nic 
Attorneys fo 
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THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV -08-7069 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION IN LIMINE RE: DAMAGES 
COMES NOW, defendant Hartford Fire Insurance Company ("Hartford"), by and 
through its counsel of record Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., and hereby submits this 
reply in support of Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Damages ("Hartford's Motion"). For the 
reasons stated below, Hartford's Motion should be granted. 
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U~, ~u, ~'U'..l.V .LV. VU ... ~"'.l" _"""' .... "' .......... _ .......... 
ARGUMENT 
A. Plaintiff cannot recover consequential damages. 
1. Plaintiff misconstrues Idaho law on consequential damages. 
Plaintiffs opposition fundamentally turns on the position that the question of 
foreseeability (in regards to consequential damages) is a question of fact to be determined by the 
jury, citing Appel v. LePage, 135 Idaho 133, 15 P.3d 1141 (2000). However, this argument 
paints an incomplete picture of Idaho law. What the Apnel decision actually said was as 
follows: 
Generally, a question of foreseeability constitutes a question of fact for 
determination by a jury, unless the proof is so clear tbat reasonable minds 
could not draw different conclusions or where all reasonable minds would 
construe the facts and circumstances in only one way. Davis v. McDougall, 94 
Idaho 61, 480 P.2d 907(1971). 
135 Idi'lho Rt 117 (~mphflRis added), Tn that case. the CQl.l1i actually affirmed a motion in limine 
barring presentation of evidence on consequential damages, correctly putting the onus on 
plaintiffs to offer proof in support of an argument for reasonable foreseeability of consequential 
damages: 
The district court determined as a matter of law that the consequential damages 
sought by the Appels were not within the contemplation of the parties at the time 
they contracted and, therefore, not foreseeable and not recoverable. The district 
court stated: 
The strongest argument that plaintiffs could make is that a flood warning 
was issued on [February] 8th. And then, assuming that [February] 8th is a 
time when the parties contracted, because foreseeability is determined as 
of the time of their contract, that there would not only be a flood but that 
the flood would damage personal property that would be moved by the 
plaintiffs to a place unknown to the defendants but which the plaintiffs 
would choose to be in the flood plain, is as a matter of law so remote as to 
not be within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of 
contracting. 
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for the sale of a home. There is nothing in the contract that indicates the parties 
contemplated liability for flood damage to personal property moved out of the 
home to land unrelated to the contract. The Appels had the opportunity to outline 
for the district court the proof they would offer to support the claim. Nothing 
indicated the damage was reasonably foreseeable and within the contemplation of 
the parties. 
Id Thus, at the motion in limine phase, the Court is empowered to review the evidence placed 
before it to determine whether plaintiff has identified proof it might offer to support a claim of 
reasonable foreseeability. Plaintiff cannot simply invoke a mantra of "question of fact", but, 
instead, must demonstrate proof adequate to present such' a claim at the time of trial. As 
Jis\,;u:sst:J LduVV', however, plai1"1tiffhas fniled to do GO. 
2. Plaintiff inaccurately characterizes the terms of the Policy. 
In addition to preeenting an incomplete picture of Idaho law, plRint.iff also fails to fully 
outline the salient portions of the Policy, which are unambiguous and demonstrate that 
consequential damages were not reasonably foreseeable by the parties and were, in fact, 
expressly excluded by the Policy. 
As an initial matter, the Policy expressly excludes and unambiguously consequential 
damages: 
4. Business Income and Extra Expenses Exclusions. We will not pay for: 
b. Any other consequential loss. 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Damages, filed February 
8,2010 ("Counsel Aff."), Exh. B., p. 18. However, rather than quote this provision - or, indeed, 
any other provision of the Policy - plaintiff inaccurately offers its characterization of Policy 
terms. 
}1'm:t, plamtltt contenas maT me pnh .. y ·'r.nnmmphll.r.:; ,.h\;; JJiLYlJlw.u' V1 l\l~t JI~v.Gb LC,",Q""'''' 
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it is a policy that pays lost profits when the insured business is not in operation." Response at 2. 
More correctly, the salient portions of the Policy provides: 
o. Business Income 
(1) We will pay for the actual loss of Business Income you sustain due to the 
necessary suspension of your "operations" during the "period of restoration ". 
The suspension must be caused by direct physical loss of or physical damage to 
property at the "scheduled premises", caused by or resulting from a Covered 
Cause of Loss. . 
(2) With respect to the requirements set forth in the preceding paragraph, if you 
occupy only part of the site at which the "scheduled premises" are located, your 
"scheduled premises" also means: 
(a) The portion of the building which you rent, lease or occupy; and 
(b) Any area within the building or on the site at which the "scheduled 
premises" are located, but only if that area services, or is used to gain 
access to, the "scheduled premises. " 
(3) We will only pay for loss of Business Income that occurs within 12 consecutive 
months after the date of direct physical loss or phYSical damage. This Additional 
Coverage is not subject to the Limits of Insurance. 
(4) Business Income means the: 
(a) Net Income (Net Profit or Loss before income taxes) that would have 
been earned or incurred if no direct physical loss or physical damage had 
occurred: and 
(b) Continuing normal operating expenses incurred, including payroll. 
(5) With respect to the coverage provided in this -Additional Coverage, 
suspension means: 
(u) TIll: pudlul .l/vwJurv,. v' "'v""jJl~t\: ""99Jlti01e vi }'Vtl'Jf1 bu,ViJtJOll,f 
activities,' or 
(b) That part or all of the "scheduled premises 1/ is rendered untentantable 
[sic} as a result of a Covered Cause of Loss if coverage for Business 
Income applies to the policy. 
12. "Period of Restoration" means the period of time that: 
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a. Begins with the date of direct physical loss or physical damage 
caused by or resulting from a Covered Cause of Loss at the "scheduled 
premises, " and 
b. Ends on the date when: 
(1) The property at the "scheduled premises" should be 
,·cpai,.cd, 1'obuj/t, or rop/Dead with r"oyonnhlp sJ1P'p,d and similar 
quality; 
(2) The dule when yuur uw'iltess is "I!surned at a new, pCI"ma1'lo1'lt 
location. 
(Counsel Aff., Exh. B, at pp. 10 & 24-25,) What this provides - unacknowledged by plaintiff-
is that the coverage is bounded by time on two fronts. First, it provides no coverage, under any 
circumstance, beyond 12 months after the date of loss. Second, it provides that coverage 
terminates when the insured (here, Lakeland) should reasonably have been prepared to resume its 
business, following repair of the premises. Thus, the coverage is not open-ended. 
Second, plaintiff oontendE that "the policy provides that it will pay the money it takes tQ 
get the business re-opened so the insured can again generate the profit that it was before the 
catastrophe." Response at 2. This contention is made, citing to the Policy's Extended Business 
Income provision. Plaintiffs characterization of this provision, however, is wholly inaccurate. 
The actual provision states as follows: 
r. Extended Business Income 
(1) If the necessary suspension of your "operations" produces a Business 
Income loss payable under this policy, we will pay for the actual loss of 
Business Income you incur during the period that: 
(a) Begins on the date property is actually repaired, rebuilt or 
rep/aced and "operations" are resumed; ... 
(Counsel Aff., Exh. H, p. II.) Hy Its pJain terms, EBI coverage is inlt:IU1.;J lu jJ1Uvid~ a ~ertAit'l 
period of additional Business Income coverage (in this case, 120 days) after operations are 
V~, ..1.u/ ,-"..LV .LY. "'''' .& ~:L.&& ___ " ................. _ .... 
guarantee that an insured will "generate the profit that it was before the catastrophe." In fact, no 
provision of the Policy makes any such guarantees: Rather, the onus to resume operations falls 
squarely on the insured, who even has an express contractual duty to do so - the Policy expresses 
this duty twice, and explains that Business Income coverage is reduced by the failure to resume 
operations: 
3. Duties in the Event of Loss or Damage 
You must see that the following are done in the event of loss of or damage to 
Covered Property: 
j. Resume part or all of your 'operations' as quickly as possible. 
7. Resumption of Operations 
In the event of physical loss or physical damage at the Ilscheduled premises" you 
must resume all or part of your "operations" as quickly as possible. 
We will reduce the amount of your: 
a. Business Income loss, other than Extra Expenses, to the extent you can 
resume your 'operations', in whole or in part, by using damaged and 
undamaged property (including merchandise or stock) at the 'scheduled 
premises' or elsewhere. . .. 
(Counsel Aff., Exh. B, pp. 20 & 22.) Thus, the Policy is even constructed in such a way that it 
addresses circumstances where an insured either cannot resume operations (12 months of 
Business Income coverage, but no EBI coverage) or voluntarily will not resume operations 
(termination of Business Income at end of determined Period of Restoration, and no EBI 
coverage). The unambiguous tenns of the Policy, then, make clear that an insured is neither 
provided Business Income coverage for an indefmite period of time, nor guaranteed a resumption 
of operations (let alone a return to 100% of prior profit levels). Plaintiffs argument on this 
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point also fails. 
Third, plaintiff contends that the Policy "pays for the damage to the contents of the store, 
which includes inventory and the fixtures and equipment needed to sell that inventory." 
Response at 1. Setting aside discussion of policy limits (here, a Business Personal Property 
coverage limit of $370,000) and various exclusions/limitations that may apply (see, generally, 
Counsel Mf, Exh. B), the implication of this contention, again, is that Hartford has some 
obligation under the Policy to take actions to cause Lakeland's owners to re-open the business. 
No such obligation exists. Rather, Hartford is obligated only to pay for Business Personal 
Proporty and BUfineii Income (including ERT) that iR proven to it by its insured. l It is the 
insured's responsibility - and, indeed, its duty under the Policy - to resume operations, even if 
only partially. Thus, plaintiff's argument again fails. 
Finally, plaintiff's improper conclusory contention - that "it is foreseeable that failing to 
payor unreasonably delaying payment under the policy would cause the damages that Lakeland 
seeks in this lawsuit" - not only ignores the unambiguous language of the Policy as discussed 
above, but attempts to recharacterize its lawsuit, again, into one of bad faith (e.g., ''unreasonably 
delaying"). Plaintiff's claims for bad faith have been dismissed. The only question remaining is 
a breach of contract claim on "Hartford's detennination of the dates of the 'Period of 
Restoration' at issue in this matter." MSJ Order at 2. What this actual issue at trial further 
implicates is another provision of the Policy, unacknowledged by plaintiff despite Hartford's 
Ji:';l,;u::s:.;iull ill its opel,h,g brief - the Ilpprlliolll proviEion. That liection provides: 
2. Appraisal 
If we and you disagree on the amount of loss, either may make written demand for 
an appraisal of the less. In that event, each party will select a competent and 
I Again, plaintiff appears to suggest that advances are due under the Policy, but fails to cite any provision requiring 
such. 
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impartial appraiser. The two appraisers will select an umpire. If they cannot 
agree, either may request that selection be made by a judge of a court having 
jurisdiction. The appraisers will state separately the amount of loss. 
If they fail to agree, they will submit their difference to the umpire. A decision 
agreed to by any two will be binding. Each party will: 
a. Pay its chosen appraiser; and 
b. Bear the other expenses of the appraisal and umpire equally. 
If there is an appraisal, we will still retain our right to deny the claim. 
(Counsel Aff., Exh. B, p. 20.) Thus, what the contract expressly and unambiguously provides is 
that there is a dispute over the value of the loss payments, an appraisal may be had. Thus, what 
was actually reasonably foreseeable in the event of a disagreement over loss payments was not 
inaction by Lakeland and a claim of ongoing, accruing damages, but rather that Lakeland would 
invoke the appraisal provision and seek to address its concerns in that forum. 
Thus, the unambiguous teons of the Policy - errantly characterized by plaintiff - more 
than amply demonstrate that consequential damages were not reasonably foreseeable. Further, 
1'laifttiffhas failed to put forth AE Euch, Hartford's Motion should hr. enmt~n. 
3. Hartford's caselaw is appropriately considered by the Court. 
Plaintiffs attempts to attack the authority cited by Hartford also fail, and such cited 
decisions are appropriately considered by the Court. 
• The Streamline decision. 
Plaintiff asserts that Hartford's reliance on Streamline Capital, LLC v. Hartford Cas. Ins. 
Co., 2003 WL 22004888 (2003) is "frivolous," claiming that Bi-Economy Market, Inc. v. 
Harleysville 1m. Cu. uf Nt:w York, 886 N.n.2d 127 (N.Y. 2008) presents a more accurate 
statement of the law in New York. However, this ignores the facts distinguishing Bi-Economy 
from both Streamline and this matter. First, although plaintiff claims that "the insurance policy 
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was almost identical to the policy in this case," the Bi-Economy case contains very few specific 
policy citations, and makes no discussion of an appraisal provision, which has played a 
significant role in precluding consequential damages in other cases. See, e.g., BUs Day Spa, LLC 
v. The Hartford Ins. Group, 427 F.Supp.2d 621 (2006); accord, Lava Trading Inc. v. Hartford 
Fire Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 2d 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)(barring claim for consequential damages 
under policy containing appraisal provision, not utilized by insured - "The Policy sets forth an 
explicit dispute resolution mechanism, to be conducted by ~ appraiser, that either party may 
invoke in the event of any disagreement as to the amount of loss. There is no evidence in the 
record before me on this motion that [plaintiff-insured] Lava ever sought, or obtained, an 
appraisal award, or indeed made any claim other than that made in January 2002.")(attached). 
Further, the Bi-Economy case involved a bad faith claim, and the Bi-Economy court took 
pains to note that consequential damages were specifically being allowed in light of the nature of 
the action: "in light of the nature and purpose of the insurance contract at issue, as well as Bi-
Economy's allegations that Harleysville breached its duty to act in good faith, we hold that 
Bi-Economy's claim for consequential damages including the demise of its business, was 
reasonably foreseeable and contemplated by the parties[.)" 886 N.E.2d at 132. However, in this 
action, plaintiffs bad faith claims have been dismissed. 
Accordingly, given the factual and legal differences in Bi-Economy, the Streamline 
decision is appropriately considered by the Court, and no consideration of Bi-Economy is 
necessary. 
• The Brown's Tie decision. 
Plaintiff makes little discussion of the Idaho Supreme Court decision in Brown's Tie & 
Lumber Co. v. Chicago Title Co. of Idaho, 115 Idaho 56, 61, 764 P.2d 423, 428 (1988), which 
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rejected a claim for consequential damages which were not specifically contemplated by the 
panies at the time of conLra(.;ling, C1t1 JI;111utlstl'ated by the language of the contract (Epecifically, a 
commitment for title insurance) which limited liability to "actual loss incurred in clearing or 
removing Wll;}U,;c;pkJ cJl~U.lubrA1 .. ees ftot to cHcccd tho omount Ebted in Schedule A." fd Ht 61-
62, 764 P.2d at 428-29. 
Instead, plaintiff again fails to correctly summarize the coverages by the Policy at issue in 
this action, ignoring the limitations of such coverage and the appraisal provision, as discussed 
above. For those reasons, the Court should appropriately consider Brown's Tie in reaching its 
decision on Hartford's Motion. 
• The BUs dec.ision 
Again, plaintiff makes little discussion of holding in Blis Day Spa, LLC v. The Hartford 
Ins. Group, 427 F.8upp.2d 621 (W.D.N.C. 2006), which also upheld the exclusion ofa claim for 
consequential damages, relying, iu pC1lL, Ull tl.lC pvli~y1! A1'l'rni9nl provioion, which, aQ:iin, 
plaintiff fails to address. Plaintiff, instead, claims that Hartford withheld payment without basis. 
A lengthy recitation of the facts Hartford has placed into the record regarding Lakeland's failure 
to document its claim - and Hartford's full payment of those claims that were proven to it - is 
sununary judgment motion and subsequent opposition briefs responding to plaintiff s two 
motions for reconsideration. However, what is relevant to this question is that the Policy 
expressly contemplates delay via the time needed for the parties to calculate and present their 
positions (see, e.g., Counoel Aff., Exh. B, p. 20, ~ection 3.h (immrr:n tn provide information 
within 60 days of request); p. 20, section S.b (Hartford's notice of intent within 30 days after 
statement of loss); p. 22, section g (pay within 30 days after statement of loss if all terms of 
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policy complied with by insured and agreement on value of loss reached or appraisal award 
made)), and also provides for a remedy in the event of a dispute (the appraisal provision). 
Plaintiffs do not cite to any provision in the Policy that requires Hartford to make hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in advance payments based upon incomplete and inadequate information 
provided by the insured. 
Thus, like the policy at issue in BUs, the Policy in this action both disclaims 
consequential losses and provides an appraisal mechanism to address valuation disputes. 427 
F.Supp.2d at 639-40; accord, Lava Trading, 365 F. Supp.2d at 447-48 ("In short, contrary to 
T 11{1' .. nn .. ition thllt thr Polirlr hnnmmr mnnin irlln HHrtfnrn to nnrlrntilnn thilt ilmr nrJilv in 
payment or disagreement with respect to the claim would render it liable for the consequential 
damages sought, the Policy explicitly recognizes that delay (including potential delay of more 
thim three month.,) j" fnrt':~~~ahJ~") Ar.r.nrrlingJy, plflintifrR f1re1Jmr.nt fails. lmd Hartford's 
Motion should be granted. 
B. Lakeland should be precluded from offering any evidence or making any claim for 
claimed expenses or damages at trial, otber. tban with respect to tbe time period at 
issue, November 1, 2008 to January 28, 2009. 
In Hartford's Motion, Hartford sought the exclusion of damages that extended beyond the 
maximum 12 months of coverage afforded under the Policy for Business Income (that is, beyond 
January 28,2009), or, otherwise, to preclude Lakeland from claiming any damages in excess of 
the $54,990 amount-in-controversy identified at Mr. Harper's deposition. 
Plaintiff did not address this argument section of Hartford's Motion and, as such, 
Hartford's Motion on this point should be deemed unopposed. 
c. Lakeland's claims for damages that are not covered under tbe Policy and/or bave 
already been paid sbould also be excluded. 
In Hartford's Motion, Hartford also sought the exclusion of particular items of damages 
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that wore inappropriatoly olaimed; specifically, 1) lost profits foJ' Just Ask Rental, whieh entity is 
actually an assumed business name for the Fritzes and, thus, an unrecoverable personal claim; 2) 
the $16,031 claim for "Unpaid Staff Wages" which have, in fact, been paid by Hartford; and 3) 
any claim for inventory in excess of the $370,000 BPP limit in the Policy. 
Again, plaintiff did not address these argument sections of Hartford's Motion and, as 
such, Hartford's Motion on these points should be deemed unopposed. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, Hartford respectfully requests this Court grant its Motion in Limine Re: 
Damages. 
DATED this.tf= day of February, 2010. 
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Westtaw. 
365 F.Supp.2d 434 
(Cite as: 365 F.Supp.ld 434) 
United States District Court, 
S.D. New York. 
LA VA TRADING INC., Plaintiff, 
v. 
HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, De-
fendant. 
No. OJ CW. 7037(pKC). 
March 30, 2005. 
Background: Insured whose offices were des-
troyed as a result of a terrorist attack sued business 
insurer, seeking a declaratory judgment and seeking 
to recover damages for breach of contract, viola-
tions of the New York State General Business Law, 
and consequential damages as a result of the al-
leged breach. Insurer moved for partial summary 
judgment on consequential damages claim and 
sought order declaring when "period of restoration" 
under policy expired. 
Holdings: The District Court, Castel, l, held that: 
(I) under New York law, "period of restoration" 
ended upon replacement of insured's rental offices, 
not reconstruction of building in which offices had 
been located; 
(2) "property at the described premises" referred to 
business property in rental offices; 
(3) period of restoration ended with respect to in-
sured when it moved into replacement offices and 
construction was completed, not when insured fully 
resumed all obligations; and 
(4) insurer did not assume liability for consequen-
tial damages in event of breach. 
Motions granted in part and denied in part. 
West Headnotes 
11] Insurance 217 ~216J(1) 
2 I 7 Insurance 
217XVr Coverage--Property Insurance 
Page I 
217XVI(A) In General 
217k2139 Risks or Losses Covered and 
Exclusions 
217k2163 Business Interruption; Lost 
Profits 
217k2163(1) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Under New York law, "period of restoration" in 
business interruption insurance coverage ended 
when insured's rental offices, rather than entire 
building in which offices were located, should have 
been repaired, rebuilt, or replaced with reasonable 
speed and similar quality after destruction of build-
ing in terrorist attack. 
(2] Insurance 217 ~2163{1) 
2] 7 Insurance 
217XVI Coverage--Property Insurance 
217XVJ(A) In General 
217k2139 Risks or Losses Covered and 
Exclusions 
217k2163 Business Interruption; Lost 
Profits 
217k2163(l) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Under New York law, "property at the described 
premises" for purposes of period of restoration un-
der business interruption insurance coverage unam-
biguously referred to business personal property 
located in insured's suite of rental offices in build-
ing that was destroyed by terrorist attack, and there-
fore period of restoration ended when insured's 
business property in rental premises should have 
been repaired, rebuilt, or replaced with reasonable 
speed and similar quality. . 
(3) Insurance 217 (:::::;;'>2163(1) 
2 J 7 Insurance 
217XVI Coverage·-Property Insurance 
217XVl(A) In General 
217k2139 Risks or Losses Covered and 
Exclusions 
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Profits 
Cited Cases 
2]7k2163 Business Interruption; Lost 
217k2163( I) k. In General. Most 
Under New York law, purpose of providing busi-
ness interruption coverage only during the ''period 
of restoration" is to provide a limit, where neces-
sary, to the amount of business income recoverable 
in those situations where an insured's ability to re-
store its business income to previous levels may ex-
tend beyond any period during which it reasonably 
"should" repair, rebuild or replace its damaged 
property. 
(4) Insurance 217 €=2163(1) 
217 Insurance 
2]7XVJ Coverage--Property Insurance 
217XVI(A) In General 
217k2139 Risks or Losses Covered and 
Exclusions 
217k2]63 Business Interruption; Lost 
Profits 
217k2 I 63( 1) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Under New York law, period of restoration in busi-
ness interruption coverage was not measured by 
time needed for insured to resume functionally 
equivalent operations at former location or else-
where; such construction would have rendered su-
perfluous extended business income coverage, 
which explicitly provided coverage for the poten-
tially longer period, up to 30 days, that it might 
take to restore operations to condition that would 
have existed if no direct physical loss or damage 
had occurred. 
(5] Insurance 217 ~2Hj3(1) 
217 Insurance 
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217XVI(A) In General 
2]7k2139 Risks or Losses Covered and 
Exclusions 
217k2163 Business Interruption; Lost 
Profits 
Page 2 
217k2163(1} k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Under New York law, period of restoration under 
business interruption coverage of insured, whose 
offices were destroyed in terrorist attack, ended 
when insured moved into replacement offices and 
construction on those offices was completed, not-
withstanding that insured did not yet have fully op-
erational off-site back up center, as off-site back up 
center had not been located at premises that were 
destroyed and coverage did not extend until insured 
again became fully operational. 
(6J Federal Civil Procedure 170A €:=:>2547.1 
l70A Federal Civil Procedure 
170AXVll Judgment 
tion 
] 70AXVII(C) Summary Judgment 
170AXVII(C)3 Proceedings 
170Ak2547 Hearing and Determina-
170Ak2547.1 k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Where the record does not support the assertions in 
a party's statement of facts provided under local 
rule, those assertions should be disregarded and the 
record reviewed independently in summary judg-
ment proceedings. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 
U.S.C.A.; U.S.Dist.Ct.Rules S.D.N.Y., Civil Rule 
56.1. 
(7] Federal Civil Procedure 170A ~2547.1 
170A Federal Civil Procedure 
170AXVII Judgment 
tion 
170AXVTI(C) Summary Judgment 
170AXVIl(C)3 Proceedings 
170Ak2547 Hearing and Determina-
]70Ak2547.1 k. In General. Most 
Citid CJt:II£ 
Statement of facts required by local summary judg-
ment rule is not itself a proper vehicle for making 
factual assertions that are otherwise unsupported by 
the record. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A 
.; U.S.Dist.Ct.Rules S.D.N.Y., Civil Rule 56.1. 
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l]S Damages 
IISIIl Grounds and Subjects of Compensatory 
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IISIII(A) Direct or Remote, Contingent, or 
Prospective Consequences or Losses 
I I SlII(A) I In General 
11Sk21 Natural and Probable Con-
sequences of Breaches of Contract 
I lSk23 k. Under Circumstances 
Within Contemplation of Parties. Most Cited Cases 
Under New York law, in actions for breach of con-
tract, the nonbreaching party may recover such un-
usual or extraordinary damages as were within the 
contemplation of the parties as the probable result 
of a breach at the time or prior to contracting. 
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liS Damages 
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Damages 
J ISI1I(A) Direct or Remote, Contingent, or 
Prospective Consequences or Losses 
IISIll(A)l In General 
Jl5k21 Natural and Probable Con-
sequences of Breaches of Contract 
11Sk23 k. Under Circumstances 
Within Contemplation of Parties. Most Cited Cases 
Under New York law, the availability of con-
sequential damages for breach of contract in a giv-
en case requires an examination of: (l) the particu-
lar contract at issue; (2) whether there has been any 
conscious assumption of liability by a contracting 
party; and (3) whether, by words or deeds, one 
party was reasonably led to believe that the other 
had assumed such liability. 
(10J Insurance 217 ~2I63(1) 
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217XVl Coverage--Property Insurance 
217XVI(A) In General 
217k2139 Risks or Losses Covered and 
Exclusions 
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217k2l63 Business Interruption; Lost 
Profits 
217k2163(1) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Insurance 217 ~3374 
217 Insurance 
217XXVn Claims and Settlement Practices 
2]7XXVll(C) Settlement Duties; Bad Faith 
2]7k3373 Amount and Items Recoverable 
217k3374 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Under New York law, insurer did not asswne liabil-
ity for consequential damages in event of breach of 
its obligations under business intenuption insur-
ance policy, absent any evidence that parties con-
templated, or insurer reasonably warranted. that in-
surer would be liable for such damages; thus, in 
event insurer was found to have breached policy, 
insurer would not be liable for costs insured in-
curred in securing interim funding after destruction 
of its offices or for loss of clients during period of 
nonpayment, particularly where policy contem-
plated substantial delay in payment of claim. 
*436 Finley Harkham, Jeremy J. Flanagan, Ander-
son, Kill, Olick & Oshinsky, PC, New York City, 
Jonathan O. Bauer, Anderson, Kill, et ano., Ne-
wark, NI, for Plaintiff. 
Elizabeth R. Leong, Melissa Faith Savage, Robin-
son & Cole, LLP-NYC, New York City, Rebecca 
Levy-Sachs, Robinson & Cole, LLP, Sarasota, FL, 
Rhonda J. Tobin. Stephen E. Goldman, Wystan M. 
Ackerman, Robinson & Cole, LLP, Hartford, CT, 
for Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
CASTEL, District Judge. 
Plaintiff Lava Trading Inc. ("Lava") has sued de-
fendant Hartford Fire Insurance Company 
("Hartford") under a business insurance policy (the 
"Business Insurance Policy" or "Policy") asserting 
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coverage for certain losses resulting from the ter-
rorist attack of September 11, 200 I. Plaintiff's busi-
ness had been located in One World Trade Center. 
In a March 18, 2004 Memorandum and Order, 326 
F.Supp.2d 434 (SD.N.Y.2oo4), I granted in part 
and denied in part Hartford's motion to dismiss pur-
suant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., holding that 
Lava had adequately pled a claim for consequential 
damages. As I made clear, "it remains to be proven 
... whether the parties contemplated that the type of 
consequential damages alleged to be available here 
would be the likely result of a breach by Hartford, 
as well as whether Lava even suffered any losses 
attributable to Hartford's alleged breach .... " 326 
F.Supp.2d at 443. 
Hartford now moves for partial summary judgment 
dismissing Lava's claim for consequential damages. 
It also seeks a ruling, pursuant to Rule 56( d), 
Fed.R.Civ.P., that the "period of restoration" 
provided for in the Policy ended on April 30, 2002 
and that certain business income losses are not 
covered because they are excluded as consequential 
losses or are speculative. For the reasons set forth 
herein, Hartford's motion for summary judgment 
dismissing Lava's claim for consequential damages 
is granted. Hartford's motion also is granted to the 
extyi'\l thllt it ~~eks il lUIin~ that the "period of res-
toration" ended, at the latest, as of April 30, 2002. 
The Court reserves ruling on the remainder of Hart-
ford's motion. 
*437 Lava's Operqtions FoUC'wing {he Seofember 
I J ;waCK 
Lava was founded in 1999 and sells computer pro-
grams to assist in the electronic trading of equities 
in various equity markets known as Electronic 
Communication Networks (ECNs). Allen Cert. " 
3-4.FNI Lava describes its product as an innovative 
means for equity traders "to take all the information 
from all the ECNs and NASDAQ and put it into 
one computer window that would allow for a ready 
comparison [of the market] for a particular equity." 
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Jd ~ 12. Prior to September II, 2001, Lava main-
tained offices, including a functioning data center, 
on the 83rd floor of One World Trade Center. 
Those offices were destroyed in the terrorist attack 
of September lJ, 2001. As of September 11,2001, 
Lava also maintained a small, "nearly complete ( 1" 
back up location at 75 Broad Street, which was not 
destroyed. Allen Cert. , 15; Complaint ~ 33. As de-
scribed in Lava's Complaint, the 75 Broad Street 
location "was not yet fully operational in that it 
lacked the connectivity necessary for Lava's com-
plete operations." Complaint, 33. 
FN 1. Although the parties appear to dis-
agree as to how best to describe the specif-
ics of Lava's business, see Defs. 56.1 
Statement" 3-4 and Pis. 56.) Response " 
3-4 & pp. 21-23, any such disagreement, 
and a detailed description of Lava's busi-
ness, are not material to the Court's de-
cision on this motion. 
Following the September II attack, Lava converted 
its 75 Broad Street back up facility into a function-
ing data center. After briefly securing temporary of-
fice space at another location, Lava set up tempor-
ary offices at 75 Broad Street in October 2001. 
Complaint ~ 37. According to Lava, these tempor-
flry offir.r.s "hr.rJ'lmr. npr:rntinnl'll on Or.tober ll, 
20ot." ld 
According to internal Lava e-mails, by October 12, 
2001, Lava had resumed operations sufficiently to 
begin conducting live trades. Ackerman Aft't Exh. 
IS. In the words ofT Lava C:hiflf InfonTIllt,'on
h 
Offir.r.r 
Kamran .K.lltleyan, tnlS was accomp IS ed by, 
among other things, "getting a new data center built 
in [Connecticut] as well as building out a totally 
slick data center at 75 Broad St." ld At that time, 
Lava executives believed it would be another 
month (i.e., November 2001) "to get to where we 
were.'" Id As of October 22, 2001, Lava CEO 
Richard Korhammer wrote in an e-mail to Lester 
Gray of Schroder Investment Management that 
"[w]e have Merrill, Lehman, and Carlin trading 
today (We started last Friday). Every week one or 
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two more should be going live." Ackerman Afl't 
Exh. 20 at LKR 107986. On November 14, 2001, 
Lava's CEO wrote in an e-mail to a Bruce Rosenth-
al (whose connection to Lava, if any, is unclear) 
that "[oJur volume is about 25% higher than it was 
before the disaster now. We're back up and run-
ning'" ld. at LKR ] 07748. 
In December 200], Lava signed a lease for office 
space at its present location, 95 Morton Street. 
Complaint ~ 38; Pis. 56.1 Response ~ ] 4. 
On January 8, 2002, Lava, through an independ-
ently retained claims adjuster, submitted a prelim-
inary draft Business Interruption and Extra Expense 
claim for the period September I J, 2001 through 
November 2001 for $933,658.39. Ackerman Aff't 
Exh. ] 2 at LNF 00308, 316. In the preliminary 
claim submission, Lava's independent adjuster also 
stated that "the period of interruption has not been 
determined." ld at LNF 00308. This initial claim 
appears to assert that Lava's projected revenues 
would grow from an estimated $600,000 in Septem-
ber 2001 (based on actual revenues for September 1 
through 11, 2001 of less than $200,000) to "'438 al-
most $350,000,000 in August 2002. ld. at LNF 
00311. Lava has not provided evidence of any 
claim made by it with respect to its alleged losses 
under the Policy other than the preliminary estimate 
of its adjuster. See Pis. 56.1 Response '1f 21. Al-
though Lava states that it submitted a claim to Hart-
ford for approximately $59 million prior to the 
commencement of this litigation (see id), it cites 
only to its Complaint in this action in support of 
that assertion. 
By April 8, 2002, Lava had moved into its new per-
manent location at 95 Morton Street, while its data 
center remained at 75 Broad Street. Defs. 56.1 
Statement & PIs. 56.1 Response '1f 16; Complaint '11 
44. Construction was completed at 95 Morton 
Street on April 22, 2002. Defs. 56.1 Statement, ) 7 
& Exh. A at HFIC 0017; PIs. 56.1 Response' 17. 
The parties appear to dispute when a new back up 
data center in Connecticut was completed. Lava as-
serts that it was "completed and operational some 
PageS 
time after October, 2002" (Complaint ~ 45; bur see 
Ackerman Afft Exh. 15), while Hartford asserts 
that the back up center (which it claims was not ne-
cessary for Lava to be fully operational) was com-
pleted in August 2002 (Defs. 56.1 Statement ~ 18). 
As previously noted, prior to the September I] at-
tack, Lava's then back up facility had not become 
fully operational. 
On December 4, 2002, The Wall Street Journal 
published an article on Lava's resumption of opera-
tions, which Lava posted on its website. Ackerman 
Aft't Exh. 19. In that article, Korhammer is quoted 
as stating that "[o)ur customers were out of service 
[for about a] month and it took about two months 
before we got everyone back up and running to the 
levels [they) were prior to 9/1 1." ld In describing 
Lava's history on its website, Lava states that 
"[w]ithin two months of [September 11] the de-
termined and spirited team regrouped and rebuilt 
their business and data centers ... The company's 
growth continued and in November 2001, it reached 
profitabili ty." Ackerman Atrt Exh. 19 at third page. 
In June 2003, Hartford determined Lava's opera-
tions were suspended for the period September ll, 
200 1 through October 3 I, 2001, quantified Lava's 
business loss during that period and paid Lava over 
$2 million on its claim under the Business Insur-
ance Policy written by Hartford. Ackerman Atrt 
Exh.14. 
Lava alleges that by failing to pay its claim for lost 
business income in December 2001, and by only 
paying for business income losses through October 
31, 2001, Hartford breached the Policy, and as a 
result, Lava "was forced to obtain funding [in 
March 2002] to continue its operations, obtain suit-
able office space, and build a necessary back up 
location." Complaint , 42. Lava appears to claim 
that because of Hartford's delay in payment, it was 
forced to obtain $30 million in financing that it oth-
erwise would have not needed, although it submits 
no evidence on this point. See February 16, 2005 
Tr. at 16-18; Pis. 56.1 Response. Lava asserts that 
its business was not fully restored until a new back 
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up facility was completed in October 2002. Com-
plaint 'lI45; Allen Cert. 
The Policy 
The Business Insurance Policy held by Lava covers 
the period January 12, 2001 through January 12, 
2002. It provides coverage for physical loss or dam-
age to Lava's property, the loss of business income 
caused by a suspension of operations in the wake of 
physical loss or damage to its property, and certain 
extra expenses incurred as a result of such a sus-
pension. As part of its coverage, the Business Insur-
ance Policy provides that Hartford would pay Lava 
"for the actual lO~1i of *439 Rmdnr.'I.'1 lnr.nme you 
sustain due to the necessary suspension of your 
'operations' during the 'period of restoration.' Th e 
suspension must be caused by direct physical loss 
of or damage to property at the described premises 
... caused by or resulting from any Covered Cause 
of Loss." Policy (Bauer Cert. Exh. C) at LA V 
00028. It is coverage under this provision that is at 
issue on this motion. 
Under the Business Insurance Policy, "Operations" 
is defined as ''the type of your business activities 
occurring at the described premises and tenantabil-
ity of the described premises." Policy at LA V 
00039. The Policy defines "period of restoration" as 
" ... the period oftime that: 
(a) begins with the date of direct physical loss or 
damage caused by or resulting from any Covered 
Cause of Loss at the described premises, and 
(b) ends on the date when the property at the de-
scribed premises should be repaired, rebuilt or re-
placed with reasonable speed and similar qual. ity," 
Policy at LA V 00039. 
"Business Income" is defined as "(I) Net Income 
(Net Profit or Loss before income taxes) that would 
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have been earned or incurred; and (2) Continuing 
nonnal operating expenses incurred, including 
payroll." Policy at LA V 00028. 
The Business Insurance Policy also provides cover-
age for "Extended Business Income" for a limited 
period. This coverage pays: 
;'the actual loss of Business Income you incur dur-
ing the period that: 
( 1) Begins on the date property is actually repaired, 
rebuilt or replaced and 'operations' are resumed; 
and 
(2) Ends on the earlier of: 
a) The date you could restore your 'operations' 
with reasonable speed, to the condition that 
would have existed if no direct physical loss or 
damage occurred; or 
b) 30 consecutive days after the date determined in 
(1) above. 
Loss of Business Income must be caused by direct 
physical loss or damage at the described premises 
caused by or resulting from any Covered Cause 
of Loss." Policy at LAV 00029. 
1. SUMMARY ruDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogator-
ies, and admissions on file, together with the affi-
davits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is en-
titled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c). 
In considering a summary judgment motion, the 
Court must "view the evidence in the light most fa-
vorable to the non-moving party and draw all reas-
onable inferences in Jts favor, and may grant sum-
mary judgment only when no reasonable trier of 
fact could find in favor of the nonmoving party." 
Allen v. Coughlin. 64 F.3d 77, 79 (2d Cir.1995) 
(citation and quotation marks omitted); accord 
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Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 106 8.Ct. 1348, 89 
L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). However, when the moving 
party has asserted facts to demonstrate that the non-
moving party's claim cannot be sustained, the op-
posing party must "set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial," and cannot 
rest on "mere allegations or denials" of the facts as-
serted by the movant. Rule 56(e). 
It is the initial burden of a movant on a summary 
judgment motion to come forward with evidence on 
each material *440 element of its ~Iflim Qr defew;. 
demonstrating that it is entitled to relief. The evid-
ence on each material element, if unrebutted, must 
be sufficient to entitle the movant to relief in its fa-
vor, as a matter of law. Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v. 
1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d 
Cir.2004). When the moving party has met this ini-
tial burden and hoa oaaortod facts to den10nstrate 
that the non-moving party's claim cannot be sus-
tained, the opposing party must "set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" 
as to a material fact. A fact is material if it "might 
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing 
law .... " Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 248, 106 8.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 {I 986). 
An issue of fact is genuine "if the evidence is such 
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party." Id. Thus, in order to survive 
summary judgment, plaintiffs must come forth with 
more than a mere scintilla of evidence in support of 
their position; they must come forward with evid-
ence "on which tbe jury could reasonably find for 
the plaintiff" Id at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In the ab-
sence of any genuine dispute over a material fact, 
summary judgment is appropriate. 
II. PERIOD OF RESTORATION 
[1] As noted above, the Policy defines the "period 
of restoration" as ending "when the property at the 
described premises should be repaired, rebuilt or re-
placed with reasonable speed and similar quality." 
Policy at LA V 00039. As a result, there are two is-
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sues that arise on this motion relating to the "period 
of restoration." First, what constitutes the "property 
at the described premises," the potential replace-
ment of which triggers the end of the "period of 
restoration" under the Policy? Though offering dif-
ferent interpretations of the language, neither side 
claims. that the definition of "period of restoration" 
contains an ambiguity material to this dispute. I 
agree that the language is unambiguous and thus it 
raises an issue of contract interpretation, a question 
of law for the Court. See Us. Fire Insurance Co. v. 
General Reinsurance Corp., 949 F.2d 569, 571 (2d 
Cir.' 991) ("(T]hr. rlr.tr.rminlltinn of whr.thr.r (l con. 
tract is ambiguous ... is a threshold question of law 
for the court.") (citation omitted). For the reasons 
discussed below, I conclude that the "period of res-
toration" ends when the property in Lava's 83rtl 
floor offices (and not the entire World Trade Center 
complex or the One World Trade Center building) 
/l1i.:,ul':] lnlvc Lccu ICJ.1I1iICU, n:lJuill ur replaced with 
reasonable speed and similar quality. 
Second, is there any disputed issue of fact as to 
whether the event triggering the end of the "period 
of restoration" has come to pass? For reasons also 
discussed below, J conclude that Hartford has come 
forward with evidence that the date on which the 
property at Lava's 83111 floor offices was replaced 
is, at the latest, April 30, 2002, and that Lava has 
failed to come forward with any evidence to refute 
this date. 
What Constitutes "Property at the Described 
Premises" Under {he Policy? 
[2] Hartford seeks a ruling that the "period of res-
toration" ended when Lava should have replaced its 
business personal property that had been located in 
its offices on the 83 rd floor of] World Trade Cen-
ter at a new location with reasonable speed and 
similar quality. Hartford urges that I construe the 
phrase "property at the described premises" to 
mean the property in Lava's offices on the 83 rtl 
floor of the World Trade Center. Lava contends that 
the phrase "property at the described *441 
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premises" refers to the entire One World Trade 
Center building, and because that building could 
not be rebuilt within the twelve months following 
September 11, 2001, the "period of restoration" 
should be the maximum twelve months (plus 30 
days for certain coverage) permitted under the Policy. 
In support of its argument, Lava relies heavily on 
Duane Reade, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insur-
ance Co., 279 F.Supp.2d 235 (S.D.N.Y.2003), a 
case brought by the owners of a retail store at the 
World Trade Center whose business depended on 
foot traffic by potential customers. On the facts and 
policy language before it, the Court found that the 
term "property" in the applicable period of restora-
tion provision unambiguously referred to "the spe-
cific premises at which Duane Reade operated its 
WTC store." Id at 238. The ruling implicitly turned 
on the contracting parties' understanding of the ne-
cessity of a walk-in consumer popUlation to the 
success of a retail operation. The Court rejected as 
"untenable" the very argument Lava makes here-
that the period of restoration "must be coterminous 
with the time actually required to rebuild the entire 
complex that will replace the Word Trade Center." 
Id at 239. 
Here, the "described premises" in the Policy is 
Lava's suite of offices on the 83n1 floor of the 
World Trade Center.PN2 If, as Lava suggests, this 
Court were to adopt a construction of "property" 
similar to that in the Duane Reade case-that is, that 
the term "property" itself refers to the specific 
premises at which Lava operated-the phrase 
"property at the described premises" would be re-
dundant. I decline to adopt such an interpretation. 
FN2. Although the 22nd floor of 75 Broad 
Street appears to have been added to the 
Policy as a covered location for certain 
purposes, see Policy at LA V 0014, Lava is 
not arguing that 75 Broad Street should be 
considered part of the "described 
premises" for purposes of the issues before 
the Court on Ihis motion. 
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Nor do I find the Second Circuit's recent decision in 
Zurich American Insurance Co. v. ABM Industries, 
Inc., 397 F.3d 158 (2d Cir.200S) controlling in this 
case. In Zurich American, the Second Circuit held 
that the insured-which provided janitorial, lighting 
and engineering services throughout the World 
Trade Center complex pursuant to a contract with 
the Port Authority-was entitled to swnmary judg-
ment on the issue of whether, under the policy at is-
sue, it had an "insurable interest" in the common 
areas and premises of the other tenants in the World 
Trade Center. The Second Circuit found that "[t]he 
existence and configuration of the common areas 
and tenants' premises were vital to the execution of 
ABM's business purpose ... [and] were the means 
by which ABM derived its income .... " 397 FJd at 
165-66. For similar reasons, the Second Circuit 
found that ABM was entitled to coverage for areas 
of the World Trade Center that were not part of 
ABM's own offices, but that ABM "occupied" by 
its use of the space, even though ABM did not have 
a legal interest in the space. Id at ] 66-67. The 
Zurich American decision turned on the policy lan-
guage and unique facts of a business dependent 
upon providing services to other tenants. 
Lava's Policy specifically provides that there is "no 
coverage" for the "building." Policy at LA V 002 
(Declarations). Here, the "premises" covered by the 
Policy is specified-suite 8369 of One World Trade 
Center. Id (In its "Iocation/building rating detail," 
the Policy even appears to indicate the square foot-
age of the covered space-7S00 square feet. Id at 
LA V 008) In *441Streamline Capital, L.L.C. v. 
Hartford Casualty Insurance Co., 2003 WL 
22004888, at *9 (S.DN.Y. Aug.2S, 2003), the 
Court held, under identical policy language, that the 
phrase "property at the described premises" re-
ferred to the insured's business personal property 
located in its rented office suite. The Court found 
that the "described premises" under the policy was 
the insured's office suite on the specified floor of 
One World Trade Center, and not the entire build-
ing. The Court concluded that the "period of restor-
ation" therefore should end when the insured's busi-
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ness personal property in its World Trade Center 
offices should have been repaired, rebuilt or re-
placed with reasonable speed and similar quality. 
I find the reasoning of the Streamline decision per-
suasive in this case. As the Court concluded, "[i)t is 
wholly unreasonable to think that the period of res-
toration should be tied to the rebuilding of real 
property over which neither the insured nor the in-
Rllrr,r MflIt IIny ...... ntrl'll, in5t .... 3d of ly ih~ jl (u it IJIl ... 
cess that the plaintiff controlled: the acquisition of 
replacement office space and the installation of the 
plaintiffs personal property in that space." 2003 
WL 22004888, at *8. Nothing in the Hartford train-
ing materials relied upon by Lava supports a differ-
ent conclusion. See, e.g., Bauer Cert. Exh. E at 
HCAS 2560 (noting that "the direct physical dam-
age must be at the 'described premises' " and 
providing an example of damage elsewhere in a 
building that would not give rise to coverage for a 
premises that was described as "10 State Street-
Unit 80]" as opposed to simply "to State Street"). 
Two points of clarification are in order. First, al-
though I agree that the Policy does not tie the 
"period of restoration" to the rebuilding of One 
World Trade Center, and that the phrase "property 
at the described premises" refers to property loc-
ated in Lava's rented office suite, I refrain from rul-
ing whether the coverage for such property could 
ever include property other than the insured's busi· 
ness personal property at the "described premises." 
There does not appear to be any claim that any 
property other than Lava's business personal prop-
erty is at issue. It suffices to rule that the "period of 
restoration" end s when the property at Lava's 83rd 
floor offices should have been repaired, rebuilt or 
repJaced with reasonable speed and similar quality. 
(3] Second, I do not read the Streamline decision to 
have ruled, as defendants suggest, that ''the period 
of restoration concludes by the time plaintiff should 
have been able to reestablish its operations, either 
at the World Trade Center site or in some other loc-
ation." Defs. Br. at 12 (quoting Streamline, 2003 
WL 22004888, at *7). The Court's holding was de-
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cidedly narrower: the "period of restoration" ends 
when the property necessary to resume operations 
should have been repaired, rebuilt or replaced with 
reasonable speed and similar quality, and not when 
operations have been actually resumed, whether to 
their pre-loss levels or otherwise. The unambiguous 
definition of "period of restoration" does not look 
to the resumption of a policyholder's "operations" 
as a measuring stick. It looks to "when the property 
:d the utI.:t:ribwd prllmi!:1I1l Ehould bll rllpllirod, robullt 
or replaced." The purpose of providing coverage 
only during the "period of restoration" is to provide 
a limit, where necessary, to the amount of business 
income recoverable in those situations where a poli-
cyholder's ability to restore its business income to 
previous levels may extend beyond any period dur-
ing which the policyholder reasonably "should" re-
pair, rebuild or replace its damaged property. See, 
e.g., Business Interruption Insurance Current Is-
sues, 702 Prat..iicing Law Institute/Litigation 233, at 
253·54 (2004) ("The theoretical period [of restora-
tion] is the length of time needed to replace or re-
pair the damaged property in *443 the exercise of 
due diligence and dispatch ... Thus, the insured will 
not recover for any additional contingent business 
interruption loss beyond the theoretical period in 
the absence of expanded ... coverage. The theoretic-
al period can terminate while the insured is still los-
ing sales."); see also Duane Reade, 279 F.Supp.2d 
at 239. FNl 
FN3. Of course, the reverse is also true: a 
policyholder's business income claim could 
end on the date that It actually resumes 
"operations," even if that event happens 
prior to the end of the theoretical period of 
restoration. Although the evidence on this 
motion suggests that Lava may well have 
resumed its operations prior to April 30, 
2002, Hartford has not sought summary 
judgment on this basis. 
[4] Thus, I disagree with Lava's assertion that the 
"period of restoration" should be measured by ''the 
time needed for the policyholder to resume fune-
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tionally equivalent operations"-whether at its 
former location or elsewhere (Lava Br. at 5). Such a 
result would be contrary to the unambiguous defini-
tion of "period of restoration," and would render 
superfluous the provision for Extended Business In-
coma Covorage, whioh ollplieitly I'rovides ~o'VerA~e 
for thc potentially longer-i.e., "eXlemJIaI"-pt:rimJ, 
up to 30 days, that it may take to "restore [the in-
~\lr~g'~l OUf¥fUtiQO:l III to the I:onrlition thllt wOllin 
have existed if no direct physical loss or damage 
occurred." See also Pis. 56.J Counterstatement p. 
30 (quoting Hartford training materials that note 
that "the Extended [Business Interruption] Period 
often begins immediately after the Period of Restor-
ation ends. The two periods do not overlap."); 
Duane Reade, 279 F.Supp.2d at 239 (any losses 
continuing beyond the "hypothetical ... (as opposed 
to actual) time for rebuilding ... would be addressed 
by the 'Extended Recovery Period' provision in tbe 
Policy."). 
Is There a Triable Factual Dispute as to Whether 
the "Period of Restoration" Extended Beyond April 
30, 2002? 
[5J Having construed the Policy language "property 
at the described premises" to mean the property in 
Lava's 83 111 floor offices, the question remains 
whether Lava has succeeded in raising any genuine 
issue of material fact as to when that property 
should havc been repaired, rebuilt or l'epllb::eJ, 
thereby ending the "period of restoration." Hartford 
has come forward with evidence that Lava had re-
placed the property at in its 83'" Floor offices when 
construction was completed and Lava occupied its 
new location, 95 Morton Street, which was, at the 
latest, by April 30, 2002. See Defs. 56.1 Statement 
Ti 16-18. Plaintiff does not dispute these facts. See 
Pis. 56.1 Response n 16-18 and Counterstatement 
p. 28 (stating that Lava moved into 95 Morton 
Street on April 5, 2002 and that construction was 
completed on April 22). 
As I read Lava's opposition papers, the only factual 
issue it seeks to raise is whether Lava had fully re-
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stored its operations as of April 30, 2002. And the 
only fact Lava points to in this regard is that its 
Connecticut back up data center was not fully oper-
ational by this date. See Allen Cert. Ti 20-30; Pis. 
56.1 Response , 18; Pis. 56.1 Counterstatement pp. 
25-29. A:;:.uuailll;; {i:ll> I Jv} L1111l L"vl1 lau::! rcll::!l::d i:I 
genuine dispute over this fact, I conclude it is not 
material to a determination of when the "period of 
m"tnriltinn" t'nnrn 'ny IOhnrtrnm inn of T 1,,1'r naUt 
back up data center cannot serve to extend the 
"period of restoration. II As I have ruled, the "period 
of restoration" is measured by when the property 
that was in the "described premises"-Lava's 83nl 
Floor offices-should have been repaired, replaced 
or rebuilt, and not by the resumption of operations. 
*444 Rather than disputing that this was accom-
plished by April 30, 2002, Lava argues only that it 
needed a fully functional back up data center to be 
fully operational, and that its Connecticut back up 
center was not fully functional until the fall or 
winter of 2002. But before September II, 2001, 
Lava's back up data center was not part of the 
"described premises"-it was several blocks away. 
Therefore, the time it took to rebuild the off-site 
back up center is not included within the "period of 
restoration." For the reasons I have fully discussed, 
the point in time when Lava fully resumed all oper-
ations, including those not originally within the 
"described premises," is immaterial to the issue of 
when the "period of restoration" ended. Because 
Lava offers no evidence to contradict Hartford's 
liilvwiug lhi:!l thl:: "pl::riud of rl::slurittiun" should end, 
at the latest, on April 30, 2002, Hartford is entitled 
to a ruling in its favor on this issue. See Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 
("Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary 
will not be counted."); Knight v. US. Fire Insur-
ance Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11-12 (2d Cir.1986) ("[T]he 
mere existence of factual issues-where those issues 
are not material to the claims before the court-will 
not suffice to defeat a motion for summary judg-
ment.") (citation omitted; alteration in original). 
{6][7] Although not material, Lava has. failed in any 
event to create any factual dispute as to whether a 
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fully functioning back up center was necessary for 
Lava's operations. Lava sets forth no evidence in 
opposition to that portion of Hartford's 56.1 State-
ment addressing the back up data center and its date 
of completion. Instead, Lava states simply that 
"Hartford's entire statement is argument" and that 
"Lava did indeed have a back up center prior to the 
loss as required by several of its clients." Pis. 56.1 
Response -U 18. But characterization and conclusory 
description do not create a triable issue of fact See 
Patterson v. County of Oneida. 375 F.3d 206, 219 
(2d Cir.2004) (opposing party may not create a 
genuine issue of fact "merely by the presentation of 
assertions that are conclusory"). Nor is "a Local 
Rule 56.1 statement ... itself a [proper] vehicle for 
making factual assertions that are otherwise unsup-
ported by the record. Where ... the record does not 
support the assertions in a Local Rule 56.1 state-
ment, those assertions should be disregarded and 
the record reviewed independently." Holtz v. Rock-
efeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 74 (2d Cir.2001).FN4 
FN4. The Certification of Lava's Chief Op-
erating Officer, Charles C. Allen, cited in 
support of Lava's response to paragraph 18 
of Hartford's 56.1 statement-which appears 
to address technical difficulties at 75 
Broad Street after September 11 unconnec-
ted to the damage to Lava's property at the 
premises covered in the Policy-does not in 
fact address the facts in the cited para-
graph. See Allen Cert. 1 28. 
Indeed, Lava's Chief Operating Officer acknow-
ledges that as of September II, 2001, the 75 Broad 
Street back up center was only "nearing comple-
tion" (Allen Cert. , 27) and the facility's servers 
were not installed. Jd , 24 (noting that "the com-
pletion of the [75 Broad Street] data center was ... 
90 days away"). See also Pis. 56.1 Response , 2 
(admitting that as of September II, 2001, construc-
tion at 75 Broad Street was not complete). The Al-
Ien Certification also acknowledges that Lava's cus-
tomers do not require a completed data center in or· 
der to do business with Lava. Allen Cert. , 25 
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(attesting that customers "insisted that Lava have a 
backup data center that was near completion before 
doing business with Lava"). In short, nothing in 
Lava's response to Hartford's 56.1 statement with 
respect to the role and functioning of Lava's off-site 
back *445 up data center creates any genuine issue 
of material fact as to the appropriate end date of the 
"period of restoration." 
III. CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES 
In addition to all sums that it alleges are due and 
owing uilder the Policy, Lava seeks as 
"consequential damages," inter alia, the following: 
(1) costs to secure funding which should have been 
provided by Hartford; (2) damages resulting from 
the alleged loss of clients; and (3) damages result· 
ing from the alleged loss of future business growth. 
At the pleading stage, I denied Hartford's motion to 
dismiss. The parties have now had a full opportun-
ity to conduct discovery and Hartford moves for 
summary judgment. 
[8][9] In Keriford Co. v. County of Erie. 73 N.Y.2d 
312, 540 N.Y.S.2d I, 537 N.E.2d ]76 (1989) (" 
Kenford Il "), the New York Court of Appeals held 
that "[i]t is well established that in actions for 
breach of contract, the nonbreaching party may re-
cover ... such unusual or extraordinary damages 
[as] have been brought within the contemplation of 
the parties as the probable result of a breach at the 
time or prior to contracting." Jd at 319, 540 
N.Y.S.2d J, 537 N.E.2d 176 (citations omitted). In 
order to determine what damages are reasonably 
contemplated by the parties, "the nature, purpose 
and particular circumstances of the contract known 
by the parties should be considered ... as well as 
'what liability the defendant fairly may be supposed 
to have assumed consciously, or to have warranted 
the plaintiff reasonably to suppose that it assumed. 
when the contract was made.' " Jd (citations omit-
ted; emphasis added); see also Trademark Re.vearch 
Corp. v. Maxwell Online, Inc., 995 F.2d 326, 
332-33 (2d Cir.1993) (finding that plaintiff had 
"failed to establish its lost future profits with the 
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degree of certainty required by Kenford r 1 ... ami 
has failed to establish that liability for such dam-
ages were contemplated by the parties at the time of 
contracting."). As the quoted language makes clear, 
the availability of consequential damages in a given 
case requires an examination of: (I) the particular 
contract at issue; (2) whether there has been any 
conscious assumption of liability by a contracting 
party; and (3) whether, by words or deeds. one 
party was reasonably led to believe that the other 
had mum", riLl,h liflhililY, Thllli. 1111 inniroiltr.d in 
my prior rulings on the subject. the Court in Ken-
ford 1/ looked to whether there was a "provision in 
the contract" or "any evidence in the record to 
demonstrate that the parties, at any relevant time. 
reasonably contemplated or would have contem-
plated that the [defendant] was undertaking a con-
tractual responsibility" for the consequential dam-
ages sought by the plaintiff. KeJiford II. 73 N.Y.2d 
at 320, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1. 537 N.E.2d 176 (emphasis 
added); see also Trademark Research Corp., 995 
F.2d at 334 (finding that "[t]he record contains no 
specific evidence that. at the time of contracting, 
[rlr:fr:nrlant] IIl~cepted liability for nine years of Im:t 
profits. No evidence was offered that the parties 
ever discussed lost profits liability."). 
In order to prevail, Lava is required to .. 'establish 
that liability for [the consequential damages sought] 
were contemplated by the parties at the time of con-
tracting.' ., Lava Trading Inc. v. Hartford FIre In-
surance Co., 2004 WL 943565, at "2 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 3, 2004) (quoting Trademark Research Corp., 
995 F.2d at 332-33). Plaintiff must present evidence 
"of 'whnt the I'lU'ties would l,avG G6JI.:.luJ"J t. .. J 
they considered the subject,' or that, in light of the 
parties' discussions on the subject, one party would 
have been led to believe that the other was assum-
ing liability for such damages." Id 
*446 [10] On its motion for summary judgment, 
Hartford has pointed to a lack of any such evidence. 
and has presented evidence that neither it nor 
plaintiff contemplated that Hartford would be liable 
for consequential damages in the event of a breach. 
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"In moving for summary jnrlemr:nt Re:RinSt a party 
who will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, 
the movant's burden will be satisfied if he can point 
to an absence of evidence to support an essential 
element of the nonmoving party's claim." Goenaga 
v. March of Dimes Birth Defoe's Fdn., 51 F.3d 14, 
18 (2d Cir.1995); see also Gallo v. Prudential Res-
idential Services, L.P .. 22 F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (2d 
Cir.J994) ("[TJhe moving party may obtain sum-
mary judgment by showing that little or no evid-
ence mil)' 00 found in £upport of tho nonmo\'iftg 
party's case."). "In other words, the moving party 
does not bear the burden of disproving an essential 
element of the nonmoving party's claim." Bussa v. 
Alitalfa Linee Aeree llaliane. S.pA, 2004 WL 
1637014. at "'3 (S.D.N.Y. Ju1.21, 2004). In light of 
Hartford's initial showing that there is no evidence 
that the parties contemplated, or that Hartford reas-
onably warranted, that Hartford would be liable for 
the consequential damages sought here in the event 
of a breach of the Policy. the burden shifts to Lava 
to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial," and it cannot rest on "mere 
nlleglltionn or denillls" of thc facts assertGd by th~ 
movant. Rule 56(e). Fed.R.Civ.P. 
In opposition to Hartford's motion, Lava points 
only to internal Hartford documents demonstrating 
that Hartford was aware of the reasons why people 
buy business interruption coverage. and the import-
ance of resolving such claims promptly to minimize 
actual lost income. Thus, Lava quotes from certain 
training materials that acknowledge that when a 
business is experiencing downtime, its net earnings 
!IItly Lc i1.I1'e"lcd, tllld lhi1l swift ucdon on me pan of 
the insurer may be beneficial to the policy holder. 
Lava also relies on certain advertising material~ in 
which, it asserts, Hartford touts-the type of policy at 
issue as security against "unexpected loss [ J 
wip[ing] out your bottom line" (Bauer Exh. I at 
HCAS 02545) and claims that "you simply can't af-
ford to be caught short on insurance protection" 
(Bauer Exh. K at HCAS 02539). Lava also relies on 
certain statements from Hartford claim adjuster 
Peter Pollicino, who acknowledged, not surpris-
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ingly, that a lack of insurance coverage could "be 
JctlJly tv It bUlilne5s" and/or "wIpe out .. a ousmess 
financially. Bauer Cert. Exh. L at 471. 
None of this "evidence," however, creates a genu-
ine issue of material fact as to whether Hartford 
was assuming liability for consequential damages 
in the event of a breach. The evidence adduced by 
Lava simply illustrates the rather unremarkable pro-
position that business interruption insurance is 
meant to insure against loss of business income and 
other expenses, and that if a company does not have 
such insurance, they stand the risk of financial con-
sequences if they are not otherwise prepared. It is a 
significant leap of reasoning to conclude from this 
that Hartford understood that it would be liable for 
the consequential damages sought here, or was war-
ranting to Lava that it would be so liable. No reas-
onable jury could conclude otherwise. 
Of course, New York law also requires that the 
Court consider "the nature, purpose and particular 
circumstances of the contract known by the parties" 
in determining whether consequential damages are 
available. Keriford I/, 73 N.Y.2d at 319, 540 
N. Y.S.2d I, 537 N.E.2d 176. The Appellate Divi-
sion, Third Department, has held that "[t]he very 
purpose of business interruption coverage would 
makedefendant*447 aware that if it breached the 
policy it would be liable to plaintiffs for damages 
for the loss of their business as a consequence of its 
breach or made it possible for plaintiffs reasonably 
to suppose that defendant assume such damages 
when the contract was made." Sabbeth Industries 
Ltd v. Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mutual Insur-
ance Co., 238 A.D.2d 767, 769, 656 N.Y.S.2d 475 
(3d Dep't I 997). But in Sabbeth, the insurer dis-
claimed any coverage under the policy, and 
plaintiff sought the "lost value of its business" and 
other damages. It is not clear from the Court's opin-
ion which of these losses would have been due un-
der the policy had the insurer met its obligations. 
Certainly, if an insurer breaches its policy, it should 
expect to be liable for covered losses under the 
policy. But most importantly, Sabbeth was decided 
Page ]3 
in the context of a motion to dismiss. As in Sab-
beth, 1 denied Hartford's motion to dismiss and 
have given Lava the opportunity to prove its allega4 
tions. This plaintiff's "consequential damage" claim 
fails because there is no evidencc to stippOi't it. 
Nothing in the Policy before me would lead either 
the insured or the insurer to understand that the in-
surer, in the event of breach, would be liable for 
costs to secure funding that should have been 
provided by Hartford, the loss of clients or the loss 
of future business growth. Lava relies on language 
in the Policy itself that provides, for example, that 
there is no dollar limit for business interruption 
coverage, which is limited only by a maximum of 
twelve months plus thirty days. Policy at LA V 0028 
& 0029. From this provision, and the fact that the 
Policy was designed to pay Lava for certain eX 4 
penses and lost income during the period it could 
not operate (up to a maximum of 13 months), Lava 
extrapolates that "[b Joth parties understood ... that 
Lava's lost income would be greater if (1) business 
interruption coverage were denied or delayed; or 
(2) of the Period of Restoration were miscalculated 
or abbreviated by Hartford's own wrongdoing; and 
(3) that Hartford would be responsible for paying 
the costs of its delay or wrongdoing." Lava Br. at 
18. Lava's conclusion, however, does not foHow 
from the cited Policy provisions. Indeed, it is un-
dermined by the fact that the Policy contemplates 
substantial delay in payment, during which time 
both the insured and the insurer presumably are as-
sessing the losses, the insured is submitting its 
claim, and any differences between the insured and 
insurer are resolved. See Policy at LA V 0035-0038 
(providing, inter alia, that the insurer will pay for a 
covered loss within 30 days of receiving the signed 
statement of loss only if (1) the insured has com-
plied with all of the terms of the Policy and (2) the 
insured and the insurer have agreed upon the 
amount of the loss or an appraisal award has been 
made). Thus, the Policy contemplates that a period 
of at least 90 days may pass before Hartford indic-
ates its intentions with respect to a claim, and con-
templates payment within 90 days (or less) of a 
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covered loss only if the insured has complied with 
all the terms of the Policy and the insured and in-
surer have reached an agreement as to the amount 
of the loss or "an appraisal award has been made." 
Id The Policy sets forth an explicit dispute resolu-
tion mechanism, to be conducted by an appraiser, 
that either party may invoke in the event of any dis-
agreement as to the amount of loss. Id at LA V 
0036. (There is no evidence in the record before me 
on this motion that Lava ever sought, or obtained, 
an appraisal award, or indeed made any claim other 
than that made in January 2002. See PIs. 56.1 Re-
sponse , 21.) In short, contrary to Lava's position 
that the Policy language would lead Hartford to un-
derstand that any delay in payment or disagreement 
"'448 with respect to the claim would render it li-
able for the consequential damages sought, the 
Policy explicitly recognizes that delay (including 
potential delay of more than three months) is fore-
seeable. 
Although the Policy language may have a direct 
bearing on whether damages sought were within the 
contemplation of the parties, it is not necessarily 
controlling on the issue. Lava Trading Inc. v. Hart-
Tara ./'ire insurance Co., 326 F.Supp.2d 434, 442 
(S.D.N.Y.2004). I have considered the Policy ex-
clusions and payment provisions cited by Lava in 
support of its contention that liability for con-
sequential damages are contemplated by the Policy, 
as well as the entirety of the Policy, and conclude 
they, either alone or in conjunction with other evid-
ence, do not raise a genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether the parties contemplated consequential 
damages of the kind and character sought. 
The loss of business income that arises from a 
covered loss such as the destruction of the World 
Trade Center was, indeed, contemplated by the 
parties. That was the purpose of the contract of in-
surance. But, with the benefit of the full summary 
judgment record before me, I conclude that the con-
sequential damages that this plaintiff seeks were 
not contemplated as a foreseeable consequence of a 
breach of Hartford's duty to pay under the Policy. 
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The parties knew that Hartford would be liable for 
the sums paid and they knew that if those sums 
were not paid, Hartford would be liable for simple 
interest at 9% per annum from the date of the 
breach. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5001 & 5004 
(McKinney's 1992 & 2005 Supp.); Feb. 16, 2005 
Tr. at 18. In response to Hartford's motion, Lava 
has failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to wheth-
er anything further was contemplated. 
CONCLUSION 
Hartford's motion for summary judgment dismiss-
ing Lava's claim for consequential damages is 
GRANTED. On Hartford's motion, I conclude un-
der Rule 56(d), Fed.R.Civ.P., that the following 
fact "appear[s] without substantial controversy": 
the "period of restoration" ended no later than April 
30,2002. 
Hartford has also moved for summary judgment on 
the grounds that the damages sought by Lava are 
excluded under the Policy or are too speculative to 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
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THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV -08-7069 
AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING RE 
DEFENDANT'S. MOTION TO STRIKE 
RE: DAMAGES, OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE SECOND MOTION TO 
COMPEL, AND REQUEST FOR FEES 
AND COSTS 0 \L-
Date: March 9, 2010 
Time: 1:00 p.m. 
The Hon. John T. Mitchell, Presiding 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that defendant, the Hartford Fire Insurance 
Company, by and through its counsel, Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., will bring on for 
hearing its Motion to Strike Re: Damages, or in the Alternative Second Motion to Compel, and 
Request for Fees and Costs before the above-entitled Court on Tuesday, March 9, 2010. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE RE: 
DAMAGES, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE SECOND MOTION TO COMPEL, AND REQUEST 
FOR FEES AND COSTS· 1 
210U 
commencing at 1 :00 p.m., at the Kootenai County Courthouse before the Honorable John T. 
Mitchell. 
DATED thiS~ay of February, 2010. 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & 
BLANTON, P.A. 
" 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the dday of February, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of 
the following; 
Arthur M. Bistline 
Law Offices of Arthur M. Bistline 
1423 N. Government Way 
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83814 
Fax: 208/665-7290 
IZI U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
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THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-08-7069 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
SECOND MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
BASED UPON written motion and argument thereon, and for the reasons as stated on the 
record at the time of the hearing held on February 22, 2010, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs Second Motion for Reconsideration, filed 
February 4,2010, is DENIED. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1 
2110 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this lb f\..; day of February, 2010. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~l; day of February, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of 
the following: 
Arthur M. Bistline 
Law Offices of Arthur M. Bistline 
1423 N. Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Keely E. Duke 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & 
BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
;&' U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid o Hand Delivered o Overnight Mail 
o Telecopy 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid o Hand Delivered 
o Overnight Mail o Telecopy 
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THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-08-7069 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE 
ORDER 
BASED UPON written motion and argument thereon, and for the reasons as stated on the 
record at the time of the hearing held on February 22, 2010, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Protective Order, filed 
December 30, 2009, is DENIED. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 1 
2112 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this ;26~ay of February, 2010. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the.2k day of February, 20ID, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of 
the following: 
Arthur M. Bistline 
Law Offices of Arthur M. Bistline 
1423 N. Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Keely E. Duke 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & 
BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
o Hand Delivered o Overnight Mail o Telecopy 
~U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid o Hand Deli vered 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF KOO A 
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THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF 
ROBERT E. UNDERDOWN 
BASED UPON written motion and argument thereon, and for the reasons as stated on the 
record at the time of the hearing held on February 22, 2010, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Robert E. 
Underdown, filed February 16,2010, is GRANTED. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT E. 
UNDERDOWN - 1 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DA TED this J Gf-aay of February, 2010. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the & day of February, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of 
the following: 
Arthur M. Bistline 
Law Offices of Arthur M. Bistline 
1423 N. Government Way 
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83814 
Keely E. Duke 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & 
BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
,¥U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
D Telecopy 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
D Telecopy 
Cler of the Court 
~
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT E. 
UNDERDOWN - 2 
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Keely E. Duke 
ISB #6044; ked@hallfarley.com 
Bryan A. Nickels 
ISB #6432; ban@hallfarley.com 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W:\3\3-472.9\Amend Complaint Punitive Damages-ORDER.doc 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV -08-7069 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
BASED UPON written motion and argument thereon, and for the reasons as stated on the 
record at the time of the hearing held on February 22, 2010, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint, filed February 
11,2010, is DENIED. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT- 1 
211(j 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this $rlay of February, 2010. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the !JJf.t; day of February, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of 
the following: 
Arthur M. Bistline 
Law Offices of Arthur M. Bistline 
1423 N. Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Keely E. Duke 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & 
BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
)s;(j/u .S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
-0 Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
D Telecopy 
~U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
D Telecopy 
Cler of the Court 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT- 2 
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ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
LAW OFFICE OF ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
1423 N. Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 665-7270 
(208) 665-7290 (fax) 
ISB: 5216 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2010 f,tR -5 PM l,: 56 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE, Case No: CV-08-7069 
L.L.C., 
FFIDA VIT OF DAN HARPER IN SUPPORT 
Plaintiff, F MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE 
vs. 
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
I, Dan Harper, having been first duly sworn, upon oath depose and state that: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen (18) and a resident of Spokane County, Washington; 
2. I am familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding this matter and am 
competent to testify as to the matters herein contained; 
3. I am employed at Harper, Inc.; 
4. Attached is a true and correct copy of my analysis of True Value Hardware's 
Employees' claims. 
DATED this 5±h-day of March, 2010. 
AFFIDA VIT OF DAN HARPER 
- ] 
211U 




SUBSCRIBED AND S WORN to before me this 0B- day of March, 2010. 
NOTARY JBLIC III and for Washm~ton 
Residing at: _~Dt.fA.h.L . -
Commission Expires: (O/20/2.DI ( 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAN HARPER 
-2 
211f) 
1 hereby certify that on the S-th day of March, 2010, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Keely E. Duke 
Bryan A. Nickels 
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A. 
PO Box 1271 
Boise, ID 83701-1271 
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March 5, 2010 
Mr. Arthur Bistline 
Bistline Law 
1423 N. Government Way 
Coeur d Alene, ID 83814 
Re: Lakeland v Hartford 
Dear Mr. Bistline: 
INCORPORATE) 
i:nrensit.' /\~l OI.Wliillh 
V:lIllati')lI Advl',)rS <\: 
'l~'stiryil'~~ FUHh)lIlic' Expcrh 
J have reviewed the documents and conespondence produced in this case as it relates to 
the on-going Lakeland True Value staff payroll, which excludes the Fritz's wages/draws. 
Based on this review ofthe records I have reached the following opinions. 
Opinion l-Harrford was Timely Provided lhe NecessOlY b?formalion fO Reasonably 
Estimate and Fund the Staff Payroll on a Contemporaneous Basis. 
Harford had received the monthly Lakeland statements of income by fax dated March 5, 
2008. These statements listed the actual monthly staff payroll and payroll taxes for 2007 
(MDD000428-MDD000449) (Exhibit A). In my opinion the same month prior year 
actual staff payroll expense provided a reasonable basis for Hartford to fund these costs 
on a contemporaneous basis. Any over or shOli funding, when compared to the 
subsequent actual, could have been adjusted for in the next month. 
Opinion 2-The Actual Amounts Paid to the Store StajJwere lvlaleriaf(v Less than the 
Prior Year Due to Harrford's Lack o.fTimely Funding. 
Hartford had been informed by Mr. Fritz on March 13, 2008 that he was planning on 
continuing the entire payroll during the period of restoration (1-100017) (Exhibit B). 
Hartford had been timely provided the information they needed to not only estimate and 
fund the staff payroll currently but also fund the monthly lost store income. J 
Hartford's delinquent funding of the continuing staff payroll and monthly lost store 
income caused Mr. Fritz to make financial cuts or reductions to the normal continuing 
staff wages (Exhibit C). 
I E-mail fi'om Ms. Kale indicating she had received the MDD report of loss (HOOOO 18). 
hO/ }-FtcS1 lHlIill t1Velllle •. ,>'uire 8/./ 
,)'pokallc, HA 992(J/ 
e-/II(/I/: //(/ IjH' n Ill.' (if) C{'iil/C. ljit' rI, 1"0111 
It:('hsi II': H'l\ 'IV,{'(IJI1f",l/'('I'I, (. (Jill 
51J1) 747.5850, fAX j(J<;.747.,SS5') 
2121 
Mr. Arthur Bistline 
Re: Lakeland v Hartford 
March 5, 2010 
Page 2 
The employees that would have otherwise received their normal wages were damaged to 
the extent they were not able to find a replacement job. 
I have computed the difference between what the Lakeland employees were actually paid 
in 2008 and 2009 and what they likely would have been paid if the store had remained 
fully open and each had remained employed at the store during those time frames. These 
amounts total $114,128.78 (Exhibit D). 
Very truly yours, 
HARPER INCORPORATED 
~ \\ , 
. DanieIJ.~p~ MBA 
djh/sjh 
s: Bistline re staff payroll damages 3·5·1 O.d.doc 
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Per Insurance Policy·-Continuing Normal Payroll Expenses Will Be Reimbursed 











July $ 15.518 Hartford Received this Normal PayroIT Information 'I', 
by Fax on March 5, 2008 
August $ 17,042 
, l 
i Sept $ 15.152 I 
i 
I 
October $ 22 ,337 
i 
, November $ 14,084 I 
~ ! 
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time of construction. 

















Hartford Payroll Payments Were Delinquent in all but 2 Months after the Roof 
Collapse From Feb 2008 to Oct 2008 
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Hartford Computed Combined Lost Income and Payroll Costs 
Compared to Actual Hartford Payments Reveal a $80,000 Deficiency 
Preventing the Store from Opening In October 2008 
$300,000 
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Paid Report Shortage Report Shortage 
EmQlo~ee Name 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009 
James Ahlman 21,090.75 12,516.00 (8,574.75) 9,205.88 (11,884.87) 
Carolyn Beard 30,511.93 16,327.00 (14,184.93) 7,953.25 (22,558.68) 
Jason Jacobs 12,901.51 10,102.38 (2,799.13) 0.00 (12,901.51 ) 
Pam McMaster 26,646.90 13,218.76 (13,428.14) 10,703.13 (15,943.77) 




ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
BISTLINE LAW, PLLC 
1423 N Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 665-7270 
(208) 665-7290 (fax) 
abistline@povn.com 
ISB: 5216 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
STJY;'E Or !CMIO > ss 
CO'Ji'riY Q~' KOOTENAll 
FI! 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation, 
Defendant. 
ase No.: CV-08-7069 
EMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
o CONSOLIDATE 
FACTS 
Lakeland True Value Hardware, LLC, operated a hardware store and the roof collapsed. 
Lakeland had an insurance policy with Hartford which promised to pay continuing operating 
expenses incurred during the cessation of operations, including payroll. Lakeland filed suit in 
this case for breach of the insurance contract. The employees of Lakeland filed suit in Kootenai 
County Case CV10-774 based on the same transaction and occurrence because they did not 
receive the payroll they would have had the store been operating. I 
I Affidavit of Arthur M. Bistline at I. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
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ARGUMENT 
"It is the policy of the law to limit the number of trials as far as possible. When claims 
arise out of the same accident and one trial is sufficient to determine all the facts, separate trials 
would be a waste of time and expense." Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 597, 768 P.2d 1321, 
1330 (1989) citing Nelson v. Inland Motor Freight Co., 60 Idaho 443,92 P.2d 790 (1939). The 
basis for the suit in Kootenai County Case CVlO-774 is that the employees of Lakeland were 
entitled to be paid what they would have earned if the store had not been destroyed during the 
period of time the store was not operating. The issue in that case is the same as this - whether 
~artford reasonably performed its duties under the insurance contract. The only additional item 
of proof that is required on the issue is a simple calculation of the difference between what each 
employee was paid in 2008 and 2009 and the estimated amount each would have been paid if the 
store was fully operational. 
A. The adjusters handling this loss have admitted the employees of Lakeland were 
entitled to full payroll during the time the store was not open. The employees 
are third party beneficiaries of the contract and entitled to enforce it in a 
direction acton. 
The policy in question provides for the payment of continuing operating expenses, 
including payroll, during the period ofrestoration.2 This provision provides a direct benefit to 
the employees of Lakeland - that being that those employees are paid what they would have 
been paid if the store had been fully operational. 3 The adjuster handling the claim as well as her 
supervisor have dmitted that this was the proper interpretation of the policy language.4 
1 Affidavit of Melany Copley In Support of Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgment (Copley affidavit) at H419, Paragraph 0, (I) and 0, (4) 
3 Furthermore, Hartford's argument that Mike and Kathy should not have been paying themselves from the insurance proceeds, which this Court 
touched on in dismissing their bad faith claims, is not even supported by Hartford's own agent's testimony. On this point also see below where 
the adjuster knew all along the income payments were intended to cover the Fritz's draws/payroll from the company. 
4 Affidavit of Julia Kale attached to the affidavit of Arthur M. Bistline at 38: 15 to 39: I. 
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In order for a party to be a "third party beneficiary", the parties to the contract must so 
intend, and that intention is a question of fact to be detennined by the facts and circumstances. 
Downing v. Travelers Ins. Co. 107 Idaho 511, 525, 691 P.2d 375, 389 (1984) "That intent must 
appear from the contract itself or be shown by necessary implication." Id. 
In Williston on Contracts (Third Edition) § 369 the rule is stated: 
In practically every jurisdiction, a beneficiary to whom the insurer 
has promised the insured that the insurance money shall be paid is 
given a right to enforce the policy, and generally by a direct action. 
This result has been reached in jurisdictions adhering to the strict 
doctrine of privity of contract by statute; but in most states without 
the aid of a statute. 
Ordinarily, a beneficiary of such an insurance contract may 
maintain an action thereon, though not named therein, when it 
appears by fair and reasonable intendment that his rights and 
interests were in the contemplation of the parties, and were being 
provided for at the time of making the contract. 
Id 
A provision in a contract which provides that employees will be paid the full amount they 
would have earned if the store would have been operating clearly was intended to benefit the 
employees. "A third party may only enforce a contract "if he can show he is a member of a 
limited class for whose benefit it was made." Sharp v. W.H Moore, Inc. 118 Idaho 297,305, 
796 P.2d 506, 514 (1990) citing Stewart v. Arrington Construction Co., 92 Idaho at 532, 446 
P.2d at 901; Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462,464,583 P.2d 997, 999 
(1978). The policy sets forth it will pay "payroll" during the period of restoration, and the 
adjusters admit that the employees are a member of a class of individuals who are entitled to 
receive payment under the policy and are third party beneficiary of the contract. At a minimum 
it is a question of fact. 
II 
B. Lakeland's Employees did not receive the payroll each would have if the store 
opened because of Hartford's breach of the insurance contract. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
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Hartford's agent, Sedgwick, hired an accounting firm to corne up with schedules by 
which Hartford could make advances on the policy to assist the insured while the business was 
not operating. 5 The information provided to the accountants was more than sufficient to 
estimate the estimate the entire business income claim - including payroll - for advance 
purposes and Hartford refused to advance the sums because of "lacking information," but still 
have provided no indication whatsoever of what infonnation they thought they were missing. 
The adjuster, Julia Kale, (Kale) and Mike Fritz had a conversation on February 1 st, 2008, 
and in that conversation, Mr. Fritz advised her that his payroll expense ran roughly $4,000 per 
week and that he had five full time employees.6 The accounting firm hired by Kale received the 
required financial infonnation from Lakeland in early March 2008 and this information included 
profit and loss statements. 7 In mid-March, the accountant developed schedules from which to 
make advances to Lakeland and called to discuss those with Kale. Those schedules were for 
making advances over the next four months. The schedules estimated for advance purposes 
payroll expense $18,622 but the accountant was very clear that the numbers did not include 
amounts for payroll other than for Mike and Kathy Fritz. Kale called Mike Fritz and was told 
they were paying the entire payroll, not just their own.8 There is no evidence that Kale ever told 
that to the accountants or in any way directed that they recomputed their schedules based on this 
infonnation so they could recomputed the schedules. At deposition Kale testified: 
By Mr. Bistline 
Q. Okay. And did you ever call MD&D and advise they needed to rework the 
schedules based on the amount of actual payroll? 
5 Deposition of Julia Kale at 36:24 to 37:8 
6 Affidavit of Melany Copley In Support of Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgment (Copley affidavit) at 1-14 (claim notes) 
7 Affidavit of Dan Harper filed in opposition to Hartford's Summary Judgment Motion at paragraph 5. 
8 Copley affidavit at H 17. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE -4 
21:11 
A. We discussed on numerous occasions the missing documentation that was needed 
and requested from Mr. Fritz. 
Q. What was missing at that point on March 14th about the payroll? 
A. We did not have his complete payroll information. 
Q. And who told you you didn't have the complete payroll information? 
A. Per the discussion with Patrick, all we had was the information for Mike Fritz and 
his wife. We did not have the other employees' documentation and -- to show 
what was paid to them. 
This is an outright falsehood. As March 14th, 2008, MD&D, the accountants had in their 
possession everything they need to know to calculate the payroll for each and every month of 
this loss - they had the prior year's monthly payroll expense. If Kale had called the accountants 
and conveyed this to them, it would have been a simple matter to re-compute the schedules based 
on the prior year's payroll information which was in the possession of the accountants. Either 
Kale did not tell them this information or the accountants did not do anything with it. Either way 
it is negligent and rendered Lakeland unable to pay its Payroll. 
The total payroll expense from the four months of the prior year was $61,5039, which is 
roughly 330% higher than the payroll estimate used to pay Lakeland during the months of 
February through May 2008. 
Besides already having reason to know of this error, the adjuster was further made aware 
of the problem in mid-April when Lakeland's independent adjuster informed her of Lakeland's 
cash flow problems, 10 and on May 2, 2008, Kale was informed that Lakeland had not been able 
to pay its payroll since mid-April. 1 1 
9 Affidavit of Arthur M. Bistline at 7 
10 Affidavit of Arthur Bistline at 4 - 'The insured is in dire need ofthese funds to assist them in meeting their current financial shortages ... " 
II Copley affidavit at H30 
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Then in May, MD&D issued another schedule that reflected the actual payroll paid 
through April 2008, as well as the estimated payroll for the month of May. Hartford immediately 
issued another check to bring the account current. 12 
Thereafter, for inexplicable reasons, Kale refused to advance anything on payroll until 
she had verification that it had actually been paid. Kale advances on estimates from the first 
schedule, but refused to do it any thereafter unless Lakeland verified it had paid that payroll by 
the production of bank statements. 13 Lakeland informed Kale that they could not pay payroll 
until the money for payroll was received 14 and therefore could not verify with bank statements 
that the checks had been cashed. 
Lakeland's allegation is that Hartford did not timely pay under the policy and that fact 
did not allow them to open the store. The evidence developed in the recent deposition indicate 
that Hartford was at minimum in breach of contract, and more likely than not negligent. 
The schedules utilized for advancement purpose are not difficult to understand. The first 
set of schedules developed in this case could have been used to estimate the loss through the year 
2008. The schedules provide the numbers for a simple calculation: prior year's revenue in any 
given month multiplied by the projected growth in sales multiplied times the gross earnings less 
non-continuing expenses percent (BI%).15 The first page of that schedule tells you the projected 
lost revenue of $354, 189 and the BI% is 18.83% for a lost business income estimate (other than 
payroll) for the months covered of $66,694 ($354,189 * 18.83%). In order to calculate the 
month of June, which his not included in the $66,694, all that has to be done is multiply the BI% 
times the 2007 sales for June l6 times the projected growth of revenue of 11 %.17 This calculation 
12 Copley affidavit at H31 
IJ Affidavit of Arthur Bistline at 5 
14 Affidavit of Arthur Bistline at 6 
I~ Affidavit of Arthur Bistline at Exhibit 1 page I. 
16 Id at page three. 
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is demonstrated on the second page of those schedules. Plug in the numbers for any month and 
you know your lost business income for that month, other than payroll. This is first grade math. 
Julia Kale, the adjuster assigned to this claim, testified in deposition that she had no idea 
what those schedules represented. 
Q. Okay. So if in any given month would you take, for example, the lost revenue, 
the projected lost revenue that he did not earn, and multiply it times that 18.83 
percent to come up with the business income portion of the income for that 
month. 
A. I do not know that answer. I am not a certified accountant. 
Q. Okay. So you don't know what a 18.83 percent was to be used for? 
A. That determines what his percentage of his gross earnings less his ongoing 
expenses Therefore, he has 18.83 percent. 
Q. And did you -- so you didn't understand how they calculated the lost income then? 
A. Yes--
MS. DUKE: Object to the form. 
BY MR. BISTLINE: 
Q. Did you understand how they calculated the lost income for that time frame? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And how did they do that? 
A. Based on the documentation that Mr. Fritz provide for the lost income. 
Q. I'm not talking about the calculation. They came up with a number 66,694. Do 
you know how they arrived at that number? What that's a product of? 
17 ld. 
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A. It's his lost revenue, his gross earnings less his continuing expenses and his lost 
income, to determine the lost income. 
Q. Okay. And do you understand that 18.83 percent was multiplied against that 
354,189? 
MS. DUKE: Foundation. 
A. I did not know that precisely. 18 
[ .. ] 
Q. But do you understand specifically how that 11.38 percent would be utilized to 
make that calculation? 
MS. DUKE: Foundation. 
A. Could you repeat that? 
BY MR. BISTLINE: 
Q. I'm just asking if you understand how that 11.38 percent figure would be used in 
the calculation to compute lost business income for any given month. 
A. Yes. 
MS. DUKE: Foundation. Go ahead. 
A. Yes. Based on the documentation in the profit and loss statements. 
BY MR. BISTLINE: 
Q. What I'm saying is that you calculate business income by basically multiplying 
numbers together. And do you understand what that 11.38 percent would be 
multiplied against in that calculation? 
MS. DUKE: Foundation. 
A. No, I don't know precisely. 
I' Kale deposition at 48: 16 to 49:7 
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Ms. Kale not understand the information she was presented and neither did her supervisor Ms. 
Reynolds. 
Q. At this point, if! gave you that 18.83 percent, if you wouldn't know how to plug 
that in to calculate lost business income? 
A. Well, with a loss of this size we defer to the professional accountants on that. 
Hartford had everything it need to calculate business income. The adjusters 
assigned to this case just did not have any idea what they were looking at when 
they received schedules. 
The adjusters claim to not have enough information to make advances, because the 
':lccountants could not complete their schedules. They could not testify what the information was 
missing and deferred to the accountants. Ms. Copley testified: 
Q. Okay. What was missing? 
A. For specific missing information you'd have to go back and talk to MD&D. 19 
Ms. Kale testified 
Q. Did -- at some point you received a schedule and you hadn't had it prior to that 
point. Had anybody at your accounting firm told you that we cannot generate this 
schedule because we don't have the information we need? 
A. Amy at Matson & Driscoll had continuously advised that we were missing 
documentation needed to have another schedule.2o 
[ .. ] 
'9 Deposition of Melanie Copley at 12:21 
20 Deposition of Kale 73: 15 
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Q. But she didn't say I cannot calculate an advance schedule without this 
information? 
MS. DUKE: Object to the form. Asked and answered. 
A. She advised she needed additional information. 
BY MR. BISTLINE: 
Q. Again, the question is she never did say, though, I cannot give you an advance 
schedule without it? 
A. I don't know if she used those exact words, but we could not continue to make 
payments based on speculation. 
Q. And you view those schedules anything paying past May, based on those 
schedules, would be speculation? 
A. Yes. We don't have hardcore -- we don't have hard numbers. We can only pay so 
much on speculation until it gets to the point where we need to have hardline 
numbers. 
Q. What hard number were you missing? 
MS. DUKE: This has been asked and answered now several times. 
MR. BISTLINE: Well, she hasn't actually told me the hard number. Because we know it 
could be a hard number on profit and loss because that's, by definition, an estimate. 
BY MR. BISTLINE: 
Q. So a hard number, to me, says you're looking for something actually done. And 
what actually were you looking for that had actually occurred? 
A. We continuously needed the insured's financial statements, we needed the wage 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
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documentation. All the things that we've been requesting through this whole 
time. 
Q. Was it just the wage documentation primarily? 
A. No. Like I said, all of the insured's financials in order to determine his lost 
income.21 
Obviously, the accountants had the financials because they had already estimated the 
loss. Contrary to Ms. Kale's testimony, the only thing they were missing was payroll and they 
only reason they could not issue a new schedule was because Kale told them to wait for actiual 
payroll. They could have completed the schedules based on prior years information and then 
made adjustments later, and even could have finished the schedules without that information, but 
did not at Kale's direction. 
Amy Kohler, Kale's accountant, testified as follows regarding the alleged missing 
information: 
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) And there's numerous references throughout this case of 
you trying to complete your schedules, and what does that mean? If I say that to 
you, "I have to complete my schedule for July," what would that mean to you? 
A. In my memory, the main piece that we were continually trying to obtain 
was related to the payroll disbursements.22 
Had Ms. Kale been willing to pay based on estimated schedules for payroll, which she had 
already done in the past, then Kohler could have calculated the schedules simply by using last 
year's numbers and then made minor adjustments after the fact. 23 
2' Deposition of Kale 78: 10 to 79:24 
22 Deposition of Amy Kohler at 32:14 
2J Affidavit of Dan Harper at page I of his report. 
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There is no explanation for Kale's refusal to pay payroll based on estimates as she 
already had paid based on estimates. Her insistence on actual payroll paid was not reasonable 
and it this insistence is why further schedules were not created. Even if Kale was justified in 
requiring actual disbursements before payment of payroll, it was not reasonable for her to with 
hold all payment pending receipt of that information. She could have paid something pending 
receipt of the payroll information. Her own accountant testified to this fact. Amy Kohler 
testified: 
Q: So from what I understand before, though, you could have completed your 
schedule other than payroll, and payroll could have been treated separately as far 
as, you know, Here's your business income claim and here's the payroll part of it, 
two separate items? 
MR. NICKELS: Objection; form, foundation, and speculation. 
A. I suppose it could have been done that way. That wasn't the way we were asked 
to do it. 
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) Okay. And who asked -- when you say "it wasn't the way we 
were asked to do it," who told you how to do it? 
A. In our conversations with Julia, we would have talked over how she would want 
to see schedules, what information she needed to have.24 
Kale could have authorized payroll estimates based on the prior year and then adjusted 
for any actual changes in the next month.2s Amy Kohler agreed that the schedules are the 
projection of loss based on historical data and then you use current information to slightly adjust 
the claim. She testified: 
24 Deposition of Amy Kohler at 32:22 - 33: II 
25 Affidavit of Dan Harper at page I of his report. 
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Q: So if I understand what you're saying is, you come up with a projection of lost 
business income based on historical data, and then as the claim progresses, utilize 
current information to slightly adjust the business income claim. 
A. I would agree with that--
Q. Okay. 
A. -- description. 
Hartford had schedules that allowed the calculation of lost business income in mid-March 
2008. It had everything it needed to calculate the lost business income, including payroll, 
through the year based on that schedule. The adjusters conduct amount to negligence at a 
minimum for the mistake made, and more likely than not, the conduct of withholding payment 
based on "missing infomlation" that is not missing at all and refusing to make advancements 
when you have in the past, amounts to intentional misconduct performed with knowledge of how 
it was strangling Lakeland True Value Hardware. 
Lastly, the inventory in this case was not paid for until 8 months after the issuance of the 
certificate of occupancy for the store. Melanie Copley calculated the period of restoration as 
October 30th, 2008. The undersigned and Ms. Copley had the following exchange regarding the 
fact that the inventory claim had not been paid at that point: 
Q. But it does say that the inventory has to be replaced before the period of 
restoration ends. 
A. It does not. Where does -
Q. Doesn't it say that? 
A. It doesn't say that. 
Q. Wouldn't inventory be property at the scheduled premises? 
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A. It would, but it says the property at the scheduled premises should be repaired, 
rebuilt or replaced with reasonable speed and similar quality. It doesn't say has 
to be, it says should be.26 
How exactly the inventory "should be" replaced at the store when the insured has not 
been paid for it by the insurance company is a mystery. No reasonable person would think that 
the policy would be so interpreted. This is bad faith. Michelle Reynolds apparently cannot even 
read the policy. 
By Ms. Duke 
Q. Does period of restoration, pursuant to that policy provision, in any way take into 
account whether the insured is ready to move back in to the building? 
A. No, it doesn't. 
Q. And why is that? 
A. Because it's outside the policy. The period of restoration is when the building is 
rebuilt?7 
BY MR. BISTLINE: 
Q. You read from the period of restoration and then in response to another question 
you said the period of restoration ends when the building is rebuilt. Is that your 
opinion that that period of restoration ends when the building is rebuilt? 
A. That was using my own terms without reading from the policy. 
Q. Okay. Because the policy says the property at the scheduled premises should be 
repaired, rebuilt or replaced. 
MS. DUKE: I'm just handing her the policy so she can look at it. 
'6 Deposition ofM. Copley at 19:7 
27 Depositon of Reynolds at 55: 1 
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BY MR. BISTLINE: 
Q. Well, part of the property that would have to be replaced would be the inventory; 
correct? You could rebuild the building, but you'd have to replace the inventory 
before the period of restoration would end? 
A. Well, the property is referring to the scheduled premises. 
Q. The property at the scheduled premises. Wouldn't the inventory be at the 
scheduled premises when the roof collapsed? 
A. Well, of course it would. 
Q. Okay. So it would have had to have been replaced for the period of restoration to 
end; 
A. That's not my understanding, no. 
Q. Okay. Well, isn't that what it says, you have to replace the property at the 
scheduled premises? 
A. Yes, but the property is referring to the premises, the scheduled premises. 
Q. So you're saying that the property at the scheduled premises is only referring to 
the building? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Is there anything in the policy that tells you that? Wouldn't it read the 
scheduled premises should be repaired if that's what it was trying to convey? 
A. I didn't write the policy.28 
The policy plainly says the period of restoration end when the property at the scheduled 
premises is replaced (amongst other things). For Reynolds to interpret it in the way she did is 
28 Deposition of Reynolds at 73:22 -75:16 
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plain intentional misconduct. Furthermore, it seems that the adjusters involved don't think that 
the timing of payments is really very important. Michelle Reynolds testified: 
Q. Okay. So you acknowledge that there is an aspect of this policy that deals with the 
timing these payments are made? 
A. No, I would not say that at all.29 
Hartford did not pay for the inventory until approximately 10 months after it alleges that 
store should have been open.30 
During the years of2008 and 2009, the employees were shorted over $44,000 and in the 
year 2009 they were shorted over $114,000.31 The employees were not paid because Hartford 
~ailed to sufficiently and timely fund Lakeland's claim. If Hartford is responsible to pay lost 
business income up until the point the store opened in August of 2009, then Hartford is 
responsible to pay the full payroll the employees would have earned as that is a component of 
lost business income according to the policy. 
29 Deposition of Michelle Reynolds at 33: 11 
30 Copley affidavit at paragraph 2m, and paragraph 5. 
31 Affidavit of Dan Harper at page 2 of his report. 
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CONCLUSION 
The issues in this case and CV 10-774 arise out of the same occurrence and are identical 
in all respects. Not consolidating these cases would result in two trials with identical issues 
which would be a waste of time and which could result in inconsistent determinations on the 
same issues, which is also to be avoided if possible. Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, 
Inc. 532 F.2d 674, 690 (C.A.Cal. 1976); also see LR.C.P. 19(a)(l) which requires the joinder of 
a party who could be subject to inconsistent liabilities. 
The only additional evidence the consolidation would require would be the difference 
between what was paid to the employees and what should have been during the years 2008 and 
2009. That is a simple calculation that is completed and can be verified by Defendant's 
accountant. Consolidating these cases will not delay this trial. 
DATED this 51\ day of March, 2010. 
ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _ day of February, 2010, I seryed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
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US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile (208) 395-8585 
~Email 
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ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
BISTLINE LAW, PLLC 
1423 N. Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 665-7270 
(208) 665-7290 (fax) 
abistline@povn.com 
ISB: 5216 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 'OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE, Case No: CV -08-7069 
L.L.C., 
FFIDA VIT OF ARTHUR M. BISTLINE IN 
Plaintiff, SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE 
vs. 
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
I, Arthur M. Bistline, having been first duly sworn, upon oath depose and state that: 
1. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the complaint filed in Kootenai 
County Case. No. CV-1O-774. 
2. Attached as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of excerpts from the deposition 
transcript of Julia Kale. Exhibit I is a copy of Exhibit 3 to her deposition. 
3. Attached as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of excerpts from the deposition 
transcript of Melanie Copley. Exhibit J is copy of Amy Kohlers deposition. 
4. Attached as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of excerpts from the deposition 
transcript of Michelle Reynolds. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ARTHUR M. BISTLINE IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE - 1 
5. Attached as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of a letter written by Chris Glenister 
to Kale, and provided to me out of the files ofMD&D by the Hartford. 
6. Attached as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of a series of correspondence 
between myself and Julia Kale. 
7. Attached as Exhibit G is a correspondence between myself and Amy Kohler. 
8. Attached as Exhibit H are true and correct copy of the 2007 profit and loss statements 
for the months of February through May that were provided to me from the file of 
MD&D and received by MD&D on March 5t\ 2008, according to the fax 
identification. The total payroll and associated expense for those four months in 
2007is $61,503. 
DATED this S- day of March, 2010. 
~-'--
ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
,2010. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ARTHUR M. BISTLINE IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the .s--c.day of March, 2010, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Keely E. Duke [ ] 
Bryan A. Nickels [ ] 
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A. [] 
PO Box 1271 [ ] 
Boise, ID 83701-1271 ~ 
FAX: (208) 395-8585 
AFFIDA VIT OF ARTHUR M. BISTLINE IN 






ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
LA W OFFICE OF ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
1423 N. Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 665-7270 
(208) 665-7290 (fax) 
abistline@povn.com 
ISB: 5216 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
STA i"E Or III AHO ~ SS 
COU~iY OF KOOTENAI) 
FlLED:SCoS l 
2010 JM~ 28 PH 4: 51 
CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
t:~~'~ DfPIJ~Y ~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MICHELLE FRITZ, JAMES AHLERMAN, 
KELLY FRITZ, CAROLYN BEARD, JASON 
JACOBS, RYAN FRITZ, PAMELA 
MCMASTER, JERRY MOREAU, and MIKE 
AND KATHY FRITZ 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No: cv- 10 -ll\..\ 
COMPLAINT 
For a cause of action, Platiniff's allege as follows 
1) All plaintiffs are or were employees of Lakeland True Value Hardware. 
2) Defendant is a Connecticut Corporation in Good Standing engaged in providing insurance 
in the State ofIdaho. 
3) The contract for insurance at issue was entered into in Kootenai County, Idaho, and the 
covered property was and is located in Kootenai County, Idaho. Jurisdiction is proper 
before this Court. 
COMPLAINT - 1-
4) Defendant provided a contract for insurance for Lakeland True Value Hardware and that 
policy provided that Defendant would pay payroll during the period of any restoration. 
Plaintiffs are third party beneficiaries of that contract. 
5) On or about January 281h, 2008, Lakeland suffered a loss when the roof of its store 
collapsed and caused the immediate cessation of operations. 
6) Defendant was obligated to pay Plaintiffs pending resumption of operations the payroll 
they would have earned if the store had been operating. Defendant has refused to do so 
which is a breach of the parties agreement 
7) Plaintiffs are entitled to damages for breach of the insurance contract in an amount in 
excess of 10,000 to be proved at trial and to an award of attorneys fees and costs incurred 
in this matter 
Wherefore, Plaintiffs pray that this Court enter judgment for Plaintiffs against Defendant 
in an amount in excess of$10,000 to be proved at trial, for attorneys fees and costs and 
any other relief that this Court deems fair and equitable. 
A jury trial is demanded. 
~ \ 
~---------------------------
ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
COMPLAINT - 2-
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1 fit? 
2 A. That is correct. However, we need to know 
3 what he -- we need to have documentation on what he 
4 spent it on after he spent it, and what it pertained 
5 to as far as his business. 
6 Q. And did MD&D tell you that they needed 





I don't recall. 
And do you understand what a point of sale 









Yes, I do. 
What is a point of sale system? 
That's how he -- that's his process of 
The next note I want to refer to is dated 






And it looks like you're having a 








And is that Patrick DeLangis, is that it? 
I do not recall his last name, but I would 
23 assume that is correct. 
24 Q. Okay. I see it up above there. And in 
25 that claim note it refers to a schedule for 
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1 advancement purposes. What's the schedule for 
2 advancement purposes? 
3 A. That is in order to assist the insured in 
4 his business and his loss and his continuing 
5 expenses while his business is down. 
6 Q. So that's -- that's a schedule to make 






And it says he advised there are several 
10 items not included, as they either did not have 
11 documentation or were not sure about. And then it 
12 lists two things. Are those the only two things he 
13 didn't have information on, or were there other 
14 items? 
15 A. Well, there were other items. This is 
16 pertaining to the business income itself, not the 
1 7 inven tory. 
18 Q. Okay. So but as far as MD&D was concerned 
19 at that point, that was the two pieces of 
20 information that they were missing? 
21 A. Per the conversation with Patrick at that 
22 time. 
23 Q. And one of the issues was whether the 
24 insured is paying his entire payroll. And it looks 
25 to me like right shortly after that conversation you 
. '. ,~ 
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1 times that 18.83 percent to come up with the 
2 business income portion of the income for that 
3 month. 
4 A. I do not know that answer. I am not a 
5 certified accountant. 
6 Q. Okay. So you don't know what a 18.83 
7 percent was to be used for? 
8 A. That determines what his percentage of his 
9 gross earnings less his ongoing expenses. 
10 Therefore, he has 18.83 percent. 
11 Q. And did you -- so you didn't understand 




MS. DUKE: Object to the form. 
15 BY MR. BISTLINE: 
16 Q. Did you understand how they calculated the 







Yes, I did. 
And how did they do that? 
Based on the documentation that Mr. Fritz 
21 provide for the lost income. 
Q. I'm not talking about the calculation. 22 
23 They came up with a number 66,694. Do you know how 
24 they arrived at that number? What that's a product 
25 of? 
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1 A. It's his lost revenue, his gross earnings 
2 less his continuing expenses and his lost income, to 
3 determine the lost income. 
4 Q. Okay. And do you understand that 18.83 
5 percent was multiplied against that 354,189? 
MS. DUKE: Foundation. 
A. I did not know that precisely. 




9 Q. Okay. When you received these schedules, 
10 did you discuss them with Miss Reynolds? 
11 A. I did. 
Q. And what -- if you can recall, what did 
you cause with her about these schedules? 
12 
13 
14 A. We discussed in order to get additional 
15 advancements to Lakeland True Value, our insured. 
16 Q. Did you discuss the actual calculations 
17 that were contained in this four-page document? 
18 A. We discussed the document itself. I don't 
19 know precisely, exactly what we discussed. We 
20 discussed what payment needed to be -- what 
21 advancement, based on the information we had, for 
22 advancement purposes and how we were going to 
23 advance additional payment to Mr. Fritz based on 
24 what Mr. Fritz, Lakeland True Value, based on what 
25 documentation we had at this time. 
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1 to you that you were behind, for lack of a better 
2 term, by about $73,951? 
3 MS. DUKE: Same objections. 
4 A. It provided the documentation to show 
5 additional payment warranted that we did not 
6 previously have. 
7 BY MR. BISTLINE: 
8 Q. And who told you that it -- that you 
9 had -- I mean, who told you you didn't have the 
10 information to generate this schedule prior to this 
11 time? 
12 MS. DUKE: Object to the form. She didn't 
13 generate the schedule. 
14 BY MR. BISTLINE: 
15 Q. Did -- at some point you received a 
16 schedule and you hadn't had it prior to that point. 
17 Had anybody at your accounting firm told you that we 
18 cannot generate this schedule because we don't have 
19 the information we need? 
20 A. Amy at Matson & Driscoll had continuously 
21 advised that we were missing documentation needed to 
22 have another schedule. 
23 Q. Did she ever indicate to you that the 
24 missing documentation somehow impeded her ability to 
25 properly evaluate the claim? 
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1 A. To determine the insured's lost income. 
2 BY MR. BISTLINE: 
3 Q. Okay. And did she tell you without this 
4 information I cannot calculate the insured's lost 
5 income? 
6 A. She advised on multiple occasions that she 
7 needed additional information in order to determine 
8 and have a substantial -- a concrete number for the 
9 loss of income. 
10 Q. But she didn't say I cannot calculate an 




MS. DUKE: Object to the form. Asked and 
answered. 
A. She advised she needed additional 
15 information. 
16 BY MR. BISTLINE: 
17 Q. Again, the question is she never did say, 
18 though, I cannot give you an advance schedule 
1 9 wi thou tit? 
20 A. I don't know if she used those exact 
21 words, but we could not continue to make payments 
22 based on speculation. 
23 Q. And you view those schedules anything 
24 paying past May, based on those schedules, would be 
25 speculation? 
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1 A. Yes. We don't have hardcore -- we don't 
2 have hard numbers. We can only pay so much on 
3 speculation until it gets to the point where we need 
4 to have hardline numbers. 
5 Q. What hard number were you missing? 
6 MS. DUKE: This has been asked and 
7 answered now several times. 
8 MR. BISTLINE: Well, she hasn't actually 
9 told me the hard number. Because we know it 
10 could be a hard number on profit and loss 
11 because that's, by definition, an estimate. 
12 BY MR. BISTLINE: 
13 Q. So a hard number, to me, says you're 
14 looking for something actually done. And what 
15 actually were you looking for that had actually 
16 occurred? 
17 A. We continuously needed the insured's 
18 financial statements, we needed the wage 
19 documentation. All the things that we've been 
20 requesting through this whole time. 
21 Q. Was it just the wage documentation 
22 primarily? 
23 A. No. Like I said, all of the insured's 
24 financials in order to determine his lost income. 
25 Q. And again, there's no cor -- never mind. 
"", 
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1 if you reference the claim notes, it looks like 
2 based on this report they authorized another $73,000 
3 in business income, which would be the difference 
4 between 123,951 minus the 50 that has already been 
5 advanced. Does that sound correct? 
6 A. I have a question as to who authorized. 
7 Q. Well, it's in your claim notes that as 
8 soon as they received the second schedule I believe 







And I guess my question is this. As of 
13 the end of May when you had these new updated 
14 schedules, it's your testimony you didn't have 
15 anything to put together an estimate of the next few 
16 months of business income loss? 
17 A. And I would tell you that based on my 
18 review of the file, I still think that there was 
19 missing financial information that did not allow us 




Q. Okay. What was missing? 
A. For specific missing information you'd 
have to go back and talk to MD&D. I will tell you 
24 that we typically ask for the last either two or 
25 three years financial information, which would 
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The expiration date of this policy will 
not cut short the period of restoration. So that 
3 doesn't say that the inventory claim has to be 
4 adjusted and paid before the period of restoration 
5 ends. 
6 BY MR. BISTLINE: 
7 Q. But it does say that the inventory has to 









It does not. Where does 
Doesn't it say that? 
It doesn't say that. 
Wouldn't inventory be property at the 
13 scheduled premises? 
14 A. It would, but it says the property at the 
15 scheduled premises should be repaired, rebuilt or 
16 replaced with reasonable speed and similar quality. 
17 It doesn't say has to be, it says should be. 
18 Q. Okay. So it's your position then that as 
19 of that date Lakeland should have been able to order 
20 all the inventory and all the fixtures and had them 






Okay. And did you have an accountant or 
24 somebody help you come up with that calculation 
25 based on the cash flow that had been provided to 
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1 any regular payments and just calculated the total 
2 loss and paid it all at once at the end? 
3 
4 that. 
MS. DUKE: I'm sorry, I need you to repeat 
I don't understand it. 
5 BY MR. BISTLINE: 
6 Q. I'm asking if you think it would have been 
7 proper for Hartford to make one big payment on this 






No, I would not say that. 
Okay. So you acknowledge that there is an 
12 aspect of this policy that deals with the timing 





No, I would not say that at all. 
So you think you could make a payment 
16 whenever you wanted and not be in breach of that 
17 policy? 




misstates her testimony. Go ahead and answer 
if you can. 
A. Okay. Payments are made as soon as the 
22 documentation is received to support it. And no 
23 sooner. 
24 BY MR. BISTLINE: 
I 
25 Q. Okay. So if you have sufficient 
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Does period of restoration, pursuant to 
3 that policy provision, in any way take into account 








No, it doesn't. 
And why is that? 
Because it's outside the policy. The 
9 period of restoration is when the building is 
10 rebuil t. 
11 Q. With respect to Lakeland's claims, do you 
12 recall who made a decision as to what the period of 
13 restoration would be for the Lakeland claim? 
14 A. It -- the examiner makes that decision 







And who would that have been? 
That would have been Melanie Copley. 
Did you and she discuss that period of 
19 restoration determination that she ultimately made 
20 at all? 
21 A. I don't recall, no. I'm sure that I saw 
22 that calculation or saw that analysis in the file 





And do you recall what her analysis was? 
It was based upon when the building 
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Our File No.: 
, pear Ms. Kale: 
January 28, 2008 
Lakeland True Value Hardware Store 
] 6658 N. Highway 41, Rathdrum lD 83858 
Hartford Fire Insurance Company 




PRoPllSSIONAL Loss CONSUJ.TANlS 
400 0tsn!R PoINr Ilout.!vARI>, SUrnlS19 
S. SAN l'RANoscD, CA 94ll!().1921 
(650) ,583.4300 
(800) 248-3888 
FAX (65(1) !iI!'.H049 
Call£. Uc. No. Z7f!022 
PursulllIt to instructions from the above captioned Insured, please find enclosed the Preliminary and Partial 
, Business lncome Loss calculation as measured tbrougli August 31, 2008 in the amount of $282,736. In 
~ddition, please find enclosed the following claim documentation: 
1) Idaho Monthly Sales & Use Tax Returns - For the months of February and March 2008. 
2) Quarterly Federal Payroll Tax Return (941) - For the first quarter of2008. ' 
3) Notification from Westwood Rentals conceming the Insured's temporary office location. , 
" '4) Monthly Historical Gross Sales Summari~ (plan Sheet) which includes sales for Retail, Rental and 
Internet - From January 2005 through January 2008. . 
5) Inventory Evaluation (By Class and Dept) for the damaged areas of the store (79 pages) - In the 
preliminary amount oU] 47.053.78 and the Hillman quote of$23,OOO for a total of$170,053.78 
·With regard to the enclosed Inventory Evaluation, please note that this 79 page report including summary 
,sheet was prepared by the Insured's employees OYer ~e last 6 weeks and is based on the Insured's 
perpetual inventory system using B running average cost value per SKU tag. The report was prepared in 
this manner in order to allow the Insured to be able to specifically identifY any items by class number, then 
" department 8lCll. You will find on each of these pages, the post loss SKU count (item count), Cost Value 
(Electronic Receipt Posting which comes dir~tly from True Value Corporate), and a Finals Total which 
sums each of the classes. The quote for the bulk nutslbolts from Jack Carpenter ofHiIIlt:Jan in the amount 
of $23,000 (~ot part of the perpetual inventory system) will be provided shortly', ' 
. The report that makes up each oftbe indiyidualline items was too voluminous 10 be included in.these 
, enclosures but is available for physical inspection. My suggestion for auditing these: cost prices and 
quantities would be to select a sample of your choosing by class and department and the Insured will then 
',be able to generate the de~i1ed items showing the cost and quantities for each of the SKU items. 
~ , 
J f MDD000236 E'/J11-J r+ 21(j2 
Ms. Julia Kale 
4/1812008 
Page2of2 
As for the remaining salvaged inventory in storage, those items will have to be evaluated when the Insured 
, begins restocking his store. As you and I discussed previously, the Insured bas expressed concern that this 
stored inventory bas been exposed to moistUre and humidity over the last several months and they will want 
, . to carefully inspect the condition of the merchandise and fIXtures prior to its return to the store upon 
reopening. As such, the Insureds expressly reserve their right to make claim for any merchandise or 
fixtures which has been damaged as a result of this storage condition. 
. nased upon the enclosed preliminary claims which to1ll1 $452,790, the Insured at this time respectfully 
requests that Hartford Insurance Co~pany provide an additional interim payment in the amount of 
$200,000. The Insured is in dire need of these fimds to assist them in meeting their current fmancial 
shortages brought about as a result of this loss and note the $100,000 that have been previously advanced. 
While we tmderstand the need for Hartford to be given time to conduct a thorough review these claims, we 
believe the enclosed documentation will supp?rt;;~~e.~.est,of,these funds. ' 
:. ': '. "":..:: : ~. 
: Finally, please advise us if Steve Bonnano of GAll ,Robbins is still active on this file and if you wish us to 
forward any of the preceeding documentation to his, a.ttention and further review. 
'. 
;Please feel free to-contact me or Drew Lucurell should you have any questions concerning the above. We 
look forward to working with yOl,l ~~Il~¢.!. tile ~~ssM,re.$()ltlti!lnQ,(t.b,j~ ,matter. Thank you again for 
yoW' courtesy and cooperation Bnd\ve:3W~it'1:Iartford'i:favQrible,r.e$pQilSe to the Insured's request 
Very truly yours, -... ,,:,:;::,:<,,:: . :; :;'.': :::;:{~~~:'::'::;:~:L>:-:, 
AD~TERS INTERNATIONAL ' ': .::. ": '
'1J~1.. .",' .. ': '. . ~ 
.' , .. 
Chris Gicnister, CPA .''',-' '" .. 
. .:':<'-
J;!nclosures :,:': ",':.. .. ,,: .. :; .... , 
Co: Drew Lucurell, Adju~er~ International - via E:lllail 
Mike & Katby Fritz, UikeJand True Value H~d~are-via E-mail 
Amy Kohler - Matson; T>.riscoll & Damico - y#i E-mail 
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Amy Kohler [akohler@mdd.net] 
Friday, August 29, 2008 8:55 AM 
Arthur Bistline 
Kale, Julia N.; Patrick Delangis 
RE: Fritz 
Please see your last e-mail below on August 20, 2008. We have not yet received documentation of payroll paid, or to be 
paid, for all of July 2008 or the first half of August 200B. Unless we receive documentation showing otherwise, we will 
prepare updated schedules for Ms. Kale assuming no payroll for those periods. Please advise. 
Respectfully, 
Amy Kohler, CPA 
Senior Accountant 
akohler@mdd.net 
MATSON, DRISCOLL & DAMICO, LLP 
10900 NE 8th St, Suite 1040 
Bellevue, WA 9B004 
Phone: 425.455.0056 Fax: 425.453.0052 
Please visit us at: 
http://www.mdd.net 
From: Arthur Bistline [mailto:arthurmooneybistline@me.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, August 27, 2008 1:49 PM 
To: Amy Kohler 
Cc: 'Kale, Julia N.' 
Subject: Fritz 
How are we coming on payroll? 
Art . 
•....•. • ,'.--_ ..• ' "' .... ,-, ... <.<.' •..•.... " .•. -< ••••• 
From: Arthur Bistline [mailto:arthurmooneybistline@me.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, August 20, 2008 1:44 PM 
To: Amy Kohler 









Kale, Julia N. [Julia.Kale@sedgwickcms.comJ 
Friday, August 01, 2008 4:45 AM 
arthurmooneybistline@me.com 
RE: lakeland True Value Hardware, Claim #A818400416-0001-02 
image001.png 
I agree with the accountant. We need the documentation from our insured to reflect actual incurred expenses If the 
employee quit, we do not owe for that salary as it is not an ongoing expense any longer. 
From: arthurmooneybistline@me.com [mailto :arthurmooneybistline@me.com] 
Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2008 11:58 PM 
To: Kale, Julia N. 
Subject: FW: lakeland True Value Hardware, Claim #A818400416-0001-02 
What is your position on this? 
From: Amy Kohler [mailto:akohler@mdd.net] 
Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2008 11:00 AM 
To: arthurmooneybistline@me.com 
Cc: Patrick Delangis; Kale, Julia N. 
Subject: RE: lakeland True Value Hardware, Claim #A818400416-0001-02 
Mr. Bistline, 
It is the adjuster's responsibility to interpret the policy language. We have been instructed to obtain documentation 
from the insured to support our calculations reflecting the normal operating expenses actually incurred. There has been 
some miscommunication in the past as to disbursements actually incurred and those planned to be incurred. 
It is our understanding that one or more employees have quit since our most recent schedules were issued for June 30, 
2008. We will need to know who these individuals are, if it is not clear from the documentation of disbursements 
forthcoming from Mr. Fritz. 
Amy Kohler, CPA 
Senior Accountant 
akohler@mdd.net 
MATSON, DRISCOLL & DAMICO, LLP 
10900 NE 8th St, Suite 1040 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
Phone: 425.455.0056 Fax: 425.453.0052 
Please visit us at: 
http://www.mdd.net 
16 
2 I (j(j 
From: arthurmooneybistline@me.com [mailto:arthurmooneybistline@me.com] 
Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2008 10:32 AM 
To: Amy Kohler 
Subject: RE: Lakeland True Value Hardware, Claim #A818400416-0001-02 
(4) Business income means the: 
(a) Net Income (Net Profit or Loss 
before income taxes) that would 
have been earned or incurred if no 
direct physical loss or physical 
damage had occurred; and 
(b) Continuing normal operating 
expenses incurredl including 
payroll. 
When the roof fell down, my clients had a certain number of employees and no longer had anything for those 
employees to do. In order to keep those employees from finding other employment, my client needs to keep paying 
them while the store is rebuilt. Calculating payroll would them simply be a function of taking the last pay-roll from 
before the roof collapse and adjusting it for any anomalies in that pay period, such as someone taking unpaid time off, 
and then applying it each month that the employees cannot be employed. This would obviate the need for anything 
other than the last pay roll before the roof fell down, unless one or more employees has quit. 
Is this how you are viewing pay roll? And if so, what is the purpose in seeing bank statements etc? 
Art. 
From: Amy Kohler [mailto:akohler@mdd.netJ 
Sent: Thursday, July 31, 20088:58 AM 
To: arthurmooneybistline@me.com 
Cc: Patrick Delangis; Kale, Julia N. 
Subject: RE: Lakeland True Value Hardware, Claim #A818400416-0001-02 
Mr. Bistline, 
We use the documentation the insured sends us of his payroll expenses for a given month. This documentation 
includes, as we stated below, the check register from his QuickBooks reflecting the payroll disbursements made 
(paychecks, tax and insurance payments). We need to check this against the bank records to confirm these 
disbursements were indeed issued. Also, so that we can include any payroll due to employees for past periods that has 
not yet been paid, we have requested written detail ofthose planned disbursements. 
I hope this answers your question. Please feel free to call me if anything is not clear. 





MATSON, DRISCOll & DAMICO, llP 
10900 NE 8th St, Suite 1040 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
Phone: 425.455.0056 Fax: 425.453.0052 
Please visit us at: 
http://www.mdd.net 
From: arthurmooneybistline@me.com [mailto:arthurmooneybistline@me.com] 
Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2008 8:47 AM 
To: Amy Kohler 
Subject: RE: lakeland True Value Hardware, Claim #A818400416-0001-02 
How are you determining payroll? 
. __ .• _.--_ •. --................ ~ ••. " .. " •. ,~. · .. ·~··w .~._ .......... ~_ ...... _. __ ~".'. ". ."". . ... , .. " ... '0" •. ' "~"~ .,'. •• , .. ~. ~"'~"""'" .• _ ••• ____ •• ~ ........... _.......... '" •••• .•••• ••••• • ...... " .. ". , •• ".",. , •• ",,,~,,,,,,,,,,_,,~~,_,", •• ~~,.,..~_ ••• ~ .... ~,,,~,.,.~.,, •• ,,,...,, ........ -'< •• ~,,;~'".,._"' •• ,_.~ •••• _ .. __ •• 
From: Amy Kohler [mailto:akohler@mdd.net] 
Sent: Wednesday, July 30, 2008 3:57 PM 
To: arthurmooneybistline@me.com; Kale, Julia N. 
Cc: Patrick DelangiS 
Subject: Lakeland True Value Hardware, Claim #A818400416-0001-02 
Mr. Bistline, 
Thank you for the documents you e-mailed today. We received the following: 
1. lakeland True Value's bank statement for June 2008 
2. The Summary and Detail reports from the QuickBooks bank reconciliation for June 2008 
3. The Demand letter from True Value Company 
The provided documents are not the same as the documents provided for prior periods. There are a couple of 
additional pieces of information that we will need to update our schedules, as we stated in our document request sent 
to you on July 28,2008. The insured is familiar with the documents that he has been sending us each month since 
February 2008; we need the same document types reflecting all July 2008 activity: 
(1) check register detail out of QuickBooks for the cash account 
(2) a note from Mr. Fritz detailing any payroll disbursements for July that have not yet been made that he intends to 
make 
(3) a print-out from the True Value bank account through the end of July to support the previous two items 
In our letter dated July 28,2008, we also requested lease payment documentation for the JAR and Great American 
Leasing leases. Please provide this also at your earliest convenience. 
Thank you for your assistance. Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have any questions. 









Arthur Bistline [arthurmooneybistline@me.com] 
Wednesday, September 10, 2008 1 :33 PM 
'Amy Kohler' 
RE: Did you see this? FW: Payroll information 
The checks are cut, waiting to be delivered and have not. There is nothing to substantiate. If the concern is that his 
money will not be paid to the employees, then that is insurance fraud and not difficult to figure out. 
From: Amy Kohler [mailto:akohler@mdd.net] 
Sent: Wednesday, September 10, 2008 1:23 PM 
To: Arthur Bistline; Kale, Julia N. 
Subject: RE: Did you see this? FW: Payroll information 
Mr. Bistline, 
As indicated in the string of e-mails attached in the last set I forwarded to you, we did receive this attachment. Our 
requests have been for additional substantiation supporting these copies of payroll checks for August 2008 and for July 
2008 payroll. 
Respectfully, 
Amy Kohler, CPA 
Senior Accountant 
akohler@mdd.net 
NOTES: WE'RE MOVING OUR OFFICE LOCATION ON SEPTEMBER 30. 2008!1I 
MATSON, DRISCOLL & DAMICO, LLP 
10900 NE 8th St, Suite 1040 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
Phone: 425.455.0056 Fax: 425.453.0052 -
Please visit us at: 
http://www.mdd.net 
MATSON, DRISCOll & DAMICO, LLP 
19125 North Creek Parkway, Suite 208 
1 
21()f) 
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402 • NONTAXABLE SALES 
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695 • FreIght In 
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768' Work Comp 
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~1 • Regular Payroll 
6602 • Overtime Payroll 
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8111 • Store Suppllll' .. Expense 
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liDO • GI'DJIII Salae 
60.2 • .NONTAXABLE SALES 
ToIal-499· SALES 
Totallnootn. 
Cost ofOoods Sold 
653 • Purchaass • Cotler & Co 
555' Purchalos, 0thIIr& 
695 ' Froight In 
751 • W;tUes & Payroll C05\s 
758 • Wort Comp 
Total 751 . Wage!! & r>lI)Iroll Costs 
790 • Advertlalng 





8580 • I>ayroll 
6581 • Regular Payroll 
8582 • Overtime Papoll 
SSM • VaCQlion 1".,. 
6560 • Payroll - Otmt 
lolal 6560 ' PayroD 
8* • Payroll T8lI; Expense 
B001 • FICA t;xpcnse 
6602 • MedicDI'G EXJHtnsa 
Gao3' SUTA Expansll 
6604· FUTA ExpenlQ 
T~' 0000 • I>ayroll Tax Expense 
161 ·lnsunlOC8 
7110 • LIfe Ins UTarlCII • PlIrtnOr 
B25 • Insuntnce - SIDI9 
To~17B" • InsUl'lU')c. 
798 • Computer Support· Triad 
su· Rent 
813 • Utilities 
815' Tal.phonD 
821 • Malntananca &. ~palr$ 
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B45 • Bad Dtlbt 
849 • Bank Sa~ ChN"gn 
850 • EmployaA Ex,..",. 
853 • Cash Ovarl8hort 
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889 ' Lagal &. Accounting 
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Profit & loss 
March 2007 
893 ' Travel & Bn! 
895'Tl'llval 
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Total Other Income 
other ExpttnH 
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MAR-05-z~oe WED 06:30 PM p. 012 
3:49PrJI EVERGREEN·FRITZ 
03/05108 Profit & Loss 





!iOO • Gross s..I.... 8O,MSt35 
502 • NONrA)(AI3LE $All!.S· 3,431.94-
Total 4119 • SALES 83,881.29 
TotallnCOll\~ 83,861.29 
Cost of Goods Sold 
653 • Pun:haaas • Coltar & Co 49,966.62 
855' PurCbasas • othen 3.176.67 
69& • Fre1llilt In 676.30 
751 • Wagas & Payroll Costs 
768 • Worl( Comp 2,792.58 
Tobil T51 • Wages & PlI)'folt Costs 2.792.58 
790 . AdVertl&lng 
197' Advertising -Other -42.00 
Tgt'" 790 • Advertising --42.00 
Total COGS 56,574.11 
OrouProftt 27.3\17.12 
Expense 
6560 • Peyron 
6561 • Regular Payroll 15,BlI7.38 
6562 • Ovvrtlma Payroll 1.323.02 
6560 • Payton - CIIl.r 0.00 
Total 6560 • Payroll 17.310.40 
6&00 • Payroll Tax Expense 
6801 • FlCA gponsc 1.071.62 
6802 • Medlcs1'8 Expense 250.62 
6603, 6UTA EXpens. 11K89 
6804 • FlITA El(pon&9 98.22 
T otIII 6600 - PII)'TOII T me Expenae 1.565.35 
7111 • Insuranco 
825· Insuranee - Store -17.82 
Tota1161 • lneurance -17.82 
798 . Computer SuPPOrt· Triad G17.74 
811'Renl 3,170.00 
813 • utllltlas 688.71 
815 . T"ephono 242.36 
821 • Maln~ & bpalro 511.25 
8!5 • Leased Equlpmant 126.00 
845 • aad bebt 24.11 
Nt . aank Servioe Charges 60.77 
$60 • Emp"""" Expernle 1,331.52 
8'3 • Cesb 0ver1S00rt 321.89 
SH • DonaUons 35.77 
885.- Offio. Supplies" Expense 140.87 
51 . Stor8 Suppllos & Expense 999.57 
Tolal Expense 27,149.15 
~t OrdInIlfY Im;ome 151.97 
other Inoomtlflxpen.e 
other Ineema 
912 • OIher Incoma 5,476.01 










Profit & Loss 
April 2007 
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190 • AdYf:l'tlslng 
797 • AdYariblng • otho'!' 
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85110 • PII)'rOII • Other 
Tolal6560 • Payroll 
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8l1Oi • FICA ElIpenx 
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6604 • FUTA J;xpunse 
Total 6600 . Payroll Tax ~&I\$e 
761 • IIIsUl1l11C& 
760· Ufllinsuranca· Parln.r 
826-~nca.S~ 
ToI&1781 • Insurance 
798 • Computer Support· Triad 
811'Rcnt 
813 • UtiJiU .. 
816' Telephone 
ez1 • Malntenance & Rtpalrs 
83(1- I.e_ad equipment 
84l'I • Bad Dubl 
849 • BlIIlk SIJIVIc» C~ 
850· Employee Expense 
853 • caatI OVll1Short 
865 • Donations 
885 ' OfftCII Buppllot> & ExPIlI15I1 
891 • Store 6uppIK .. ExP*f1,ti8 
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Profit & Loss 
May 2007 
~r !IIQQIJI,/J;l(pt/n .. 
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Schedule 1 
Summary of Business Interruption - FOR ADVANCE PURPOSES ONLY 
Lakeland True ValUe Hardware 
Date of Loss - January 28, 2008 
Description 
January 28,2008 - May 31, 2008 
Lost Revenue 





Temporary Location Expenses 
Total Loss 
Background & Issues: 
Schedule As 
Reference Calculated 





Matson, Driscoll & Damico 
1 
- Period of Restoration has yet to be defined by adjuster. For the purposes of an adva·nce calculation, our projection is from the date of loss 
through the current expected date to re-open per the insured-January 28,2008 through May 31, 2008. 
- We have not received documentation of expenses related to the temporary location from the insured. 
- Calculations presented do not take into account any deductibles or previous advances. 
Summary of Schedules -Lakeland True Value - Schedule 1 Preliminary - For Discussion Purposes Only 
t .. 





Analysis of Lost Revenue - FOR ADVANCE PURPOSES ONLY 
LakeianQ True Value Hardware 
Oate of Loss - January 28. 2008 
Actual Projected Actual 
Period 2001 2008 2008 Loss 
(@ 111.3S·,4) 
Sch 3 
January 28-31 $ 6,632 (A) $ 7.386 $ $ 7,386 
February 39,186 43,645 43.645 
March 61,586 68,594 68,594 
April 83.881 93,427 93,427 
May 126,716 141,136 141.136 









(A) : January 28-31 revenue was calculated by dividing total January 2007 revenue by 30 days, multiplyiOQ by 4. 
\ 
~/ 
Summary of Schedules - Lakeland True Value - Schedule 2 
== I .... .... 
~l 
Matson. OrisCO» & Damico 
Preliminary - For Discussion Purposes Only 
/ 
r Schedule 3 
Analvsis of Revenue - FOR ADVANCE PURPOSES ONLY 
Lakeland True Value Hardware 
Date of Loss - January 28, 2008 
..,.' 
Increase f 
200t~OO7 Month , .. 2005 2005/2006 Decrease 
February nfa $ 37,733 . n/a $ 40.092 
March nfa 45,498 nfa 45,987 
April "fa 65,153 n/a 69,414 
May "fa 87,343 n/a 96,732 
June nfa 76,159 nfa 100,854 
July n/a 81,433 nfa 97,444 
August nfa 72,173 n/a 84,845 
September "fa 65,329 n/a 72,258 
October nfa 57,906 n/a 65,800 
November nfa 56,421 n/a 66,421-
December n/a 17.818 nfa 55,364 
Subtotal n/a 662.,966 n/a 795,211 
January 40,303 39,474 -2.06% 49,738 
Subtotal 40,303 39,474 -2.06% 49,738 
Total $ 40,303 $ 702,440 1642.90% $ 844,949 
Notes: 
- Source: QuickBooks Monthly Profit & Loss Statements 


















= t .... ..... 
~l 
Matson, Driscoll & Damico 
Increase f 
2007/2008 Decrease 






93,270 9.93% J 
78,528 8.68% 
75,296 14.43% 
65,i07 ___ . __ :1.07%t~- . 




$ 885,675 4.82% 
Preliminary - For Discussion Purposes Only 
Schedule 4 
Page 1 of 3 
Analysis of Gross Earnings Less non-Continuing Expenses - FOR ADVANCE PURPOSES ONLY 
Lakeland True Value Hardware 
Date of Loss - January 28, 2008 
Description 
Ordinary Income I Expenses 
Income 
499 - Sales 
500 - Gross Sales 
502 - Nontaxable Safes 
499 - Sales - Other 
Total 499 - Sales 
Total Income 
Cost of Goods Sold 
651 - Inventory Adjustment 
653 - Purchases - Cotter & Co 
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1 know, I don't know it's bad to make a distribution 
2 pending receipt of this because we can adjust it 
3 later? 
4 MR. NICKELS: Objection; speculation. 
5 A. That wasn't our place --
6 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) Okay. 
7 A. so no. 
8 Q. If Ms. Kale would have asked you, "Should I withhold 
9 this distribution pending receipt of this 
10 information," what would have been your response? 
11 MR. NICKELS: Objection; speculation. 
12 A. I -- it wasn't our place to make that call, so I 
13 probably would have put it back on her. 
14 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) And there's numerous references 
15 throughout this case of you trying to complete your 
16 schedules, and what does that mean? If I say that to 
17 you, "I have to complete my schedule for July," what 
18 would that mean to you? 
19 A. In my memory, the main piece that we were continually 
20 trying to obtain was related to the payroll 
21 disbursements. 
22 Q. SO from what I understand before, though, you could 
23 have completed your schedule other than payroll, and 
24 payroll could have been treated separately as far as, 
25 you know, Here's your business income claim and here's 
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the payroll part of it, two separate items? 
MR. NICKELS: Objection; form, foundation, and 
speculation. 
4 A. I suppose it could have been done that way. That 
5 wasn't the way we were asked to do it. 






say "it wasn't the way we were asked to do it," who 
told you how to do it? 
In our conversations with Julia, we would have talked 
over how she would want to see schedules, what 
11 information she needed to have. 











e-mail she wrote me. And she says that you all had 
not received any additional documentation for June or 
July and has been requested multiple times. 
Do you recall requesting additional 
documentation for June or July multiple times? 
I remember multiple e-mails going back and forth where 
we would attach our previous document requests. I 
believe there were document requests issued in June 
and I believe again in July requesting the information 
22 that we were still missing. 
23 Q. And were those -- just to the best of your 
24 
25 
recollection, were those attachments of prior 
correspondence, were those e-mailed to me? 
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OF IDAHO ) 
County of KOOTENAI )SS 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE, ) 
LLC, ) 




THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE ) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER RE: HARTFORD'S 
MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
COMPAN~ ) 
Defendants. ) 
I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. 
Plaintiff Lakeland True Value Hardware LLC (Lakeland) owned a hardware store in 
Rathdrum, Idaho. Complaint, p. 1,1111 1,4. On January 28,2008, due to snow load, the 
roof of the hardware store collapsed, causing immediate cessation of the hardware store 
business. Id., p. 2, 1I 5. Lakeland was insured by The Hartford (Hartford). Lakeland 
made a claim under its policy with Hartford for Lakeland's loss. Id., 11 6. 
On September 4,2008, Lakeland filed this lawsuit against Hartford, alleging delay 
in payment of the claim, bad faith and breach of contract. Id., 1111 7, 8. 0 n August 20, 
2009, Hartford filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, claiming there was no dispute of 
material fact that Hartford had paid Lakeland what was owed under the policy, both for 
the Business Personal Property loss, and under the Business Income portion of the 
policy, and thus, both Lakeland's breach of contract claim and bad faith claim should be 
dismissed. Memorandum in Support of Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 2-
4. Oral argument on the Hartford's Summary Judgment motion was held on November 4, 
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2009. At the conclusion of that hearing, the Court held Lakeland's bad faith (breach of 
the duty of good faith) claim must be dismissed, and summary judgment was granted in 
favor of Hartford because Lakeland had failed to prove that the claim was not fairly 
debatable, primarily due to the fact that Lakeland's demands for amounts due under the 
policy kept changing. Lakeland's breach of contract claims relating to Hartford's 
determination of the "period of restoration" survived summary judgment and remained for 
determination at the jury trial. November 23, 2009, Order Granting Defendant's Motion to 
Compel and Order Granting Defendant's Summary Judgment in Part and Denying in Part, 
pp. 1-2. 
On December 16, 2009, Lakeland filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The basis of 
Lakeland's motion to reconsider was that because Hartford's motion for summary 
judgment was based on the theme that the Hartford had paid all that was owed Lakeland 
under the policy, such theme wasn't the primary issue; the primary issue was delay in 
making payments under the policy. Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration, pp. 1-2. On January 13, 2010, oral argument was held on Lakeland's 
Motion for Reconsideration. At the conclusion of that hearing, the Court denied 
Lakeland's Motion for Reconsideration, finding that the Court had considered Lakeland's 
claims of alleged delay in making payments at the summary judgment hearing and 
decision, that the dispute in value of the claims was caused by Lakeland in the first 
instance, due to: 1) inconsistent and different figures at different times, and 2) due to 
Lakeland's failure to timely provide Hartford with material it had requested. At the 
conclusion of the Court's decision, counsel for Lakeland claimed "the Court just said ... the 
Court is making a finding of fact that it is Lakeland's fault that Hartford didn't timely make 
payments ... that is a finding of fact." Digital record, 12:33:08-27. The Court pointed out 
that the Court was finding that Lakeland had not proven that the claim was not fairly 
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debatable due to Lakeland's unsupported, inconsistent and changing demands upon 
Hartford. 
In spite of that clarification by the Court, on February 4, 2010, Lakeland filed 
"Plaintiff's Second Motion for Reconsideration." This time Lakeland claims: "The Court 
made findings of fact which it cannot do as a matter of law." Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Support of Second Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2. Lakeland states: "This appears 
to be a finding of fact that the delay was Lakeland's fault." Id. Lakeland then made the 
following argument which not only ignores this Court's findings, but shows complete 
misunderstanding of the law of bad faith in Idaho, the elements of that tort, and which 
party bears the burden of proof as to those elements: 
The Court said it was not finding that it was Lakeland's fault, which only 
leaves that the Court found that the issues surrounding the information 
being provided to Hartford at least made it fairly debatable as to whether the 
claim was timely paid. Another way to say it is that the Court found that it is 
at least fairly debatable as to whether or not Hartford was reasonable to 
withhold payment given that a dispute about whether the information was 
being provided exists. Under the Court's holding, there could never be a 
bad faith case if there is a dispute centered on whether the insured 
provided the necessary information for the insurance company to timely pay 
the claim. 
Id. It is unknown how Lakeland can make the claim that " ... Hartford at least· made it fairly 
debatable as to whether the claim was timely paid". In an insurance claim, the ball starts 
rolling with the insured making a claim upon the insurer, putting the insurer on notice of 
the claim. Then the insurer must evaluate that claim and act in good faith. But to prove 
bad faith, the insured must prove that: 1) the insurer denied a claim in which coverage 
was not fairly debatable, and 2) that the insured had proven coverage to the point that 
based on the evidence the insurer had before it, the insurer intentionally and 
unreasonably withheld the insured's benefits. Robinson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company, 137 Idaho 173, 178,45 P.2d 829, 834 (2002). In the present case, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: HARTFORD'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE Page 3 
211&5 
this Court has found that when Lakeland started the ball rolling by making its claim, 
Lakeland made unsupported, inconsistent and changing claim demands upon Hartford. It 
is entirely Lakeland's business for Lakeland to characterize that as this Court laying "fault" 
upon Lakeland, but such exercise is not productive. At summary judgment on Lakeland's 
bad faith claim, fault upon Lakeland is wholly irrelevant. However, proving the claim was 
not fairly debatable and proving coverage to the point that based on the evidence before 
it the insurer then intentionally and unreasonably withheld benefits is not only relevant, it 
is dispositive, and, most importantly, it is Lakeland's burden to prove at summary 
judgment. Because Lakeland made unsupported, inconsistent and changing claim 
demands upon Hartford, at summary judgment Lakeland could not prove its own claim 
was not fairly debatable, and Lakeland could not prove coverage to the point that based 
on the evidence Lakeland had given to Hartford that Hartford then intentionally and 
unreasonably withheld benefits. 
This matter came before the Court for oral argument on February 22, 2010. At the 
conclusion of that hearing, this Court denied "Plaintiff's Second Motion for 
Reconsideration. " 
On February 22,2010, this Court heard oral argument on several other motions. 
The Court denied Lakeland's Motion to Amend Complaint (which sought to add a claim 
for punitive damages when all that is left is Lakeland's breach of contract claim against 
Hartford), granted Hartford's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Robert E. Underdown, and 
denied Hartford's Motion for a Protective Order (regarding some upcoming depositions). 
The Court took under advisement Hartford's Motion in Limine re: Harper and Hartford's 
Motion in Limine re: Damages. This lawsuit is scheduled fo~ a ten-day jury trial beginning 
March 22, 2010. 
I 
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II. ANALYSIS. 
A. HARTFORD'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: (CONSEQUENTIAL) DAMAGES. 
On February 9, 2010, Hartford filed its Motion in Limine Re: Damages, Affidavit of 
Counsel in Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Damages, and Memorandum in 
Support of Motion in Limine Re: Damages. Hartford seeks a ruling from this Court barring 
at the jury trial Lakeland's claims of: 1) consequential damages for any alleged breach of 
contract by Hartford, and 2) expenses and damages that are either personal to the 
owners of Lakeland, Michael and Kathy Fritz, undocumented damages or damages which 
the Hartford has already paid. Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: 
Damages, pp. 1-2. On February 16, 2010, Lakeland filed "Plaintiffs Response to 
Defendant's Motion in Limine." On February 18, 2010, Hartford filed "Reply in Support of 
Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Damages." 
1. Consequential Damages. 
Hartford seeks a ruling in limine from this Court barring Lakeland's claims of 
consequential damages for any alleged breach of contract by Hartford. In addition to 1) 
"Contract damages for lost business income for the balance of the period of restoration, 
January 28th , per the report of Dan Harper $30,400", (these damages are clearly allowed 
if the period of restoration is proven to be later than October 31,2008), Lakeland also 
claims as damage: 2) "Tort damage for lost business income from January 2009 through 
September 2009 per the report of Dan Harper -- $136,400; 3) Contract damages for 
continuing normal operating expenses through the balance of the period of restoration, 
January 28 th , 2009, per the report of Dan Harper -- $24,500; 4) Tort Damages for 
continuing normal operating expenses through September 2009, per the report of Dan 
Harper -- $39,000; 5) True Value back charge for lease hold improvements that had to 
be repaid due to late account status -- $17,219; 6) Miscellaneous charges due to cash 
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flow problems though May 2009; 7) Colonial Pacific Leasing Group has filed suit and 
has obtained a default. The amount of this judgment is not yet determined. Kootenai 
County Case No. CV09-1981; 8) Great American Leasing - Judgment $$51 ,759.58 + 
$657.55, plus interest of 18% per anum; 9) Contract damages for Adjusters International 
-- $16,000; and 10) Punitive damages -- $500,000, or such other sum as a jury deems 
appropriate." Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: 
Damages, Exhibit A: Plaintiff's Fourth Supplemental Response to Defendant's First Set 
of Interrogatories and Requests for Production, pp. 4-5. Lakeland's policy with Hartford 
reads: 
4. Business Income and Extra Expenses Exclusions. We will not pay 
for: 
*** 
b. Any other consequential loss. 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Damages, Exhibit B, 
p. 18. Hartford argues Lakeland is claiming damages beyond the twelve-month period 
following the January 28,2008, roof collapse. That twelve-month period ended on 
January 28, 2009. Hartford argues "These damages were not specifically contemplated 
as recoverable by the parties at the time of contracting because [the above] provision in 
the Policy specifically excludes coverage for consequential damages; rather, they were 
expressly contemplated as damages that were excluded from coverage." Memorandum 
in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Damages, pp. 5. 
Damages recoverable for breach of contract are those that arise naturally from the 
breach and are reasonably foreseeable. Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Inc., 136 
Idaho 879, 884, 42 P.3d 672, 677 (2002); citing Appel v. LePage, 135 Idaho 133, 136-37, 
15 P. 3d 1141, 1144-45 (2000). Damages need not have been precisely and specifically 
foreseeable at the time of contracting, but only reasonably foreseeable by the parties. Id. 
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However, "Under general contract principles, consequential damages are not recoverable 
unless specifically contemplated by the parties at the time of contracting. Id., citing Appel, 
135 Idaho 133,136-37, 15 P.3d 1141, 144-45; Brown's Tie & Lumber Co. v. Chicago 
Title Co. of Idaho, 115 Idaho 56, 61, 764 P.2d 423, 428 (1988); Suitts v. First Sec. Bank 
ofldaho, N.A., 110 Idaho 15,22,713 P.2d 1374, 1381 (1985). Consequential damages 
are not recoverable where they are not specifically contemplated by the parties. Silver 
Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Inc., 136 Idaho 879,884,42 P.3d 672,677, citing Appel, 
135 Idaho 133, 137, 15 P.3d 1141, 145; Brown's Tie & Lumber Co. v. Chicago Title Co. 
of Idaho, 115 Idaho 56, 61,764 P.2d 423, 428. Hartford accurately cites these cases 
(Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Damages, pp. 3-6) for the rule of 
contract law stated in those cases, but these cases do not deal with policy language 
under an insurance contract. Hartford cites other cases for insurance policy provisions 
with identical language to Lakeland's policy with Hartford regarding exclusion of 
consequential damages: Blis Day Spa, LLC v. The Hartford Ins. Group, 427 F .Supp.2d 
621 (2006) (interpreting North Carolina law); and Streamline Capital, LLC v. Hartford 
Casualty Ins. Co., 2003 WL 22004888 (U.S. Dist.Ct. S.D. N.Y. 2003) (interpreting New 
York law). Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Damages, pp. 5-10. 
Streamline is a breach of contract case involving a Hartford policy, specifically 
business income loss and the "period of restoration". Streamline provided computer 
services to other businesses (securities traders, brokers and dealers) in the World Trade 
Center. Streamline's headquarters and many of the businesses Streamline served were 
completely destroyed by the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Hartford paid 
Streamline $200,000 to lease another space, but that space resulted in a conflict with a 
competitor, and Streamline felt it needed to relocate again. Because Hartford would pay 
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no more than the $200,000 to Streamline, Streamline lost the ability to rent space at a 
different location. Streamline sued for not only the additional payments it claimed were 
due under their version of when the "period of restoration" ended, but also for 
"consequential damages, which include business opportunities that were lost because of 
the defendant's alleged failure promptly to meet its payment obligations under the 
contract." 2003 WL 22004888, p. 4. The analysis of that issue in Streamline is set forth 
below, and begins with a discussion of contract law identical to the Idaho cases of Brown' 
Tie & Lumber, Appel and Silver Creek Computers: 
Citing a Second Circuit case that incorporated an earlier New York 
State Court of Appeals ruling, we stated that" 'to recover damages 
beyond those flowing naturally from the breach, "such ... damages must 
have been brought within the contemplation of the parties as the probable 
result of a breach at the time of or prior to contracting." " , Continental, 
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 682, at *15 (quoting Harris v. Provident Life & 
Accident Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 73, 80 n. 3 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting Kenford Co. 
v. County of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, 319, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1,4, 537 N.E.2d 176 
(1989))). We continued: 
Thus, it is clear that unless a plaintiff alleges that the specific 
injury was of a type contemplated by the parties at the time of 
contracting, a claim for consequential damages should be 
dismissed. See Brody Truck Rental, Inc. v. Country Wide Ins. Co., 
277 A.D.2d 125, 126,717 N.Y.S.2d 43, 44 (1st Dept.2000) 
(dismiSSing the action because the insurance contract did not cover 
consequential damages and the parties did not contemplate 
recovery of consequential damages at the time of contracting); 
Martin v. Metropolitan Prop. & Casualty Ins. Co., 238 A.D.2d 389, 
390, 656 N.Y.S.2d 318, 319 (2d Dept.1997) (dismissing action 
where party sought reimbursement for foreclosure allegedly caused 
by non-payment of premiums as foreclosure was not foreseeable at 
the time of contracting). 
Specifically, in order to determine whether such damages 
were within the contemplation of the parties at the time of 
contracting, New York courts take into consideration whether there 
existed a specific provision in the policy itself permitting recovery 
for the loss. See e.g. Brody Truck Rental, 277 A.D.2d 125 at 126, 
717 N.Y.S.2d at 44 (dismissing defendant's claim for consequential 
damages and specifically noting that "the insurance policy ... 
contains no provision or language indicating that recovery of 
consequential damages was within the contemplation of the 
parties. "); High Fashion Hair Cutters v. Commercial Union 
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Insurance Co., 145 A.D.2d 465, 467,535 N.Y.S.2d 425, 427 (2d 
Dept.1998) (holding that the "plaintiff was not entitled to 
consequential or indirect damages since the policy did not contain 
a specific provision permitting recovery for such loss.") Martin, 238 
A.D.2d 389 at 390,656 N.Y.S.2d at 319 (dismissing the claim for 
consequential damages and explaining that " ... the contract of 
insurance does [not] contain any language which permits recovery 
for consequential damages."). 
Continental, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 682, at *15-*16. 
Here, the complaint does not even allege that the parties 
contemplated at the time of contracting that Streamline would incur 
additional harm from financing costs and loss of business in the event 
Hartford failed promptly to meet its obligations under the Policy. Nor is 
there a provision in the Policy making Hartford liable for such damages. 
And significantly, the Policy itself contains a provision specifically 
disclaiming any liability on Hartford's part for such losses. Specifically, the 
Exclusions section of the Policy reads: 
4. Business Income and Extra Expense Exclusions. We will not 
pay for: 
a. Any Extra Expense, or increase of Business Income loss, 
caused by or resulting from: 
(1) Delay in rebuilding, repairing or replacing the property or 
resuming "operations", due to interference at the location of the 
rebuilding, repair or replacement by strikers or other persons; or 
(2) Suspension, lapse or cancellation of any license, lease or 
contract. But if the suspension, lapse or cancellation is directly 
caused by the suspension of "operations", we will cover such loss 
that affects your Business Income during the "period of restoration". 
b. Any other consequential loss. 
Policy at 11 (PI. Cross-Motion Ex. A at STM 61). 
The meaning of this provision is unambiguous. Black's defines 
"consequential/oss" as 'Taj loss arising from the results of damage rather 
than from the damage itself." Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed.1999). 
Losses that Streamline incurred only because of Hartford's alleged failure 
promptly to meet its obligations under the Policy are clearly losses arising 
from the results of the damage at the World Trade Center rather than 
from the damage itself. Thus, the language of the contract, a key factor 
under New York law in determining whether consequential damages for 
breach of an insurer's policy obligations were within the contemplation of 
the parties, in this case further demonstrates that the parties did not 
anticipate the insurer would be liable for such damages. See Crawford 
Furniture Mfg. Corp. v. Pa. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 244 A.D.2d 881, 
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668 N.Y.S.2d 122, 122-23 (4th Dep't 1997) (reversing trial court's denial of 
motion to dismiss request for consequential damages where "[p]laintiff 
failed to establish that such damages were reasonably foreseeable or 
contemplated by the parties" and "the contract at issue contain[ed] a 
provision excluding from business interruption coverage 'any other 
consequential loss" '). 
Plaintiff relies heavily on Sabbeth Indus. v. Pa. Lumbermens Mut. 
Ins. Co., 238 AD.2d 767, 656 N.Y.S.2d 475 (3d Dep't 1997). In that case, 
the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court dealt with a trial 
court ruling prohibiting plaintiff from amending its complaint to include a 
claim for consequential damages on the ground that the insurance policy 
lacked express provisions or other language demonstrating that recovery 
of consequential damages was contemplated. Sabbeth Indus., 238 
AD.2d at 767-68, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 476-77. The Appellate Division 
overruled, calling the lack of express policy language dealing with 
consequential damages "immaterial," and concluding that, in view of the 
"specific protection [business interruption] coverage provides, ... 
consequential damages were reasonably foreseeable and within the 
contemplation of these parties." Id. at 477. 
We believe Sabbeth is inconsistent with the weight of authority of 
New York cases, which have focused on the specific language of the 
contract to find that consequential damages were within the contemplation 
of the parties at the time of contracting. Those cases include cases we 
cited in Continental, such as Brody Truck Rental, 277 A.D.2d at 126, 717 
N.Y.S.2d at 44 (1st Dep't 2000), High Fashion Hair Cutters, 145 AD.2d at 
467,535 N.Y.S.2d at 427 (2d Dep't 1998), Martin, 238 AD.2d at 390,656 
N.Y.S.2d at 319 (2d Dep't 1997); as well as Sweazey v. Merchants Mut. 
Ins. Co., 169 AD.2d 43, 45, 571 N.Y.S.2d 131, 132 (3d Dep't 1991) 
(reversing trial court's refusal to strike claim for consequential damages 
and stating that consequential damages "must have been brought within 
the contemplation of the parties as a probable result of a breach at the 
time of or prior to contracting" and finding that U[t]he insurance policy in 
this case contains neither provisions nor language which demonstrates 
that recovery of consequential damages was within the contemplation of 
the parties"). See also Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. ABM Indus., Inc., 01 Civ. 
11200(JSR), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8973, at *15-*16 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 
2003) (dismissing, in declaratory judgment action, defendant's claim for 
consequential damages based on 1) court's rejection of some of the 
claims for breach of contract underlying the consequential damages claim, 
and 2) court's finding that defendant "utterly failed to specify nature of its 
alleged consequential damages or adduce competent evidence showing, 
as required for any such claim, that the consequential damages were 
foreseeable and within the contemplation of the parties at the time the 
contract was made") (citations omitted). 
Moreover, Sabbeth did not include the compelling fact that exists 
here: that the only contract language specifically dealing with 
consequential damages precludes them. Thus, we conclude that making 
the insurer liable for consequential damages stemming from the insurer's 
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own alleged breach was not within the contemplation of the parties at the 
time of contracting, and we grant defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's 
claim for consequential damages. 
Streamline, 2003 WL 22004888, pp. 4-7. (bold and italics added). Lakeland argues: 
Reliance on this case [Streamline] is frivolous. This is an unpublished 
federal case interpreting New York law in 2003 and the interpretation is not 
a correct statement of current New York law on the subject. 
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion in Limine, p. 2. Reliance on Streamline is in 
fact not frivolous. Streamline is solidly on point. Streamline is in fact not an "unpublished" 
decision, but is simply a decision not reported in Federal Supplement 2d. Streamline 
concerns the same insurance company, Hartford. Streamline concerns identical policy 
language to that of the present case. Streamline interprets New York state case law on 
contracts which is similar, if not identical, to Idaho case law on contracts. 
Lakeland claims Bi-Economy Market, Inc. v. Harleysville Ins. Co. of New York, 10 
N.Y.3d 187, 194,886 N.E.2d 127,856 N.Y.S.2d 505 (N.Y. 2008), involves a policy that 
"was almost identical to the policy in this case". Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's 
Motion in Limine, p. 2. Nowhere in the Bi-Economy decision is the consequential damage 
exclusion discussed. The Bi-Economy decision makes no mention of an "appraisal 
provision" in the applicable insurance contract. Thus, without that policy language, it is 
difficult to understand Lakeland's argument that the policy "was almost identical to the 
policy in this case." Apparently Lakeland claims Bi-Economy is the correct current 
statement of New York law on the subject. Id. What Lakeland ignores is the fact that Bi-
Economy is a bad faith case, and Streamline was not a bad faith case. Lakeland's case 
is no longer a bad faith case, as summary judgment has been granted against Lakeland 
in favor of Hartford on Lakeland's bad faith claims. The foll,?wing quote from Bi-Economy 
shows that it is a bad faith case, and shows how important the fact that it is a bad faith 
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case is to the majority's decision: 
Thus, the very purpose of business interruption coverage would 
have made Harleysville aware that if it breached its obligations under the 
contract to investigate in good faith and pay covered claims it would have 
to respond in damages to Bi-Economy for the loss of its business as a 
result of the breach (see Sabbeth Indus. v Pennsylvania Lumbermens 
Mut. Ins. Co., 238 AD2d 767, 769 [3d Dept 1997]). 
10 N.Y.3d 187, 195,886 N.E.2d 127, 132,856 N.Y.S.2d 505, 510. (italics added). A 
breach of the covenant to act in good faith is the tort of bad faith. The dissent in Bi-
Economy shows how intertwined the tort of bad faith was intertwined with the decision to 
allow a claim for consequential damages: 
The majority achieves this simply by changing labels: Punitive 
damages are now called "consequential" damages, and a bad faith failure 
to pay a claim is called a breach of the "covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing." 
10 N.Y.3d 187,196,886 N.E.2d 127, 133,856 N.Y.S.2d 505, 511. 
Bi-Economy, in turn, cites several cases for the proposition that an exclusion 
provision regarding consequential loss does not bar recovery of consequential damages. 
10 N.Y.3d 187, 188. One of those cases is, Hold Brothers~ Inc. v. Hartford Casualty Ins. 
Co. 357 F.Supp.2d 651 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Another case is the first version of Lava 
Trading, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 326 F.Supp.2d 434 (SD.N.Y. 2004), 
These cases must be discussed. 
Neither Lakeland nor Hartford discussed Hold Brothers, Inc. v. Hartford Casualty 
Ins. Co. 357 F.Supp.2d 651 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), in their briefing or in oral argument. Hold 
Brothers is the case that Lakeland should have been advocating this Court adopt. Hold 
Brothers is factually very similar to Streamline. Hold Brothers was in the securities 
trading and software development business, and had just completed about $1 million in 
improvements in their offices in the World Trade Center when that office was 
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completely destroyed in the September 11,2001, terrorist attacks. 357 F.Supp.2d 651, 
653. Hartford insured Hold Brothers for property damage and loss of business income. 
357 F.Supp.2d 651,652. The reasoning in Hold Brothers is as follows: 
Hartford maintains that, at any rate, the Policies expressly exclude 
recovery of consequential losses. Thus, Hartford argues that 
notwithstanding Hold Brothers' allegation that "[t]he parties understood 
and contemplated that a breach by Hartford of its obligation to pay 
business income and/or extra expense losses under the Policies would 
likely cause Hold Brbthers to suffer further loss of income and/or extra 
expenses," (footnote omitted) Hold Brothers fails to state a claim for 
consequential damages. Specifically, Hartford points to two exclusions in 
the Policies. First, the Policies state that Hartford "will not pay for loss or 
damage caused by or resulting from ... Consequential Losses: Delay, loss 
of use or loss of market." (footnote omitted) Second, under the heading 
"Business Income and Extra Expense Exclusions," the Policies provide 
that: 
[Hartford] will not pay for: 
a. Any Extra Expense, or increase of Business Income loss, 
caused by or resulting from: 
(1) Delay in rebuilding, repairing or replacing the property or 
resuming 'operations,' due to interference at the location of the 
rebuilding, repair or replacement by strikers or other persons; or 
(2) Suspension, lapse or cancellation of any license, lease or 
contract. But if the suspension, lapse or cancellation is directly 
caused by the suspension of 'operations,' we will cover such loss 
that affects your Business Income during the 'period of restoration.' 
b. Any other consequential loss. FN52 
FN52.ld. § BA. (emphasis added). 
Hartford contends that these provisions excluding coverage for 
consequential losses preclude Hold Brothers' claim for consequential 
damages resulting from Hartford's alleged breach of the Policies.FN53 
FN53.See Hartford Mem. at 13; J.R. Adirondack, 739 N.Y.S.2d at 
797 (dismissing claim for consequential damages because "[t]he 
insurance policy at issue here expressly excludes coverage for 
consequential losses"); Crawford, 668 N.Y.S.2d at 122-23 (holding 
that consequential damages are unavailable because "[p]laintiff 
failed to establish that such damages were reasonably foreseeable 
or contemplated by the parties when the contract was formed ... 
and, indeed, the contract at issue contains a provision excluding 
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from business interruption coverage 'any other consequential 
loss" ') (citations omitted). 
Hold Brothers responds that the cited provisions are coverage 
exclusions and have no bearing on the availability of consequential 
damages resulting from breach.FN54 
FN54.See Memorandum of Law in Opposition at 13-15; see also 
Lava Trading, 326 F .Supp.2d at 442 ("The scope of a policy's 
coverage and the damages that are recoverable if the insurer 
breaches the policy are, of course, distinct concepts."). 
"Under New York law, the initial interpretation of a contract is a matter of 
law for the court to decide." (citation footnote omitted). "Part of this 
threshold interpretation is the question of whether the terms of the 
insurance contract are ambiguous." (citation footnote omitted). "Where 
there are alternative, reasonable constructions of a contract, i.e., the 
contract is ambiguous, the issue should be submitted to the trier of fact." 
(citation footnote omitted). For the purposes of this motion, it is only 
necessary to say that the provisions cited by Hartford do not 
unambiguously exclude the recovery of consequential damages 
resulting from breach of the Policies. Neither provision makes any 
reference to losses or damages resulting from breach; on the 
contrary, both provisions appear in the context of exclusions of 
coverage for certain kinds of losses. Hold Brothers' construction is, 
therefore, eminently reasonable. FN58 
FN58.See Lava Trading, 326 F.Supp.2d at 442 (holding that an 
identical provision "speaks only to what constitutes a covered 
loss under a policy of insurance, and not to what remedies are 
available for breach of a policy"); but see Streamline Capital, 
2003 WL 22004888, at *7 (holding that the same provision 
precludes consequential damages resulting from breach). 
Thus, while the cited policy language may ultimately have a direct bearing 
on what damages for breach were within the contemplation of the parties 
at the time of contracting, a question of fact exists as to whether these 
provisions exclude the recovery of consequential damages. 
Having determined that (1) New York law requires that in order to 
recover consequential damages for breach of an insurance policy, the 
policyholder must show only that such damages were within the 
contemplation of the parties as the probable result of a breach at the time 
of or prior to contracting and (2) the provisions of the Policies excluding 
consequential losses do not unambiguously exclude the recovery of 
consequential damages, I conclude that Hold Brothers' claim for 
consequential damages satisfies the permissive pleading standard of Rule 
8. In keeping with this standard, Hold Brothers need not plead specific 
facts to support its claim; it is more than sufficient at this stage that Hold 
Brothers has alleged that "[t]he parties understood and contemplated that 
a breach by Hartford of its obligation to pay business income and/or extra 
expense losses under the Policies would likely cause Hold Brothers to 
suffer further loss of income and/or extra expenses." FN59 Thus, Hold 
Brothers has adequately pled a claim for consequential damages. 
(footnote omitted). 
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FN59. Compl. 11 17. Hartford argues that Hold Brothers fails to 
state a claim for consequential damages because the complaint 
fails to allege that the parties contemplated that Hartford would be 
liable for the specific consequential damages sought. See Hartford 
Mem. at 7. Not only is this argument out of sync with Swierkiewicz 
v. Sorema and the rest of the Supreme Court's and Second 
Circuit's Rule 8 jurisprudence, but it is also premised on a 
misreading of Kenford. On a motion to dismiss, a court must draw 
all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. It is reasonable to infer 
from Hold Brothers' allegations that Hartford assumed liability for 
losses resulting from a breach of the contract. In any case, as 
stated earlier, in order to impose liability for consequential 
damages, the plaintiff must show that such "unusual or 
extraordinary damages ... [were] within the contemplation of the 
parties as the probable result of a breach." Kenford, 73 N.Y.2d at 
319,540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 537 N.E.2d 176 (emphasis added). 
357 F.Supp.2d 651,658-660. (bold added). The bold portion of the Hold Brothers 
decision shows the court in Hold Brothers found the exclusion of consequential 
damages provision to be ambiguous. In making that finding, the Hold Brothers decision 
at footnote 58 cites the first Lava Trading (Lava Trading Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 
326 F.Supp.2d 434, 441 (S.D.N.Y.2004)) decision. As shown below, that first Lava 
Trading decision found the exclusion clause unambiguous, but distinguished between 
"covered loss" under a policy of insurance, versus "what remedies are available for 
breach of a policy". In the second Lava Trading (Lava Trading Inc., v. Hartford Fire 
Insurance Company, 365 F.Supp.2d 434 (S.D.N.Y 2005)) decision, the court tackled 
the exclusionary clause on consequential damages directly, and held that the language 
of the exclusionary clause regarding consequential damages, coupled with the 
arbitration provision, made it clear that "consequential damages that this plaintiff seeks 
were not contemplated as a foreseeable consequence of a breach of Hartford's duty to 
pay under the Policy." 365 F.Supp.2d 434, 448. 
As shown above in the bold and italicized portion of the analysis in Streamline, 
the Court in Streamline specifically found the exclusionary language unambiguous: 
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The meaning of this provision is unambiguous. Black's defines 
"consequential loss" as "[a] loss arising from the results of damage rather 
than from the damage itself." Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed.1999). 
Streamline, 2003 WL 22004888, p. 5. (italics added). Lava Trading did not really 
mention ambiguity, but the decision obviously finds the exclusionary clause on 
consequential damages to not be ambiguous. Blis Day Spa (discussed below) did not 
mention ambiguity, but the decision obviously finds the clause not ambiguous. Thus, 
the only case that finds the clause ambiguous is Hold Brothers, and the court in Hold 
Brothers makes that conclusion by making the distinction between exclusion of 
coverage vs. damages, a distinction which no other case makes. 
Lava Trading Inc., v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 365 F.Supp.2d 434 
(S.D.N.Y 2005) also involves Lava Trading's lost business which was destroyed in the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. As a result of that 
destruction, Lava Trading had to relocate its business. Lava Trading also sought 
damages for its costs to secure funding, for damages resulting from loss of clients and 
from damages resulting from the alleged loss of future business growth. 365 F.Supp.2d 
434,445. 
The portion of Lava Trading which discusses consequential damages shows how 
important the "appraisal provision" in the applicable insurance contract was to the Federal 
District Court judge: 
In Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 
537 N.E.2d 176 (1989) (UKenford 11"), the New York Court of Appeals held 
that "[i]t is well established that in actions for breach of contract, the 
nonbreaching party may recover ... such unusual or extraordinary 
damages [as] have been brought within the contemplation of the parties 
as the probable result of a breach at the time or prior to contracting." Id. at 
319,540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 537 N.E.2d 176 (citations omitted). In order to 
determine what damages are reasonably contemplated by the parties, 
"the nature, purpose and particular circumstances of the contract known 
by the parties should be considered ... as well as 'what liability the 
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defendant fairly may be supposed to have assumed consciously, or to 
have warranted the plaintiff reasonably to suppose that it assumed, when 
the contract was made.''' Id. (citations omitted; emphasis added); see 
also Trademark Research Corp. v. Maxwell Online, Inc., 995 F.2d 326, 
332-33 (2d Cir.1993) (finding that plaintiff had "failed to establish its lost 
future profits with the degree of certainty required by Kenford [ ] ... and 
has failed to establish that liability for such damages were contemplated 
by the parties at the time of contracting."). As the quoted language makes 
clear, the availability of consequential damages in a given case requires 
an examination of: (1) the particular contract at issue; (2) whether there 
has been any conscious assumption of liability by a contracting party; and 
(3) whether, by words or deeds, one party was reasonably led to believe 
that the other had assumed such liability. Thus, as indicated in my prior 
rulings on the subject, the Court in Kenford " looked to whether there was 
a "provision in the contract" or "any evidence in the record to demonstrate 
that the parties, at any relevant time, reasonably contemplated or would 
have contemplated that the [defendant] was undertaking a contractual 
responsibility" for the consequential damages sought by the plaintiff. 
Kenford 11,73 N.Y.2d at 320,540 N.Y.S.2d 1,537 N.E.2d 176 (emphasis 
added); see also Trademark Research Corp., 995 F.2d at 334 (finding that 
"[t]he record contains no specific evidence that, at the time of contracting, 
[defendant] accepted liability for nine years of lost profits. No evidence 
was offered that the parties ever discussed lost profits liability."). 
In order to prevail, Lava is required to " 'establish that liability for 
[the consequential damages sought] were contemplated by the parties at 
the time of contracting.' " Lava Trading Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 
2004 WL 943565, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 3,2004) (quoting Trademark 
Research Corp., 995 F.2d at 332-33). Plaintiff must present evidence "of 
'what the parties would have concluded had they considered the subject,' 
or that, in light of the parties' discussions on the subject, one party would 
have been led to believe that the other was assuming liability for such 
damages." Id. 
On its motion for summary judgment, Hartford has pointed to a lack 
of any such evidence, and has presented evidence that neither it nor 
plaintiff contemplated that Hartford would be liable for consequential 
damages in the event of a breach. "In moving for summary judgment 
against a party who will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, the 
movant's burden will be satisfied if he can point to an absence of evidence 
to support an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim." 
Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Fdn., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d 
Cir.1995); see also Gallo v. Prudential Residential Services, L.P., 22 F .3d 
1219, 1223-24 (2d Cir.1994) ("[T]he moving party may obtain summary 
judgment by showing that little or no evidence may be found in support of 
the nonmoving party's case."). "In other words, the moving party does not 
bear the burden of disproving an essential element of the nonmoving 
party's claim." Bussa v. Afitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 2004 WL 
1637014, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Ju1.21, 2004). In light of Hartford's initial 
showing that there is no evidence that the parties contemplated, or that 
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Hartford reasonably warranted, that Hartford would be liable for the 
consequential damages sought here in the event of a breach of the Policy, 
the burden shifts to Lava to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial," and it cannot rest on "mere allegations or denials" 
of the facts asserted by the movant. Rule 56(e), Fed.R.Civ.P. 
In opposition to Hartford's motion, Lava points only to internal 
Hartford documents demonstrating that Hartford was aware of the 
reasons why people buy business interruption coverage, and the 
importance of resolving such claims promptly to minimize actual lost 
income. Thus, Lava quotes from certain training materials that 
acknowledge that when a business is experiencing downtime, its net 
earnings may be affected, and that swift action on the part of the insurer 
may be beneficial to the policy holder. Lava also relies on certain 
advertising materials in which, it asserts, Hartford touts the type of policy 
at issue as security against "unexpected loss [ ] wip[ing] out your bottom 
line" (Bauer Exh. I at HCAS 02545) and claims that "you simply can't 
afford to be caught short on insurance protection" (Bauer Exh. K at HCAS 
02539). Lava also relies on certain statements from Hartford claim 
adjuster Peter Pollicino, who acknowledged, not surprisingly, that a lack of 
insurance coverage could "be deadly to a business" and/or "wipe out" a 
business financially. Bauer Cert. Exh. L at 471. 
None of this "evidence," however, creates a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether Hartford was assuming liability for 
consequential damages in the event of a breach. The evidence adduced 
by Lava simply illustrates the rather unremarkable proposition that 
business interruption insurance is meant to insure against loss of 
business income and other expenses, and that if a company does not 
have such insurance, they stand the risk of financial consequences if they 
are not otherwise prepared. It is a significant leap of reasoning to 
conclude from this that Hartford understood that it would be liable for the 
consequential damages sought here, or was warranting to Lava that it 
would be so liable. No reasonable jury could conclude otherwise. 
. Of course, New York law also requires that the Court consider "the 
nature, purpose and particular circumstances of the contract known by the 
parties" in determining whether consequential damages are available. 
Kenford II, 73 N.Y.2d at 319,540 N.Y.S.2d 1,537 N.E.2d 176. The 
Appellate Division, Third Department, has held that "[t]he very purpose of 
business interruption coverage would make defendant aware that if it 
breached the policy it would be liable to plaintiffs for damages for the loss 
of their business as a consequence of its breach or made it possible for 
plaintiffs reasonably to suppose that defendant assume such damages 
when the contract was made." Sabbeth Industries Ltd. v. Pennsylvania 
Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Co., 238 A.D.2d 767, 769, 656 N.Y.S.2d 
475 (3d Dep't 1997). But in Sabbeth, the insurer disclaimed any coverage 
under the policy, and plaintiff sought the "lost value of its business" and 
other damages. It is not clear from the Court's opinion which of these 
losses would have been due under the policy had the insurer met its 
obligations. Certainly, if an insurer breaches its policy, it should expect to 
be liable for covered losses under the policy. But most importantly, 
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Sabbeth was decided in the context of a motion to dismiss. As in 
Sabbeth, I denied Hartford's motion to dismiss and have given Lava the 
opportunity to prove its allegations. This plaintiff's "consequential damage" 
claim fails because there is no evidence to support it. 
Nothing in the Policy before me would lead either the insured or the 
insurer to understand that the insurer, in the event of breach, would be 
liable for costs to secure funding that should have been provided by 
Hartford, the loss of clients or the loss of future business growth. Lava 
relies on language in the Policy itself that provides, for example, that there 
is no dollar limit for business interruption coverage, which is limited only 
by a maximum of twelve months plus thirty days. Policy at LA V 0028 & 
0029. From this provision, and the fact that the Policy was designed to 
pay Lava for certain expenses and lost income during the period it could 
not operate (up to a maximum of 13 months), Lava extrapolates that 
'lbJoth parties understood ... that Lava's lost income would be greater if 
(1) business interruption coverage were denied or delayed; or (2) of the 
Period of Restoration were miscalculated or abbreviated by Hartford's own 
wrongdoing; and (3) that Hartford would be responsible for paying the 
costs of its delay or wrongdoing." Lava Br. at 18. Lava's conclusion, 
however, does not follow from the cited Policy provisions. Indeed, it is 
undermined by the fact that the Policy contemplates substantial delay in 
payment, during which time both the insured and the insurer presumably 
are assessing the losses, the insured is submitting its claim, and any 
differences between the insured and insurer are resolved. See Policy at 
LA V 0035-0038 (providing, inter alia, that the insurer will pay for a covered 
loss within 30 days of receiving the Signed statement of loss only if (1) the 
insured has complied with all of the terms of the Policy and (2) the insured 
and the insurer have agreed upon the amount of the loss or an appraisal 
award has been made). Thus, the Policy contemplates that a period of at 
least 90 days may pass before Hartford indicates its intentions with 
respect to a claim, and contemplates payment within 90 days (or less) of a 
covered loss only if the insured has complied with all the terms of the 
Policy and the insured and insurer have reached an agreement as to the 
amount of the loss or "an appraisal award has been made." Id. The 
Policy sets forth an explicit dispute resolution mechanism, to be 
conducted by an appraiser, that either party may invoke in the event of 
any disagreement as to the amount of loss. Id. at LAV 0036. (There is no 
evidence in the record before me on this motion that Lava ever sought, or 
obtained, an appraisal award, or indeed made any claim other than that 
made in January 2002. See Pis. 56.1 Response 1f 21.) In short, contrary 
to Lava's position that the Policy language would lead Hartford to 
understand that any delay in payment or disagreement with respect to the 
claim would render it liable for the consequential damages sought, the 
Policy explicitly recognizes that delay (including potential delay of more 
than three months) is foreseeable. 
Although the Policy language may have a direct bearing on 
whether damages sought were within the contemplation of the parties, it is 
not necessarily controlling on the issue. Lava Trading Inc. v. Hartford Fire 
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Insurance Co., 326 F.Supp.2d 434, 442 (S.D.N.Y.2004). I have 
considered the Policy exclusions and payment provisions cited by Lava in 
support of its contention that liability for consequential damages are 
contemplated by the Policy, as well as the entirety of the Policy, and 
conclude they, either alone or in conjunction with other evidence, do not 
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the parties 
contemplated consequential damages of the kind and character sought. 
The loss of business income that arises from a covered loss such 
as the destruction of the World Trade Center was, indeed, contemplated 
by the parties. That was the purpose of the contract of insurance. But, 
with the benefit of the full summary judgment record before me, I 
conclude that the consequential damages that this plaintiff seeks were not 
contemplated as a foreseeable consequence of a breach of Hartford's 
duty to pay under the Policy. The parties knew that Hartford would be 
liable for the sums paid and they knew that if those sums were not paid, 
Hartford would be liable for simple interest at 9% per annum from the date 
of the breach. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5001 & 5004 (McKinney's 1992 & 
2005 Supp.); Feb. 16, 2005 Tr. at 18. In response to Hartford's motion, 
Lava has failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether anything 
further was contemplated. 
365 F.Supp.2d 434, 445-448. (italics added) This appraisal dispute resolution 
provision was important to the court in this second Lava Trading decision. Counsel for 
Hartford in the present case noted Lava Trading involved a dispute resolution 
mechanism, to be conducted by an appraiser, which either the insured or the insurer 
could invoke in the event of any disagreement as to the amount of loss. Reply in 
Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Damages, p. 9. Hold Brothers also seems 
to have involved an appraisal provision (357 F.Supp.2d 651,655, footnote 23), but that 
fact does not enter into the court's decision in Hold Brothers in finding the 
consequential damage exclusion to be ambiguous. 
As mentioned above, Hold Brothers cites the first Lava Trading decision: Lava 
Trading Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 326 F.Supp.2d 434, 441 (S.D.N.Y.2004). The 
analysis in that case of the consequential damages exclusion is as follows: 
Consequential Damages Claim 
Although the New York Court of Appeals has not addressed the 
specific issue of the availability of consequential damages in a case 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND OROER RE: HARTFORO'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE Page 20 
??()? -- -
alleging a breach of an insurance policy, the leading New York case on 
the availability of consequential damages generally in a breach of contract 
action is Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 
537 N.E.2d 176 (1989). In Kenford, the Court of Appeals held that "[i]t is 
well established that in actions for breach of contract, the nonbreaching 
party may recover ... such unusual or extraordinary damages [as] have 
been brought within the contemplation of the parties as the probable 
result of a breach at the time or prior to contracting." Kenford, 73 N.Y.2d 
at 319,540 N.Y.S.2d 1,537 N.E.2d 176. In order to determine what 
damages are reasonably contemplated by the parties, "the nature, 
purpose and particular circumstances of the contract known by the parties 
should be considered ... as well as 'what liability the defendant fairly may 
be supposed to have assumed consciously, or to have warranted the 
plaintiff reasonably to suppose that it assumed, when the contract was 
made.''' Id. (citations omitted). In the absence of an express contractual 
provision with respect to the consequential damages sought, "the 
commonsense rule to apply is to consider what the parties would have 
concluded had they considered the subject." Id. at 320, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 
537 N.E.2d 176 (citation omitted; emphasis in the original). 
Thus, in Kenford, which did not involve an alleged breach of an 
insurance policy, the Court looked to whether there was a "provision in the 
contract" or "any evidence in the record to demonstrate that the parties, at 
any relevant time, reasonably contemplated or would have contemplated 
that the [defendant] was undertaking a contractual responsibility" for the 
consequential damages sought by the plaintiff in that case (Le., 
compensation for the lack of appreciation in the value of plaintiffs land in 
the event a stadium was not built). Ken ford, 73 N.Y.2d at 320, 540 
N.Y.S.2d 1, 537 N.E.2d 176. The Court of Appeals found that 
consequential damages were unavailable in that case because "the 
[defendant] never contemplated at the time of the contract's execution 
that it assumed legal responsibility for these damages upon a breach of 
the contract." Id. 
Other courts have recognized that consequential damages may be 
available for breach of an insurance contract, see, e.g., Landoif 
Resources Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Services, Inc., 1991 WL 
33412, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y.1991), but, as with any breach of contract, " 'to 
recover damages beyond those flowing naturally from the breach, "such ... 
damages must have been brought within the contemplation of the parties 
as the probable result of a breach at the time of or prior to contracting." , " 
Streamline Capital, L.L. C. v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Co., 2003 WL 
22004888, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.25, 2003) (quoting Continental Information 
Systems Corp. v. Federal Insurance Co., 2003 WL 145561, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan.17, 2003); (other citations omitted)). "[U]nless a plaintiff 
alleges that the specific injury was of a type contemplated by the parties 
at the time of contracting, a claim for consequential damages should be 
dismissed." Streamline, 2003 WL 22004888, at *5 (citing Brody Truck 
Rental, Inc. v. Country Wide Insurance Co., 277 A.D.2d 125,126,717 
N.Y.S.2d 43, 44 (1 st Dep't 2000), appeal dismissed, 96 N.Y.2d 854, 729 
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N.Y.S.2d 669, 754 N.E.2d 772 (2001), and Martin v. Metropolitan Property 
& Casualty Insurance Co., 238 AD.2d 389,390,656 N.Y.S.2d 318, 319 
(2d Dep't 1997)). 
Plaintiff relies on Sabbeth Industries Ltd. v. Pennsylvania 
Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Co., 238 AD.2d 767, 656 N.Y.S.2d 475 
(3d Dep't 1997) in support of its claim for consequential damages for 
defendant's breach of the Business Insurance Policy at issue in this case. 
In Sabbeth, the Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed that part of 
the trial court's ruling that denied the plaintiff leave to amend its complaint 
to include a claim for consequential damages, concluding that in light of 
the "specific protection [business interruption] coverage provides ... 
consequential damages were reasonably foreseeable and within the 
contemplation of the parties." 238 AD.2d at 769, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 477. I 
need not decide on this motion whether the Third Department's view that 
the very nature of a business interruption policy can support a claim for 
consequential damages would be adopted by the New York Court of 
Appeals. Here, in contrast to the allegations in the Streamline case, 
plaintiff has alleged that consequential damages were in fact within the 
contemplation of the parties (Complaint 1118), which allegation I accept for 
the purposes of this motion. Thus, this case is very different from 
Streamline in this respect. 
It is true that Lava's Policy does not contain a specific provision or 
language permitting the recovery of consequential damages. I do not 
read the Appellate Division cases cited in defendant's papers, which 
appear to apply the rule as set forth in Kenford, as setting forth any such 
requirement. See, e.g., Brody Truck Rental, 277 AD.2d at 126, 717 
N.Y.S.2d 43 (granting insurer's summary judgment motion where liability 
policy at issue "contains no provision or language indicating that recovery 
of consequential damages was within the contemplation of the parties ... 
and no factual issue has been otherwise raised as to whether the parties 
intended that [the insured] would be able to recover damages due to lost 
business and/or profits") (citations omitted; emphasis added); Martin, 238 
AD.2d at 390, 656 N.Y.S.2d 318 (granting motion to dismiss claim for 
consequential damages arising out of breach of "loss of use" provision of 
property insurance policy where "it was neither foreseeable nor within the 
contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract-that failure to pay 
loss of use benefits would result in foreclosure and the consequential 
damages flowing therefrom. Nor does the contract of insurance contain 
any language which permits recovery for consequential damages.") 
(emphasis added). Sabbeth is a later Third Department decision than 
Sweazey v. Merchants Mutual Insurance Co., 169 AD.2d 43, 45, 571 
N.Y.S.2d 131, 132 (3d Dep't 1991), and I must assume that Sabbeth 
better reflects how the Third Department would rule on the issue. 
Similarly, Martin is a later Second Department decision than High Fashion 
Hair Cutters v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 145 AD.2d 465, 535 
N.Y.S.2d 425 (2d Dep't 1988), and is presumably an accurate statement 
of that Court's view. Without further guidance from the New York Court of 
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Appeals or the Appellate Divisions, I would apply Kenford to contracts of 
insurance such as that at issue in this case. 
The Policy at issue in this case does expressly exclude "any other 
consequential loss" from its Business Income and Extra Expense 
coverage. See Policy at LA V 00034. Not surprisingly, the parties have 
differing views as to the significance of this provision. Lava argues that 
the policy excludes only "certain consequential losses". However, the 
unambiguous language excludes "any other consequential loss" 
(emphasis added). Lava also argues that the term "consequential loss" is 
not coextensive with "consequential damages", or at the very least, is 
ambiguous. To suggest that the terms, themselves, have different 
meanings is to stretch the meaning of "loss" and "damages" beyond their 
natural meaning. Indeed, courts routinely make no distinction between 
the two. See Mu Chapter of the Sigma Pi Fraternity of the United States, 
Inc. v. Northeast Construction Services Inc., 273 A.D.2d 579, 581,709 
N.Y.S.2d 677, 679 (3rd Dep't 2000) (finding "consequential damages ... 
precluded under the terms of the contract" where construction contract 
provided that "[o]wner waives all rights of action against the [c]ontractor 
for loss of use of the [o]wner's property, including consequential losses 
due to fire ... however caused.") (alterations in original), appeal denied 
sub nom., CNA Insurance Companies v. Northeast Construction Services, 
95 N.Y.2d 768, 744 N.E.2d 141,721 N.Y.S.2d 605 (2000) (Table); Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co. v. General Time Corp., 704 F.2d 80 (2d Cir.1983) 
(where policy provided for recovery of "all direct and consequential loss" 
from property damage, insured could recover loss profits resulting from 
physical injury to property); EeDC Environmental, L.C. v. New York 
Marine and General Insurance Co., 1999 WL 777883 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.29, 
1999) (policy covering "any consequential loss or damage" from accidents 
covers consequential damages including loss profits). 
However, a policy exclusion speaks only to what constitutes a 
covered loss under a policy of insurance, and not to what remedies are 
available for breach of a policy. The scope of a policy's coverage and the 
damages that are recoverable if the insurer breaches the policy are, of 
course, distinct concepts. Payment to an insured for a covered and non-
excluded loss is performance under the contract of insurance. Breach of 
the contract of insurance is an entirely different matter governed by the 
present day successors to Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 E.R. 
145 (1854) such as the Kenford case discussed above. See Pape v. 
Home Insurance Co., 139 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.1943); Acquista v. New York 
Life Insurance Co., 285 A.D.2d 73, 81,730 N.Y.S.2d 272, 278 (1 st Dep't 
2001) (" 'Although the policy limits define the amount for which the insurer 
may be held responsible in performing the contract, they do not define the 
amount for which it may be liable upon a breach.' ") (quoting and adopting 
the reasoning of Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 
(Utah 1985»; accord Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 118 
N.H. 607, 611,392 A.2d 576 (1978) (collecting cases for the proposition 
that "[t]he policy limits restrict the amount the insurer may have to pay in 
the performance of the contract, not the damages that are recoverable for 
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its breach"). The policy language may have a direct bearing, but will not 
always be controlling, on the damages that were within the contemplation 
of the parties at the time of a contract. 
Thus, even if a policy exclusion such as that excluding "any other 
consequential losses" in this case does not speak to what damages may 
be recovered, the existence of such a provision in the Policy in this case 
may be relevant to the inquiry of whether consequential damages are 
available. As noted, whether consequential damages are available in a 
given case depends, in part, on the intent of the parties, that is, whether 
such damages were reasonably foreseeable and in the contemplation of 
the parties at the time of contracting. Defendant argues that even if this 
exclusion does not in itself preclude recovery of consequential damages, 
it reflects the parties' intention that consequential damages were not 
contemplated. The Fourth Department of the Appellate Division appears 
to agree with this position. See J.R. Adirondack Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Hartford Casualty Insurance Co., 292 A.D.2d 771,739 N.Y.S.2d 795 (4th 
Dept' 2002) (exclusion for "any other consequential loss" in insurance 
policy precludes claim for consequential damages for breach of that 
policy); Crawford Furniture Mfg. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Lumbermens 
Mutual Insurance Co., 244 A.D.2d 881,688 N.Y.S.2d 122 (4th Dep't 1997) 
(same). Of course, the opposite conclusion can also be drawn: that by 
specifically addressing consequential losses and then expressly excluding 
them from policy coverage, consequential damages were a type of injury 
that the parties recognized might arise. Or, it may be that the policy 
provision does not speak at all to what damages might arise by virtue of 
the insurer's breach of the Policy. 
Assume a hypothetical policy allowed recovery for consequential 
losses up to $50,000. Would that mean that the parties contemplated 
that, in the event of a breach, there could be consequential damage but 
that they would be unlikely to exceed $50,000, or would that indicate 
precisely the opposite, i.e., that consequential damages exceeding 
$50,000 would be likely but that, in agreeing upon a premium in exchange 
for policy coverage, the parties were excluding them from policy 
coverage? Or would some other interpretation be the most plausible? 
Just as the policy language would be inconclusive in the foregoing 
example, so, too, do I conclude, in the context of this motion to dismiss, 
that the consequential loss exclusion at issue in this case is inconclusive. 
The ultimate question remains: what damages were in the 
reasonable contemplation of the parties in the event of breach by the 
insurer at the time they entered into the contract of insurance? In this 
case, Lava has alleged that U[t]he parties understood '" that a breach by 
Hartford of its obligation to pay business income and/or extra expense 
losses under the Business Insurance Policy would likely cause Lava to 
suffer further loss of income and/or extra expense." Complaint 1{18. 
While it remains to be proven whether this is indeed true, and whether the 
parties contemplated that the type of consequential damages alleged to 
be available here would be the likely result of a breach by Hartford, as well 
as whether Lava even suffered any losses attributable to Hartford's 
alleged breach, for the purposes of this motion pursuant to Rule 12(b )(6), 
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I must take plaintiff's allegations as true and draw all reasonable 
inferences in plaintiff's favor. In the absence of Policy language (which is 
incorporated into the Complaint) that negates, as a matter of law, that 
consequential damages were contemplated, the allegation suffices for 
purposes of this motion to dismiss. Therefore, I decline to dismiss 
plaintiff's claim for consequential damages at this stage of the litigation. 
326 F.Supp.2d 434, 439-443. In the later (2005) Lava Trading decision, it is written: 
In a March 18,2004 Memorandum and Order, 326 F.Supp.2d 434 
(S.D.N.Y.2004), I granted in part and denied in part Hartford's motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., holding that Lava had 
adequately pled a claim for consequential damages. As I made clear, "it 
remains to be proven ... whether the parties contemplated that the type of 
consequential damages alleged to be available here would be the likely 
result of a breach by Hartford, as well as whether Lava even suffered any 
losses attributable to Hartford's alleged breach .... " 326 F.Supp.2d at 443. 
Hartford now moves for partial summary judgment dismissing Lava's claim 
for consequential damages. It also seeks a ruling, pursuant to Rule 56(d), 
Fed.R.Civ.P., that the "period of restoration" provided for in the Policy 
ended on April 30, 2002 and that certain business income losses are not 
covered because they are excluded as consequential losses or are 
speculative. For the reasons set forth herein, Hartford's motion for 
summary judgment dismissing Lava's claim for consequential damages is 
granted. 
365 F.Supp.2d 434, 436. 
The other cases cited in Bi-Economy (10 N.Y.3d 187, 188) are not on point. 
Sabbeth Industries Limited v. Pennsylvania Lumberman's Mutual Insurance Company, 
238 A.D.2d 767, 656 N.Y.S.2d 475, (N.Y.A.D. 1997), would at first glance seem to allow 
consequential damages when only breach of the insurance contract is alleged (ie., no bad 
faith claim is alleged). However, a close reading of that case shows that there was no 
exclusion clause against consequential damages such as is present in the instant case. 
Kenford Co., Inc. v. County of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, 540 N.Y.2d 1 (N.Y. 1989), did not 
concern an insurance contract and did not concern an exclusionary clause on 
consequential damages. Carney v. Memorial Hasp. and Nursing Home of Greene 
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County, 101 A.D.2d 990,477 N.Y.S.2d 735 (N.Y.A.D.,1984), adds nothing as it did not 
concern an insurance policy, but merely stands for the proposition that punitive 
damages will not be allowed under New York case law in a breach of contract case. 
In the present case, Hartford also cites to Blis Day Spa, LLC v. The Hartford Ins. 
Group, 427 F.Supp.2d 621 (W.D.N.C. 2006). Blis Day Spa, similar to Streamline, 
concerns the same insurance company as the present case, Hartford. Blis Day Spa 
concerns identical policy language to that of the present case. The exclusion of 
consequential damage clause is identical to that of the present case. Blis Day Spa also 
concerned an appraisal provision, similar to that found in the present case, and that 
appraisal provision was important in the Federal District Court's reasoning as shown 
below. Blis Day Spa interprets North Carolina state case law on contracts which is 
similar, if not identical, to Idaho case law on contracts. In Blis Day Spa, the trial court, 
similar to the present case, found the insured's bad faith claim to be without merit, 
holding: " ... the Court finds Plaintiffs have fail to demonstrate that Hartford's refusal to 
pay the claim was not because of a legitimate, "honest disagreement" as to the validity 
of the claim or innocent mistake." 427 F.Supp.2d 621,633. The Federal District Judge 
in Blis Day Spa held: 
In its motion for summary judgment Defendant asserts that not only 
is there no provision in the Business Policy making Hartford liable for 
consequential damages, but the policy specifically excludes from business 
interruption coverage "any other consequentialloss."FN7 
(FN7) 
.4. Business Income and Extra Expense Exclusions. We will 
not pay for: 
a. Any Extra Expense, or increase of Business Income loss, 
caused by or resulting from: . 
(1) Delay in rebuilding, repairing or replacing the property or 
resuming "operations," due to interference at the location of the 
rebuilding, repair or replacement by strikers or other persons; or 
(2) Suspension, lapse or cancellation of any license, lease 
or contract. But if the suspension, lapse or cancellation is directly 
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caused by the suspension of "operations", we will cover such loss 
that affects your Business Income during the "period of restoration". 
b. Any other consequential loss. 
Hartford also contends that Heil's estimates of consequential damages 
are too speculative. In light of Defendant's initial showing, the burden 
shifts to Plaintiffs to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for triaL" Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(e). Having examined the 
record, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to offer sufficient 
evidence, in the contract or otherwise, that at the time of contracting that 
the parties contemplated, or that Hartford reasonably warranted, 
Defendant would be liable for the consequential damages of the kind and 
character sought here in the event of a breach of the Business Policy. 
The Court first notes that Plaintiffs offer no evidence, or even 
allege, that the parties contemplated at the time of contracting recovery of 
consequential damages of the type sought in the' instant case. 
Second, the Court does not find any specific provision or language 
in the Business Policy itself that would lead either the insured or the 
insurer to understand that in the event that the parties had a reasonable 
dispute over business expenses Hartford would be liable for loss of future 
business growth. Plaintiffs do not contend that the Business policy 
provisions specifically excluding from business interruption coverage 
consequential losses have no bearing on the availability of consequential 
damages from an alleged breach. Rather, it appears Plaintiffs tacitly 
accept that the lost profits that they incurred because of Hartford's failure 
to pay all dispute amounts under the Business Policy are unambiguously 
consequential lasses within the meaning of the policy. Thus, the Court 
finds nothing in the Business Policy language would lead Hartford to 
understand that any delay in payment or disagreement with respect to the 
claim would render it liable for the consequential damages sought in the 
instant case. 
Third, the Court also finds no evidence from which the parties could 
presume special. Plaintiffs do not even allege that the parties 
contemplated at the time of contracting that Plaintiffs would incur 
additional harm from loss of business in the event Hartford failed to pay 
disputed sums under the Business Policy. Furthermore, any argument 
that such consequential damages that result from delay in disputed 
payments are foreseeable is further forestalled by the appraisal 
provision,FN8 
(FNB.) 
The Appraisal of Property Loss provision provides: "If we or 
you disagree on the value of the property or the amount of loss, 
either may make a written demand for an appraisal of the loss ... A 
decision agreed to by any two [of the appraisers and/or umpire] will 
be binding." 
the purpose of which is to avoid precisely the sort of damage caused by a 
lengthy delay in payment as exists in the instant case. 
Finally, because courts are instructed to examine "the nature of the 
contract itself," the absence of a provision in the contract providing for 
such damages is not necessarily controlling on the issue of whether 
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damages sought were within the contemplation of the parties. To this end, 
Plaintiffs contend that "the purpose of the policy is to put the parties in the 
position they would have been in had no fire occurred. Had the defendant 
honored its contractual obligations the plaintiffs would have had the cash 
necessary to continue moving forward with its business operations." The 
Court finds the Plaintiffs' lone argument is unpersuasive as it rests not on 
the basis of anything Hartford may be presumed to have known at the 
time of contracting, but rather merely on the type of insurance that 
Plaintiffs purchased. As noted in Lava Trading Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. 
Co., 
[t]he evidence ... simply illustrates the rather unremarkable 
proposition that business interruption insurance is meant to insure 
against loss of business income and other expenses, and that if a 
company does not have such insurance, they stand the risk of 
financial consequences if they are not otherwise prepared. It is a 
significant leap of reasoning to conclude from this that Hartford 
understood that it would be liable for the consequential damages 
sought here, or was warranting ... that it would be so liable. 
Id. 365 F.Supp.2d 434, 446 (S.D.N.Y.2005). 
Having considered the entirety of the Business Policy, the Court 
concludes that the parties knew that Hartford disclaimed business 
interruption coverage for consequential losses, and that in the event of a 
disagreement, either party could seek appraisal. Because the 
consequential damages that plaintiffs seek were not contemplated as a 
foreseeable consequence of a breach of Hartford's duty to pay under the 
Business Policy, the Court need not consider whether Heil's estimates are 
as a matter of law too speculative. 
427 F.Supp.2d 621, 638-640. This Court finds this reasoning to be sound. Similar to the 
court's finding in Blis Day Spa: "Plaintiffs offer no evidence, or even allege, that the 
parties contemplated at the time of contracting recovery of consequential damages of 
the type sought in the instant case" (427 F.Supp.2d 621,639), this Court has examined 
the Complaint and the Amended Complaint in the present case, and Lakeland has not 
alleged that Lakeland and Hartford contemplated consequential damages at the time 
their insurance contract was entered into. Just as in Blis Day Spa: " ... the Court does 
not find any specific provision or language in the Business Policy itself that would lead 
either the insured or the insurer to understand that in the event that the parties had a 
reasonable dispute over business expenses Hartford would be liable for loss of future 
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business growth." Id. In the present case, loss of profits beyond the "period of 
restoration" would be the claimed non-covered loss, instead of lost future business 
growth. 
This Court is persuaded by Bfis Day Spa, Streamline, and Lava Trading, and finds, 
due to the unambiguous language of the exclusionary clause regarding consequential 
damages, and due to the arbitration provision, consequential damages in the present 
case must be excluded. Hartford's Motion in Limine Re: (Consequential) Damages is 
granted. 
B. HARTFORD'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: DAN HARPER. 
On February 8,2010, Hartford filed Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Expert Dan 
Harper and Memorandum in Support. In that twenty-eight page memorandum, Hartford 
claims Lakeland's expert, Dan Harper, should be limited in his testimony in several areas. 
Lakeland filed a five-page response brief on February 16, 2010. 
First, Hartford claims regarding the issue of "reasonableness of the adjuster's 
actions", that such issue is a) no longer relevant and b) Harper agreed in his deposition 
that he cannot testify as to reasonableness. Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Expert 
Dan Harper and Memorandum in Support, pp. 1-5,8-11. This Court agrees on both 
grounds. The "reasonableness of the adjuster's actions" is largely irrelevant, given that 
there is no bad faith cause of action, given the fact that there will be no punitive damage 
claim, and given that all that remains is whether Hartford breached its contract with 
Lakeland (which in turn revolves around the determination of the applicable period of 
restoration). If there is any relevance, Harper himself has admitted he cannot testify as to 
reasonableness. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: 
Expert Dan Harper and Memorandum in Support, Exhibit A, p. 18, L. 5 - p. 19, L. 7; p. 
136, L1. 13-23. Harper is not a claims adjuster and is not an insurance professional. 
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Harper has agreed to limit his opinions to three of his reports. Affidavit of Counsel in 
Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Expert Dan Harper and Memorandum in 
Support, Exhibit A, p. 75, L1. 15-18. Lakeland does not contest Harper's inability to testify 
about reasonableness of Hartford's actions. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion in 
Limine Concerning Dan Harper, pp. 1-2. Instead, Lakeland focuses on the relevance of 
"reasonableness", claiming "it was not reasonable or necessary to withhold payment 
under the schedules to properly determine the final amount of the claim." Id., p. 2. While 
the "final amount of the claim" is what is at dispute, "reasonableness" of Hartford's actions 
is no longer relevant. Hartford's Motion in Limine as to Harper's testimony on the 
"reasonableness of the adjuster's actions" is granted. 
Second, Hartford claims that any opinions of Harper as to any claim valuation 
beyond January 28, 2009, is irrelevant as such would be beyond the one year limitation 
(from the date of the roof collapse) on the policy. Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: 
Expert Dan Harper and Memorandum in Support, pp. 11-13. Lakeland simply responds 
with a "foreseeability" argument. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion in Limine 
Concerning Dan Harper, p. 2. Foreseeability is discussed above regarding consequential 
damages, and the contractual exclusion of consequential damages, and thus, is not a 
valid argument. Due to the Court's decision above regarding consequential damages, 
Hartford's Motion in Limine as to Harper's testimony as to any claim valuation beyond 
January, 28, 2009, is granted, as such opinion testimony is not relevant. 
Third, Harford claims Harper cannot testify about "unreimbursed inventory losses", 
because Harper has not explained his opinion and because he simply reiterates Frtiz' 
testimony. Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Expert Dan Harper and Memorandum in 
Support, pp. 13-14. Those are not sufficient grounds to grant Hartford's Motion in Limine. 
Admissibility of this testimony will depend on what foundation can be laid at trial. 
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Hartford's Motion in Limine to keep Harper from testifying about "unreimbursed inventory 
losses" is denied. 
Fourth, Hartford claims Harper cannot testify about the amount of damages if the 
"period of restoration" had been later than October 31,2008, because he has not given 
an opinion on that matter. Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Expert Dan Harper and 
Memorandum in Support, pp. 15-16. Indeed, Harper admits he has not been asked to 
calculate those damages. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine 
Re: Expert Dan Harper and Memorandum in Support, Exhibit A, p. 84, L. 7 - p. 85, L. 8. 
Because Lakeland has not disclosed such opinion by Harper as to the amount of 
damages if the "period of restoration" had been later than October 31,2008, Hartford's 
Motion in Limine precluding Harper from testifying about such is granted. 
Fifth, Hartford claims Harper's first and second reports fail to satisfy the 
requirements of I.R.E. 702 and Daubert. Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Expert Dan 
Harper and Memorandum in Support, pp. 17-28. Hartford claims Harper cannot rendered 
an opinion about the ability of Lakeland to reopen as Harper has not formed any opinion 
as to what would be required to open the store. Id., pp. 17-18. Harford also claims 
Harper's opinion ignores the actual facts of this case. Id., pp. 18-19. Even if Hartford's 
claims are true, Lakeland must be given the opportunity to develop Harper's foundation at 
trial. Hartford claims Harper will testify about "continuing normal operating expenses 
incurred, including payroll", even though such is precluded under the policy. Id., pp. 19-
20. Specifically, Hartford objects to rental fees paid and attorney fees paid. Id. However, 
Hartford failed to set forth which portions of the policy prohibit such. Hartford claims 
Harper is errant in suggesting the Fritzes were making no draws from insurance 
proceeds. Id., p. 21. This Court finds Harper should be allowed to explain such. Hartford 
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claims other math errors and foundation problems for Harper's opinions. Id., pp. 22-28. 
Hartford will certainly be allowed to inquire about these matters at trial, but this Court 
cannot at this time prohibit Harper's testimony on these matters. Hartford's Motion in 
Limine under I.R.E. 702 and Daubert must be denied at this point. 
III. ORDER. 
IT IS HERBY ORDERED Hartford's Motion in Limine Re: (Consequential) 
Damages is GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Hartford's Motion in Limine as to Harper's testimony 
on the "reasonableness of the adjuster's actions" is GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED due to the Court's decision above regarding 
consequential damages, Hartford's Motion in Limine as to Harper's testimony as to any 
claim valuation beyond January, 28, 2009, is GRANTED, as such opinion testimony is not 
relevant. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Motion in Limine to keep Harper from testifying about 
"unreimbursed inventory losses" is DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that because Lakeland has not disclosed such 
opinion by Harper as to the amount of damages if the "period of restoration" had been 
later than October 31,2008, Hartford's Motion in Limine precluding Harper from testifying 
about such is GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Hartford's Motion in Limine under I.R.E. 702 and 
Daubert must be at this point be DENIED. 
Entered this 8th day of March, 2010. 
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THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV -08-7069 
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTI1N TO 
RECONSIDER [filed March 8, 201d] 
BASED UPON plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider filed March 8, 2010, and argument 
thereon at the hearing of March 9, 2010, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider this Court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Hartford's Motions in Limine, filed March J, 2010, is 
I 
hereby GRANTED IN PART, for those reasons as stated by the Court at the hearing otMarch 9, 
I 
2010. Specifically, the Court will allow plaintiffs expert, Dan Harper, to testify I regarding 
" 
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plaintiffs damages in this action total no more than $19,052, which amount will be su ~ect to 
I 
cross-examination by defendant at the time of triaL 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an other aspects of plaintiffs Motion to Reoonsider 
I 
are DENIED, and all prior decisions of the Court, including those relating to bah faith, 
consequential damages, and the scope of Mr. Harper's testimony at the time of trial (JcePt as 
described above), remain unchanged. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this ~'~ay of March, 2010. 
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1423 N. Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Keely E. Duke 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & 
BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
o U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid o Hand Delivered o Overnight Mail 
EJ Tclecopy v~S--1.J, qD 
o U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid o Hand Delivered o Overnight Mail 
G21 Telecopy !J,D'g - 315 .-~~S 
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER [filed March 8, 20101- 2 
???I ---
ARTHVR M. BISTLINE 
BISTLINE LA W, PLLC 
1423 N Govenunent Way 
Coeur d'Alene, [D 83814 
(208) 665-7270 
(208) 665-7290 (fax) 
abistline@povn.com 
ISB: 5216 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
I -
STATE OF IDAHU } 
COUNT\, O~ ~<DC:TU'jN SS 
JILED 
lOIOMM? 19 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICI~L DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
I 
I 
LAKELAND TRUE V ALUE HARDWARE, ase No.: CV -08-7069 
L.L.C., 
FFIDA VIT OF ARTHUR M. BISTLINE IN 
Plaintiff, SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONTINUE 
vs. 
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation, 
Defendant. 
ST ATE OF IDAHO ) 
) S8. 
County of Kootenai ) 
I, Arthur M. Bistline, having been first duly sworn, upon oath depose and state that: 
1) Attached as Exhibit A are true and correct copies of the cited portions of the deposition 
transcript of Melanie Copley. 
2) Attached as Exhibit B are true and correct copies of the cited portions of the deposition 
transcript of Michelle Reynolds. 
3) Attached as Exhibit C are true and correct copies of the cited portions of the deposition 
transcript of Julia Kale. 
4) Dan Harper is a resident of the State of Washington and this Court cannot compel his 
attendance at this trial. . 
AFFIDAVIT OF ARTHUR M. BISTLINE IN SUPPORT Qf MOTION TO CONTINUE - 1 
???? ----
i 
5) All statements of counsel set forth in the Memorandum in Support of this Motion to 
Continue are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge an~ the entire contents 0 that 
memorandum are incorporated here as if set forth in full. 
DATED this (1(1ray of March, 2010. 
~----------
ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this IT d ... 
" .. .-.,1 .... 
..... 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
fer
v 
I hereby certify that on the __ /aay of March, 2010, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Keely E. Duke 
Bryan A. Nickels 
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1271 
Boise, ID 83701 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
~and Delivered 




AFFIDAVIT OF ARTHUR M. BISTLINE fN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONTINUE : - 2 
Lakeland True Value Hardware, L.L.C. v. The Hartford ~ire Insurance Co. CV-OB-7069 
Michelle Reynolds March 1, 2010 
Page 29 
1 MS. DUKE: Object to the form. I think 
2 that assumes facts not in evidence. 
3 BY MR. BISTLINE: 
4 Q. Okay. Let me just rephrase it. At some 
5 point after I filed suit, did you inform anybody at 
6 Sedgwick and/or Hartford that no business income 
7 payment had been made since -- welf' for anything 
8 other than up through the month of June? 
9 MS. DUKE: And again, I'm going to need 
10 you to narrow the time frame because you may be 
11 invading the attorney-client privilege at some 
12 point, obviously_ 
13 BY MR. BISTLINE; 
14 Q. Let's just say right after the suit was 
15 filed, before you talked to an attorney, did you 
16 inform anybody at The Hartford, other than your 
17 lawyer, that no business income payment had been 
18 made for July, August or September? 
19 A. Personally, no. 
20 Q. And why hadn't a payment been made for 
21 those months? 




Q. And what documentation was missing? 
MS. DUKE: Objection. Foundation. You 
Reported By: Beverly J. Gramm, RPR www.huseby.com 
HUSEBY, INC. - 1230 W. Morehead Street, ~40e, Charlotte, :Nor1:h Carolina 2820a (900) 333-2092 
----_ .. _------------
Lakeland True Value Hardware, L.L.C. v. The Hartford Fire Insurance Co. CV-08-7069 
Melanie R. Copley March 1, 2010 
Page 12 
1 if you reference the claim notes, it looks like 
2 based on this report they authorized another $73,000 
3 in business income, which would be the difference 
4 between 123,951 minus the 50 that has already been 
5 advanced. Does that sound correct? 
6 A. I have a question as to who authorized. 
7 Q. Well, it's in your claim notes that as 
8 soon as they received the second schedule I believe 







And I guess my question is this. As of 
13 the end of May when you had these new updated 
14 schedules, it's your testimony you didn't have 
15 anything to put together an estimate of the next few 
16 months of business income loss? 
17 A. And I would tell you that based on my 
18 review of the file, I still think that there was 
19 missing financial information that did not allow us 




Q. Okay. What was missing? 
A. For specific missing information you'd 
have to go back and talk to MD&D. I will tell you 
24 that we typically ask for the last either two or 
25 three years financial information, which would 
Reported By: Beverly J. Gramm, RPR www.huseby.com 
HUSE:BY. INC. - 1230 W. Morehead Street, H408, Charlotte, Horch Carolina 26206 (BOOI 333-2082 
.,.,.,~ ---,' 
Lakeland True value Hardware, L.L.C. v. The Hartford Fire Insurance Co. CV-08-7069 
Michelle Reynolds March I, 2010 
Page 13 
1 to the policy? 
2 A. It just indicated to me that they had just 
3 crunched some more numbers. This in itself does not 
4 necessarily tell me that there was sufficient 
5 evidence or sufficient documentation to say this was 
6 an accurate figure. 
7 
8 what 
Q. Okay. Now, on this documentation issue, 
the only place I could find in the claim 
9 notes where you talk about documentation being 
10 lacking occurs at page 131 in the claim notes. 
11 A. Let me get there. Okay. I'm on that 
12 page. 
13 Q. And do you see that where you're saying 
14 you don't have enough information to make a further 
15 advancement. At the top of the page, I believe. 
16 A. There's a note from May 9th. Is that the 






That's it. I'm sorry. 
Okay. 
MS. DUKE: So what's the question? 
21 BY MR. BISTLINE: 
22 Q. The question is what information did you 
23 think you were missing at that point? 
24 
25 
A. I'd have to look at that entire file to 
tell you specifically. I mean, it's indicated in 
Reported By: Beverly J. Gramm, RPR www.huseby.com 
HUSEBY, I~C. - 1230 W. Morehead Street. ti408. Charlotte, -North Carolina 26206 (BOOI 333-2082 
???. --- ) 
Lakeland True Value Hardware, L.L.C. v. The Hartford Fire Insurance Co. CV-OB-7069 
Michelle Reynolds March I, 2010 
Page 14 
1 the note that we're looking for the insured's cost 
2 to replace the damaged stock, that had not been 
3 received in the file, and to get back with our 
4 accountants regarding where they stood on their 
5 status with their numbers. 
6 Q. Okay. So I guess at that point you have 
7 to assume for me that this is true, that the first 
8 schedules actually told you how to calculate 
9 business income other than payroll. 
10 But at that pOint you didn't realize that 
11 MD&D had already provided you with the information 
12 to calculate the business income claim through the 





MS. DUKE: Okay. Misstates the evidence. 
Misstates the documents. Foundation. You can 
go ahead and answer if you can. 
A. Okay. Can you repeat the question? I'm 
18 sorry. 
19 BY MR. BISTLINE: 
20 Q. I'll try it a different way. The first 
21 set of schedules, Exhibit 3, those schedules contain 
22 the revenue that was generated by Lakeland in the 
23 year 2007 and 2000 -- or -- yes, 2006, 7. Well, 
24 basically '07 into '08, because we had the collapse 
25 in early '08. 
Reported By: Beverly J. Gramm, RPR www.huseby.com 
HUSEBY, INC. - 1230 W. Morehead Street, #408, Charlotte, 'North Carolina 28208 (8001 J3J-20B2 
2221 
Lakeland True Value Hardware, L.L.C. v. The Hartford Fire Insurance Co. CV-08-7069 
Michelle Reynolds March 1, 2010 
Page 15 
1 I'm asking you, did you understand that 
2 you can take those figures on page 3 of that 
3 schedule and you could multiply them times the 
4 projected increase in sales, which'is that 11 







percent figure, did you understand, that's how you 
could calculate the business income for any month 
the year 2000 
MS. DUKE: Same objections. 
A. The projected numbers are just that, 
they're just projections. If there was additional 
12 information that was needed by the accountants to 
13 verify those numbers, that's what they would have 
14 been requesting. 
18 
in 
15 Projected numbers can fluctuate based upon 
16 seasonal influxes, economic influxes. We can't 
17 it's not -- it would not be accurate to use one set 
18 of numbers across the board. 





And who told you that? 
It wouldn't. I mean, sales in a hardware 
22 store, retail, fluctuate with the economy, fluctuate 
23 with the customer base, fluctuate with seasonal 
24 issues. It just would not -- what you do in January 
25 would not necessarily be what you would do in July. 
Reported By: Beverly J. Gramm, RPR www.huseby.com 
HUSEBY, INC. - 1230 W. Morehead Street, M40a, Charlotte, .NOrt:h Carolina 28208 (800) 333-2082 
Lakeland True Value Hardware, LL.C. v. The Hartford Fire Insurance Co. CV-OB-7069 
Julia Kale March 1, 2010 
Page 73 
1 to you that you were behind, for lack of a better 
2 term, by about $73,951? 
3 MS. DUKE: Same objections. 
4 A. It provided the documentation to show 
5 additional payment warranted that we did not 
6 previously have. 
7 BY MR. BISTLINE: 
8 Q. And who told you that it -- that you 
9 had -- I mean, who told you you didn't have the 
10 information to generate this schedule prior to this 
11 time? 
12 MS. DUKE: Object to the form. She didn't 
13 generate the schedule. 
14 BY MR. BISTLINE: 
15 Q. Did -- at some point you received a 
16 schedule and you hadn't had it prior to that point. 
17 Had anybody at your accounting firm told you that we 
18 cannot generate this schedule because we don't have 
19 the information we need? 
20 A. Amy at Matson & Driscoll· had continuously 
21 advised that we were missing documentation needed to 
22 have another schedule. 
23 Q. Did she ever indicate to you that the 
24 missing documentation somehow impeded her ability to 
25 properly evaluate the claim? 
Reported By: Beverly J. Gramm; RPR www.huseby.com 
HUSEBY, INC. - 1230 W. Morehead Street, #408, Charlotte, North Carolina 28208 (800) 333-2082 
------------_.-.------------ .-
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ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
LA W OFFICE OF ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
1423 N. Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 665-7270 
(208) 665-7290 (fax) 
ISB: 5216 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF WASHINGTON) 
) 55. 
County of Spokane ) 
Case No: CV -08-7069 
FFIDA VIT OF DAN HARPER 
I, Dan Harper, having been first duly sworn, upon oath depose and state that: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen (18) and a resident of Spokane County, Washington; 
2. I am familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding this matter and am 
competent to testify as to the matters herein contained; 
3. I am employed at Harper, Inc.; 
4. ] understand the Lakeland True Value trial, which was scheduled to start March 22,2010, has 
now been rescheduled for April 19,20] O. (have had a long planned vacation for two weeks 
starting April] 7 through May I. As such I will not be able to testify during that time period; 
5. I also have trials starting the weeks of May 3rd and May 17th. While I would prefer not to 
schedule trial testimony on two cases in the same week I am willing to do so, given I will be 







in town, and in order to facilitate the COLlrt if these would be acceptable alternate dates. 
have 110 other plans to be out of town prior to November of this YFal' and can accommodate 
any altel'Oative dates the court chooses. 
DATED this K day of March, 2010. 
SUBSCRTBED AND SWORN to bdore me this 1'7~dav of March, 2010. -- . , 
_~ ,., - /;.ulQ~;L.-
NOTARY P . LIC in arid for Washington 
Residing at: ...)pOk..l.u1£ 
Commission Expires: 01;;2,3/~OII 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that on the Jq ~ay of March, 2010, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed (0 the 
following: 
Keely E. Duke [ ] 
Bryan A. Nickels [ ] 
Hall. Farley, Oberrccht & Blanton, P.A. [) 
PO Box 1271 M 
Boise, ID 83701-1271 [ ] 






~ BY: . ~~I ~ 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAN HARPER 
-2 
----------------------------'---- ---- '-'----- '--
.,."" I --,,) 
ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
BISTLINE LAW, PLLC 
1423 N Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 665-7270 
(208) 665-7290 (fax) 
abistline@povn.com 
19B: 5216 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
I 
I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICJL DISTRICT 
I 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 






ase No.: CV-08-7069 
LAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CONTINUE 
RIAL 
Plaintiff moves this Court for a continuance on the grounds that Plaintiff's expert witness 
is unavailable for trial on the present date set. This motion is supported by the Affidavits of 
Arlhur M. Bistline, Daniel Harper, CPA and the memorandum in support. 
DATED this 19th, day of March, 2010. 
~----
ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CONTINUE - 1 
----------- ---
??"~? __ 41:J_ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE i 
I hereby certify that on the &~ay of March, 2010, I served a!true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Keely E. Duke 
Bryan A. Nickels 
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1271 
Boise, ID 83701 
PLAINTiFF'S MOTION TO CONTINUE 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 




STATE 0::: !cif~rlU 
COUNTv Cr' K(Y 
Fl~ 
Keely E. Duke 
ISB #6044; ked@hal1farley.com 
Bryan A. Nickels 
ISB #6432; ban@hallfarley.com 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395·8500 
Fa.csimile: (208) 395·8585 
W;\3\3-472.9\Continue Trial-Memo in Opp.doc 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE rWmWARE, 
L.L.C., , 
Case No. CV·08-7069 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM: IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO CONTINUE TRIAL 
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSuRANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation, 
Defendmit. , 
COMES NOW, defendant Hartford Fire Insurance Company ("Hartford"), by and 
I 
through its tmdersigned counsel of record, and hereby submits its opposition to plaintiff's Motion 
i I 
to Continue ("plaintiff's Motiqn"), filed March 19, 2010.1 For the reasons stated herein, the 
1 Plaintiff has failed to me an accordant Motion to Shorten Time, leaving defendant only 2 business dah to respond 
in advance of the hearing noticed for March 24, 2010. Plaintiff has not explained why its motion was not filed 
immediately after the March 9, 2010 hearing resetting the trial date in this matter. 
, I 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO' 
/"nN'TIN1TF. TRTAI .. - 1 
, I 
Apri119. 2010 trial date should ~ot be vacated based simply on the unavailability of plaintiff's 
1 
expert for live testimony at the tUne of tria1. 
ARGUME~ 
I 
Plaintiff's argument is siinPly that, as its expert Dan Ha:rper is una.vailable durin'g the two 
I I 
tria) weeks in this matter, plaintif.f' cannot pu.t Mr. Hazper on to offer rebuttal testimony rollowing 
i i 
testimony by Hartford's acooun#ng witnesses. However, as discussed below. the trial! date was 
! I 
I 
agreed-to by plaintiff's counsel~ plaintiff still retains the right to secure a trial depo$ition, the 
, I 
, I 
olaimed needed scope of rebutt~ testimony is otherwise inadmissible. and plaintiff alteady had 
I , . ; 
the opportunity (through deposipon) to ascertain the infonnation now claimed to be n~ded. For 
, 
these reasons. as discussed belo~, plaintiffs Motion should be denied. 
I 




Trial in this matter was: previously set to commence on March 22, 2010. However, at 
, I 
hearing on March 9, 2010, the :court and the panies agreed that the maner could bel reset to a 
, . : 
I : 
two-week setting commencing ~April 19, 2010. At that hctlring, plaintiff's counsel could have 
: i 
proposed an alternative date ba~cd upon the availability of its expert witness, Mr. Halper. but it 
I ' 
I 
did not. Further, Plaintiff's co~sel could have even agreed to a 4-day trial during ~e original 
, : 
I _ I 
trial week of March 22, 2010, but it cUd not. Based upon the mutually agreed-to setting of the 
I ' 
I : 
April 19, 2010 mal date, defendant's counsel Ms. Duke has already had to reschedule mUltiple 
I ; 
, I 
depositions. and a trial resetting of this matter would be extremely difficult, most notably in light 
I I 
i : 







DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
CONTINUE TRIAL - 2 
??'~e'" ............ ) 
--_.--
, , , 
I ; 
Thus. plaintiff should noi now be permitted to continue a trial date it previously agreed 
I I 
i I 
to, which defendant's counsel hr relied upon for scheduling purposes, and Plaintiff~ Motion 
should be denied. i 
B. PlaintiffhAS the ipportunity to cODduct a trial deposition of its expe..;t. 
Appropriately, plaintiff rlcognizes that it can conduct a trial deposition of its ex~ert. 2. See 
I' I 
Plaintitrs Memorandum in Suppon of Motion to Continue, filed March 19, 2010" at p. 2. 
I , 
I I 
Plaintiff has not, howeva, coordinated a. trial deposition of Mr. Harper. Instead, plaintiff argues 
that it would be an abuse of dislretion for this Court to not allow live rebuttal testimohy by Mr. 
Harper, citing to Pauley v. slon River Lumber Co .. 74 Idaho 483. 264 P.2d 46~ (1953). 
i ! 
However, Pauley offers little guidance. in that neither it, nor the prior Idaho decisions upon 
I ! 
which it is based. relate to e1pert witnesses, but instead, relate only to parties ~dJor fact 
witnesses. See Pauley, 74 Idah.~ at 485 (owner of tractor at center of dispute); Huber IV. Mother 
I I 
Aurelia. 13 Idaho 276. 89 P. 942 (1907)(supervising architect during construction at a hospital, 
I 
to testify, in part, that no exteJions were granted to contractors); Rankin v. Ca1dWen~ 15 Idaho 
625, 99 P. 108, 109 (1908)(clmer at a bank in dispute over possession of rings); Storer v. 
I : 
ReHfeld, 17 Idaho 113, 105 P'i 55, 56 (1909)(deit:nc1ant); Corey v. Blackwell Lumb;er Co., 27 
Idaho 460, 149 P.S10, 511 (l~1S)(bankrupt individual; action brought by his trustee); Berlin 
I : 
Machine Words v. DehJbom Lumber Co., 32 Idaho 566, 186 P. 513, 513 (1919)(company-
party's manager); Pacific coaj Joint Stock Land Bank v. Security PxQducts Co .. 56 tdaho 436. 
55 P 2d 716, 719 (1936)(motor in promissory note dispute). Moreover, Paule¥ ~as decided 
57 years ago. and its cited decisions stretch back to 103 years ago. Thus, any rationale in Pauley 
1 Plaintiff n_ 1hat M,. HMpor ;, 1 w .. h"'stan "";den~ al<hough tb;, i. lugdy • aon-,equitur. ~. fia,per ;, 
not, e.g., an out.o.f-state fact witnes~ beyond the Court's subpoena power; rather, Mr. Harper is pl~tiff's own 
retained expert. Sunplyas a matter of course, no subpoena should be necess8r)' to compel a party's own expert to 
attend 8 trial. ' 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDr IN oPPOSmON TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO' 




favoring live testimony by fact witnesses should be tempered in light of the ease of sedlIing and 
\ i 
presenting trial depositions in this day and age; this is even more true of expens. who ate neither 
parties nor first-hand fact witnesses. 
I 
1 




desire - to conduct a trial deposition of its expert to preserve whatever testimony it may seek to 
present at the time of trial by Mr. Harper. Plaintiff's stated concem about rebuttal ~stimony. 
I , 
however, rings hollow, fI.5 discussed below, and plaintiff should not be allowed to avoid a trial 
deposition simply on a claim of-need to present rebuttal testimony.3 
C. Plaintiff's proposed scop@ of rebuttal testimony contemplates only 
inadmissible testimony. 
Plaintiff's argument that it needs Mr. Harper to present rebuttal testinlony only 
I 
i 
contemplates rebuttal testimony that would otherwise be inadmissible at the trial of this matter, 
based upon the stated scope of anticipated rebuttal testimony. 
i 
I 
First, plaintiff incorrectly attempts to recharacterize this case as a bad faith action: 
"Hartford withheld payments it was required to make pursuant to the policy. Iialrtford has 
premised its defense to this conduct on the fact that its accountants did not have thb required 
! 
I 
information to calculate the payments and have deferred to the accountant to explain what 
I 
information was missing to the jury a.t tria1.)' (plaintiff's Memo at 5.) However, thai is not the 
issue for trial in this matter. lqstead, the dispute in this action is limited to "plaintiff~ claim for 
I 
breach of contract as relatin2 to Hartford's determination of the dates of the ~Period of 
I 
Restoration' at issue in this ma1;ter." (Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Compel'and Order 
" ; 
I , 
3 Indeea, all trial preservation depoQitions eould be defeated simply on the claim that the witnesses heeded to be 
live to potentially present rebuttal "testimony. However, trial depositions are a wen-established 'tool for the 
presentation of testimony by unavailable witnesses, and plaintiff's attempt to avoid doing one for Mr. ~arper should 
be rejected by the Court. i 
! 
, I 
DEFENDANT'S MEMO~:UM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO' 





GTanting Defendant's Sununary 'Judgment in Part and Denying Summary Judgment in I'art, filed 
: 1 
November 23. 2009 ("MSJ OrCler"), at 2.) Thus, evaluation of plaintiff's claimed ,need for 
, , 
I 
rebuttal testimony should be frained in the light of the actual issue for trial, and not :plaintiff' 5 
, I 
multiple attempts to re-inject bad faith Htigation into the trial of this action. 
i 
Second, plaintiff apparently again seeks to have Mr. Harper testify on the handling of the 
" , , ! 
claim and the terms of the Policy: "Lakc:land has the right to continue this trial t6 have its 
i' I 
I i 
accountant available to rebut thb Hartford's expert testimony in this regard." (plaintiff's Memo 
: i 
, I 
a.t S.) Howover, plaintiff fails to explain how the claimed rebuttal testimony needed by plaintiff 
I 
- a critique of the document requests by Hartford's accountants and timing of paYments by 
, i , 
Hartford - would even be admissible. in light of the Court's prior limiting of Mr; Harper's 
I 
1 : 
testimony. As previously argUed by Hartford in its prior Motion in Limine Re: Dan Harper, Mr. 
I 
Harper is neither a claims adjuSter nor an insurance professional, but, rather, is a CPA: As such, 
I 
Mr. Harper agreed in his deposition that he lacks the knowledge, training, and expe~e to offer 
, i 
any opinions as to the reasonab~eness of Hartford' s adjustment of the claim or any inteipretations 
, I 
I i 
of the sUbject Policy provisi04s at issue in this litigation. Specifically, Mr. Harper ~estificd it 
I : 







opinions at trial: 
'I! 18 
5 Q What about a Jlaim related to claims handling 
6 practices, are you sd!mebody that has handled those types of 
7 cases? I, 
8 A No. I don't thi.#k my opinions are on a -- that would 
9 come more from anil~ance expert or adjuster expert. 
10 Q Sure. And tb.~tls what I wanted to get to is there's 
11 no doubt, at least ~m what I can tell in looking at your 
12 cwriculwn vitae yop're certainly well qualified as a CPA 
13 and a forensic acco!imtant. But as I understand it, your 
14 role as an expert iS'not as a claims handling expert, 
15 correct? : i :: 
, 
" 
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO' 
22:UI 
_..-----_ .. --. --
16 A That's correct. : 
17 Q You would lea, e that to claims-handling folks to 
18 address? .I 
19 A Yes. j 
20 Q Okay. And yo would do that because you don't have 
21 the education, trainJg and experience that would be 
22 necessary to render those opinions, correct? You like to 
23 stick with what yout: ow. 
24 A Sure, that's far' 
25 Q And based on ~ I would ass~: tbtn that you have 
1 not served as an exP~rt for any client, whether it's 
2 Lakeland or any oth,1 client that you and your company ha"e 
3 assisted since 1993,:1 'th respect to providing an opinion as 
4 to whether a claim's appropriately adjusted and handled. 
5 is that fair? 1 
6 A Yes, we woul ' 't have opinions as to the adjusters' 
7 actions or inactions,!! 
(Affidavit of Counsel in Supp: of Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Expert Dan Harper and 
Memorandum in Support, fileJ February 8, 2010, ("Counsel Aff."), Exh. A, 11. 18:5.t9:7.) Mr. 
" 
Harper went on to state: 
136 
13 Q In providing : ese opinions, though, you certainly 
14 acknowledge that ~ u do not feel comfonable testifying as 
15 to what the insuredJl~ obligations arc under the insurance 
16 policy, correct? ~' 
17 A Yes, that's pr: ably getting more into the policy 
18 interpretation arend 
19 Q And you cert~n1y, again, in the policy 
20 interpretation aren,tyou certainly do not feel you're 
21 qualified to repder' y opinions as to whether the Fritzs 
22 actually complied /I,' th the terms of the insurance policy? 
23 A I would agre that that's beyond my scope. , 
(Id .• ll. 136:13-23.) . 
: ; 
Instead, Mr. Harper cl,.' ed that the scope of his opinion was far narrower ana would be 




CONTINUE TRIAL· 6 
144 








not going to render any opinions 
nteI'Dre1taficm of the policy? 
....... '"OT"' .... you're not going to render an 
UJ"'PT"',...,. or not the 7B-page report complied 
145 
1 with the terms of policy, correct? 
2 A No, not with terms of the policy. I might tell 
3 the jury what it of and how it might be used. 
4 Q What the I consisted of? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q Okay. Are going to be rendering any opinions as 
7 to whether an is limited to the coverage afforded to 
8 the insured under policy? 
9 A I don't have opinions about coverage. 
10 Q Are you to render any opinions regarding an 
11 insured's duty to regarding an investigation and 
12 settlement for all made WIder the policy? 
13 A I'd defer to insurance expert. 
14 Q Okay. Axe going to render any opinions as to 
15 whether or not the has a duty to provide 
16 documentation to its claims? J think that's 
17 one you're to the insurance expert, as we 
18 discussed. 
19 A My opinion be limited to what was provided and 
20 what conveyed. 
21 Q Correct. But I not doing that in terms of 
22 whether it with the policy or not? 
23 A No, just the content and how it could 
24 be used. 
25 Q Are you to be rendering any opinions as to 
1 whether an insured 
2 they're making a 
3 their insurance 
4 A No, I'll leave 
5 Q Areyou 
6 insured has a duty 
7 covered property 




a duty to mitigate their loss when 
with their insurance policy or under 
to the insllI'ance expert. 
to render any opinions as to whether an 
take reasonable steps to protect the 
further damage? 
with that but I would leave that 
147 
. And based on that, it's not that 
I 
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13 you're saying the pO~Cy covers these things, it's just this 
14 is the damage, you 4yS sort out what the policy covers and 
15 what it doesn't. is th~t fair? 
16 A This is the economic result of the collapse and the 
17 court can decide wdo's responsible for it. 
(Id at 144:21-146:9; 147:12-'lemphases added). : 
The Court subsequently banted Hartford's motion in limine on this point, stating: "While 
the 'final amount of the claim' ~s what is at dispute, 'reasonableness' of Hartford's actions is no 
longer relevant" (MemOrandl Decision and Order Re: Hartford's Motions in Li~e, filed 
March 8,2010, at p. 30.) ThUS'fJ<intifI'S attempts to again bave Mr. Ha1per speak to 1) whether 
,or not the document SUbmiSSior complied with the terms of the Policy. and/or 2) w~ether the 
actions of Hartford (either in Lg of payments or its document requests) were reasonable, 
should be rejected by this C!urt. as 'they are patently beyond the scope of Mr.! Harper's 
admissible testimony. Indee~. in reconsideration of its almost wholesale eXCJUSi~n of Mr. 
Harper's anticipated testimonyj, the Court only allowed Mr. Harper to speak to a v~y narrow 
subject: "the Court will alloi. plaintiff's expert, Dan Halper, to testify reganling ,Plaimiff's 
damages in this action total Ao more than $19,052, which amount will be subject to cross-
examination by defendant at 11' time of trial." (See Order Re: PWntiff'. Motion to ~.eOnsider, 
filed March 13,2010, at 1-2.) , 
~ l , . 
Thus, with respect to . ,1a.intiff's Motion at bar, the identified rebuttal testimony would 
I ' 
": I , . 
otherwise inadmissible, as it ~templates testimony beyond the scope permitted by th;is Court in 
its prior orders. As such testi I: ony would be inadmissible, plaintiff has failed to de~onstrate a 
I 
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D. Kohler ofMD&D artford's: 
9.ccountant~). 
j 




rebuttal testimony as "Hartfor > accountants are the crux of its entire defense an.d those 
, 
accountants have never explain d what information they were missing" - is d.isingenu~U!l, as it 
r ; 
disregards that plaintiff had an ' . portunity to elicit that very infoImation during the depbeition of 
I , 
Amy Kohler of MD&D (Hartfa !d'S accountants), taken September 21, 2009. Indeed, t1aintiff's 
1 : 
counsel invested only an hour d twenty-one minutes in the deposition of Ms. K.ohler,iand even 
I: ; 
included, as two deposition c I' "bits, letters from Ms. Kohler to Mr. Fritz (one of plaintiff's 
,: 1 
owners) and Mr. Van Valin 'aintif£'s attorney, for a time) requesting specific docbments in 
support of the claim. (See Tr '!:criPt of the Deposition of Amy Kohler, September 21, k009, and 
Deposition Exhibits 2 and 5. I :ached hereto as Exhibit A). Notably, this deposition ~as taken 
I' : 
~ Hartford filed its Motion ,'r Summary Judgment, which placed into the record c]~s notes 
wruch included emails fTom M I; Kohler regarding needed documentation; for examPle) 
Mr. Bistline, 
Thank you for the doc ents you e-.mailed today. We received the following: ~ 
L 
1. Lakeland True Value's ank statement for June 2008 
2. . The Summary and De : il reports from the QuickBooks bank reconciliation !for 
June 2008 ! i . 
3. The Demand letter fro ,iTrue Value Company 
The provided docume .It are not the same as the documents provided for ~or 
periods. There are a c uple of additional pieces of infonnation that we will n¢ed 
to update our schedule ~ as we stated in our document request sent to you on JWy 
28, 2008" The insured I I familiar with the documents that he has been sending us 
each month since Feb ~ 2008: we need the same document types reflecting' all 
July 2008 activity: II' , 
I : ' 
I : 
(1) check register de . iout of QuickBooks for the cash account 
(2) a note from Mr. F "tz detailing any payroll disbursements for July that have 
not yet been made that e intends to make ' 
I 
·Ii : 
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(3) a print-out from th True V Blue bank account through the end of July Ito 
support the previous tw I items I : 
I . 
In our letter dated July' 8, 2008, we al~o requested lease payment documentation 
for the JAR and Great I erican Leasmg leases. Please provide this also at your 
I 
earliest convenience. I 
I 
I ' 
Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have 
, I 
any questions. i 
Amy Kohler, CPA 
Senior Accountant 
akobler@mdd.net 
i , , 
I ' I 
(Affidavit of Melanie Copley. filed August 20. 2009. at Exh. C, at HOOSl-52 (July 30, 2008 
I I 
" , 
email fromMs.KohlertopI·tiff.scouns~l.Mr. Bistline»). Thus, plaintiff's ass~rtion that 
i 
c'those accountants have never, xplamed wba~ information they were missing" rings hi:lllow, and 
, I 
plaintiff has failed to explain hy live rebuttlu testimony should be permitted to address those 
I ' 
'I ' 
issues, where plaintiff had opportunity '0 secure such information and have Mr. Harper 
i ' 
I 
address it in his initial testimo (or, as it wou)d be here, in bis trial deposition). 
I 
Thus, plaintiff has al cady had an ~ppo~ty to inquire I1S to "what ~onnation 
I , 
[Hartford's acoountants] were issing" during the deposition of Ms. Kobler. Plaintiff 'should not 
be entitled to vaoate a trial s· ,I ply because i~ failed to elicit the information it needek during a 
I i 
I I 
deposition, and now wishes to keep its expert on standby to present rebuttal testimony on such 
i J 
unexplored subjects. I i 
I 




Accordingly, for the re ons stated above, plaintiffs Motion to Continue Trial. should be 
I : 
denied. I ! 
I I 
DEFENDANT'S MEMO.l.~", ..... UM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTD'F'S MOTION TO: 
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ITTED this 22nd day of March, 2010. 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & 
BL~ON,P.A. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY at on the 22nd day of March. 2010, I caused to be s~ed a true 
copy of the foregoing docum t. by the method indicated below. and addressed to e:ach of the 
follo~g: ; 
Arthur M. Bistline 
Law Offices of Arthur M. Bis e 
1423 N. Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Fax: 208/665-7290 
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.BE IT REMEMBERED that on Monday. September 21, 
2009, at 9:02 a.m., at 19125 North Cr~ekParkway, 
Suite 208, the deposition of AMY KdFILER was taken 
before Eva P. Jankovits, a Certified. Cpurt Reporter 
and Notary Public. The proceedings took place: 
I 
I 
AMY KOlll..ER. being first duly;swom to tell the 
truth, the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth, tes~fied 
as follows: ' 
12; EXAMINATION 
13' BY MR. BISTLINE: ! 
I I 
14; Q. Okay. Please state your name for the record. 
l5:. A. Amy Kohler. : 
16: Q. And where are you presently employed? 
17:' A. LeMaster Daniels. : 
16' Q. And is that here in Bothell, Washing'ton? 
19' A. 1t's in Bellewe. . 
20;: Q. Bellevue. And where were you c::mJloyed before that? 
21 A. Here at Matson, Driscol & Damico. : 
22· Q. And where did you attend your Ulldergraduate work? 
23: A. I di.d my undergraduate work in accounting at City 
24 University in Bellevue. i 
25 Q. And did you attend any sort of postgraduate work? 
, 
2 (Pages 2 to 5) 
! 
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1- A. No. 
2 Q. And are you a CPA? 
3 A. Yes, 1 am. 
4 Q. And when did you attain your CPA? 
5 A. I knew you were going to ask me that. 1 believe it 
6 was 2006. J don't remember exactly. 
7 Q. And did you start working for this firm? 
8 A. Matson? 
.9 Q. Yes . 
10 A. No, I was working for a different finn at that time. 
1l. Q. Who did you start working with right after you had 
12 your CPA? 
1.3 A. Werner, O'Meara & Company. 
14 Q. And when did you start working for Matson? 
15 A. It was October 2007, I believe. 
1.6 Q. Okay. And do you recall working for Sedgewick Claim 
17 Management regarding a loss suffered by Lakeland l'rue 
18 Value Hardware in Rathdrum, Idaho? 
1.9 A ... Yes, I do. 
20 Q. I bet you do. And how would you describe your scope 
21- of work on that - I guess projeot is how I'll refer 
22 to it. What did you view your role as? 
23 A. My role was to calcula.te their business income loss 
24 due to being out of business because of the loss that 
2.5 they sustajned. 
Page 7 
1 Q. And did your scope of work change at any point during 
2 YOUT analysis of the project? 
3 A. No, I don't believe it did. 
4 Q. Have you performed that kind of work before., business 
5 income ana1ysis loss? 
6 A. While I was at Matson or before Malson? .., Q. At allY time. 
e A. J did while I was at Matson. 
Sl Q. Only at Matson you did? 
10 A. Yes. 
1~ Q. Okay. About how many other times did you do that'? If 
12 it's too numerous to even count ... 
13 A. Yeah. I'm not sure if 1 could count 
14 Q. Okay. Who was your immediate supervisor at the time 
15 you were working on this project? 
16 A. Patrick DeLangis. 
17 Q. And he is a partner in the flrm? 
18 A. He wasn't at the time. 
19 Q. And is he still employed with MD&D? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. And who were the other employees at MD&D who woul 
22 have had some contact with this project? 
23 A. Our schedules would have been reviewed by a partner. 
24 I'm trying to remember his name. He's in the L.A. 
























































Q. So there's other offices ofMD&O? , 
A. Y~, , 
Q. About how many are there? : 
lvfR. NICKELS: I'm going to object to the extent 
it calls for information beyond her pers6nal knowledge 
as she's not appearing as Q represcntativ~ for MD&!>. 
With that qualification, you can answer: 
A. I'm not sure. ' 
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) A lot? 
A. A lot. ~ 
Q. Okay. Good enough. And would Mr.:DeLangis also have, 
been reviewing these schedules? 
A. Yes. I 
Q. Do you recall the first time you had ~ contact 
regarding this project? ' 
A. I believe that it was in PebTUlllY of2008. 
Q. Do you recall how you first gained lcnpwledge of this 
project? : 
A. We would have .- Patrick and I would: have discussed jt 
wben we received Ii call nom the adjuster. 
Q. Was that adjuster a lady named Julia Kale? 
A. That's right, : 
Q. And did you receive the initial call from Ms. Kale? 
A. Did I personally? 1 
Q. Yes. 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know who did? 
A. No, I don't know. 
Page 9 
Q. And did you and Mr. DeLangis have a conversation wit 
Ms. Kale after you UIlderstood that she was seekins 
your services? I 
A. Yes. i 
Q. Do you remember approximately when that was? 
A. Again, I'd have to say February 2008, but 1 don't 
remember exactly. I 
Q. During that conversation, did - did'Ms. Kale 
indicate .- welt, what did she tell you the first time 
you spoke with her about the claim? : 
A. Ob, probably lots of things. Can you be more 
specific? ' 
Q. Well, did she -- I guess did she indi~te at all that 
she had any specific concerns about pus claim? 
A. I don't remember at that time Julia giving us any 
indication of specifio ooncerns. : 
Q. And when I say specific concerns, in any insurance 
loss, there's always the concern that ~-
A. Sure, yeah. I'm assuming that you'te asking for 
anything above and beyond what would be a typical -
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::L disoussed financial~ of what you would need to get the 1 Q. And 1 noticed on the document, if you look at the fax 
2 _~ 2 ID, it indicates that it's Page 3 of 13 pe,ges? 
3 A. That's right 3 A. Okay. ! 
4 Q. _ project done. 4 Q. And do you 1000.11 if this document was sent with othel' 
5 A. Yes. 5 information, as it indicates? : 
E Q. But you didn't say anything about, for example, they 6 A. 1 believe it was, yes. ' 
had just upped their claim limits before the loss? 7 Q. And what other information was included? 7 
a 
9 
AnYthing to that effect? B A. I think there were some QuickBooksifinancial 
A. Not that T can remember. 9 statements. My memory is that there were profit and 
~O 
11 
Q. Olcay. During that :first conversation, did you lO loss statcmen'Q, a!I it s1l1tc3. I'm not etk-e what e1ge 
indicate to Ms. Kale what you would need to perform l.l. wag there. ! 






A. We discussed with her what we would ask for from th~13 attached to that Exhibit 1 was not included in the 
insured to do our calculations. 14 MD&D file? I 
Q. And what would that have been? 15 A. Why·. ~ 
A. We would have asked for profit and loss information 116 MR.. NICKELS; Objection; OCtile for speculation. 
sales lnfonnation going back two yean prior to the :1. 7 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) You can answer ~ow. 
loss on (L monthly basis. We would have - because of 1B A. Can you repeat the question? I 






have asked for documentation of the payroll incurred. :2 0 with this document, I did not receive anything other 
We probably would have asked for balance sheets. 21 than it. There was no attachments ol'lanythlng else 
Those would be the basic things. There might have 2 z that he's referencing in the text. ; 
been additional things we would ask for C3 well. ~3 A. Okay. 
Q. Okay. 24 Q. And do you have allY reason to know why it wouldn't b . 
23 
24 
2S A. And things that we would ask for after we received 25 in the MD&D file? ' 
P"-go 1:1. 
1 those items if that wasn't enough infonnation. 1 
2 Q. Do you recall the frrst time that thal infonnation Wl2Z 2 
3 received in your office - excuse me. Let me 3 
4 rephrase •• that type of information, profit and loss 4 
5 ~~~~ 5 
6 A. I believe that we received some of that information 6 
7 not long after our conversation with Julia. I believe 7 
a that Julia forwarded us sOtTIe information that she: had. e 
.9 We received pieces of what we needed over this CQU1'se 9 
:1.0 of February and March, 1 believe. and into April and 10 
11 May. 11 
:1.2 MR. BISTLINE: Okay. Can I have an exhibit 12 
13 sticker? 13 
14 (pLAINTIFP'S EXt-UBIT NO. 1 WAS 14 
::I. 5 MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATTON.) 15 
16 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) I'm going to hand you what's been 16 
1 7 marked now as Exhibit 1 to this deposition. It's got 17 
1 e a Bates stamp on it also of MOD 279. And I'll 18 
19 represent to you that this was taken from a collection 19 
20 of attachme111S trom opposing counsel they &ent me:; 'Wh ,til 0 
2:1. they said was the MD&D file, and that's where I got 21 
2~ this. And T'II ask you to have a Jook at that. 22 
23 A. (Witness peruses document.) Okay. 23 
24 Q. And does that document Jook familiar to you? 24 
25 A. Yes, it does. 25 
Page 13 
I 
A. The only·· I 
MR. NICKBLS: Same obje()tio~. 
A. - reason that I can think of is that it was 
duplicates of something we had later. , 
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) When you receh'~d those P&Ls from 
that •• that apparently were attached, did you begin 
generating the schedules at that POUlt, or T guess 
your flOIlly:;is nt that point? I 
A. Our analysis would generally be done with monthly 
P&Ls. I can't remember exactly w~at came with this 
attachment If they weren't monthly P&Ls, then we 
would have gone back and requested again monthly 
Proflt and loss statements. ' i Q. Oby. , 
A. So 1 don't know for sure if we we¢ able to begin at 
this point. : j 
(PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO.2 WAS 
MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) And I'm going to hand you whtlt's 
marked Q:l Exhibit 2. It's MDD BQ.tO$ Stamp 274. And 
it appears to be a letter from you tolMr. Fritz dated 
the 21st of February, 2008. Do yo* recall that 
letter? : 
A.Ido. I 
Q. Okay. And, in essence, thtl.t letter; is requesting the 
4 (pagJs 10 to 13) 
I 
I 
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1. same information that you just told me you would need 1 
::2 in order to evaluate the claim? 2 
3 A. (Wi1ness nods head affIrmatively.) 3 
4 Q. Is that correct? 4 
5 MR. NICKELS: Objection to the extent that 5 
6 mischa:racterizcs her prior testimony, but you can 6 
7 answer. 7 
a A. Yes. this would have been some of the information th t B 
9 we needed. This would be the information that we 9 
10 would need to calculate the business income piece, not 10 
J.1 the continuing payroll piece. 11 
1.2 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) And did you view those things as 1:2 
1.3 90rt of separate issues? 13 
~4 A. To the extent that we generally will •• we generally 14 
J.5 calculated those using different documents, yes. lS 
:1-6 Q. And iJ1 that letter, jt says you may have additional 16 
17 document requests but that the lntbrmation in there :1.7 
1.8 should allow you to analyze the bwiness interruption 19 
1..9 claim. 19 
20 Was there anything besides the business 20 
21 interruption claim that you were supposed to evaluate? in 
22 A. No. n 
23 Q. Then what would have been the purpose of the 23 
24- AC1clltionaJ. infonnl1tion that you may need to - besides 24 
25 what was in that request? 25 
Page lS 
~ A. There would have been payroll information that we 1 
2 would require on an ongoing basis. And. upon receivin ~ 2 
:3 these: documen~ from the insured, if our analysis 3 
4 indicated that we needed additional information. then 4 
5 we were leaving it open for that 5 
6 Q. And l'n represent to you that there's a claim note in 6 
7 Ms. Kale's notes, claim notes, I guess, that indicates 7 
8 that she spoke with you on 2129 of '08, and mat you e 
!7 said you had not received anything fyom the insurec at 9 
~o that point. Does that sound accurate? 10 
11 MR. NTCKELS: Objection; foundation. 11 
12 A. 1 would have to assume that it was. 12 
~3 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) But at some point did you receive 13 
14 the information required to evaluate the business 14 
:1.5 interruption claim? 15 
:1.6 A. That is correet lei 
17 Q. And do you recall receivina in early March, around 17 
18 March 5th, a large collection of profit and losses and 16 
19 balance sheets from the Fritz's - or Lakeland's 19 
20 accountant in Montana? 20 
2J. A. Ida. 21 
22 Q. And 1 think what we'll do is wait tilt the end and 22 
23 then I'll have you look through what 1 have at that 23 
24 point. 24 
25 A. That sounds good. 2! 
, 
Amy KQh,ler. 9/21/2009 
, Page 16 
I 
Q. What would be the point in requesting a balance shee 
along with the profit and loss statem~ts7 
A. We would have requested the balanpc sheets just to 
glance over to sec if there WBS anything that we 
needed to consider. We wouldn't necessarily use that 
in our calculation on a routine basis, -but it was just 
another piece of their fmancial infonpation to ensure 
we had considered everythjng. i 
Q. Did anything on the balance sheet ihdiciUe to you that 
there was somcthins that should be included in the 
business interruption claim from the!balance sheets? 
MR.. NICKELS: Objection; foundation. 
A. Not that I can remember. I 
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) And Ms. Kale's bates also indicate 
that on March 10th, she had a conversation with -
witl'l your - with you llbol.)t the proircss of these 
schedules. And you indicated you h;ad some preliminllJ V 
schedules worked up but that your .~ a senior needed 
to review them; does that sound acc~ate? 
MR. NICKELS: Objection; foundation. 
A. J can't remember, but. .. 
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) It makcs sen!ic? : 
A. It makes sense. I 
Q. Oleay. ! 
A. Ye~. i 
i Page 17 ' 
I 
I 
Q. And then there's a claim note on March 14th of '08, 
wbere Ms. Kale hn3 indicated she's speaking with a 
pa.trick, and that they had come up w,ith some schedules 
for advancement purposes. What does "for advancemen . 
purposes" mean? 
MR.. NICKELS: Objection; foun~alion. 
A. That was the term Julia used to refe;'r to making a 
payment to the insured. : 
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) Okay. : 
A. In that same claim note, it says that!Mr. DeLangis 
advised that they were missing documentation which 
would be the expense for the rental Space and whether 
the insured has paid his entire payroll. That was on 
M~b 14th. I 
Does that sound - was there othe:r information 
that you were missing at that point, ~ your ' 
recollection? I , 
lVfR. NICKELS; Same objection: 
A. I don't remember whether there was additional 
!_1". • ....... I uu.ormo.tlon Ilt Ula.t pOInt. i 
(pLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO~ 3 WAS I 
MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) I'm going to hanCl you what's marked 
as Exhibit 3. I'll have you take a quick look at 
~~ : 
5 (pag~s 14 to 17) 
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3- 1\. (W'itl'less peruses doeument.) Okay. 1 
2 Q. And what do those appear to be? 2 
3 A. These appear to be schedules that MD&D would havf 3 
4: prepared. 4 
5 Q. And those scbecluJes in4icate they were up through 5 
f) June 30th of2008, correct? 6 
., A. That's what it says, yes. ? 
8 Q. In early March .- would the schedule have looked 8 
9 different in early March? 9 
3. 0 A. Well-· lO 
11 MR. NICKELS: Objection; foundation. Answer to ~1 
3.2 the extent you CIll1. 12 
3. J A. Ves. We pTobably wouldn't have included informatio~13 
~4 beyond early March, if that was the point at which we 14 
l. 5 were preparing schedules. 15 
~6 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) So when you prepared the schedule J.S 
]. 7 in early March, iTom what 1 understand, that would J. , 
l. e have been based on the profit and losses that you were. 1 B 
::L. 9 provided for - on March 5th. and from that. you woul~ 19 
2 0 estimate the lost business income from the claim note. 20 
2.1 It sounds like four months out is what you figured on ~1 
22 the lost business income. z ~ 
23 Would anything you received after March 5th to 2~ 
24 JUDe 30th changed the basic projection of lost 24 
.25 business income? 25 
Pa.sc J.9 
1 MR. NICKELS: Objection; foundation. 1 
2 A. WJthout seeins those March schedules, it's going to be 2 
:; hard for me to answer your questions oomparing the 3 
4 March schedules to the June schedules. But in 4 
5 general, as I'm looking at this, what we would 5 
6 calculate - pieces of what we calculated here 6 
7 probablY would have been the same in March, and othe" 7 
8 pieces were ongoing items. e 
9 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) While we're on that subject, I only 9 
l. 0 had that set of schedules. 10 
~J. A. Okay. 11 
12 Q. And it sounds like there are a lot of other sets of 12 
1.3 schedules. 13 
14 A. I don't know about that. 11: 
:1.5 Q. Okay. l.$ 
~ S A. I WOUldn't say a lot. 16 
17 Q. We'll get to that. 11 
18 A. Yeah. 16 
19 Q. SO if 1 understand what you're saying is, you come up 19 
2 0 with a projection of lost bUSiness income; bu:se:d on 20 
2:L. historical data, and then as the clailn progresses, 21 
2:2 utilize current infonnation to slightly adjust the 22 
23 business income claim. 23 
24 A. I would agree with that •• 24 
25 Q. Okay. 25 
I 
I 
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A. - description. : 
Q. Was there anything about the inforn'lation in your 
possession that led you to believe that anything thAt 
was going on at the present was really going to 
drastically affect your calculations? : 
MR. NICKELS: Objection; forml 
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) For example, I would say if they - " 
if you found out that three-quarters ~f the inventory 
was actually oKay. but _. and they !'lad rented a whole 
'nother building and opened tIIlothe.r ~ort of serial 
hardware store not as good as the one they had, to me 
that would be something that would drastically affect 
their lost business income because tOey were making a 
lot more money then rather than just: sitting on their 
hands waiting for the building to rebuild. Do you 
understand my question? 
A. I believe I do. 
Q. Okay. 
MR. NICKELS: Objection to the extent it wasn't 
a question. : 
A. When you say "present, II at what pciint in time are you 
referring to? 1 
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) As the claim progressed, let's say 
mid-April, did you have any information that would 
lead you to believe that your schedules were going to 
be pretty tar off base? I 
MR. NICKELS: Objection; foundation. 
A. We wouldn't have known whether they would be far ofi 
base, but there were indications that there were 
things going on that we needed to be1continually 
checking on. So we WOUldn't know Wlthout checking an 
getting information on a current basl$ continually 
whother there would be anything sub'atantial that would 
change how we would come up with'our calculations. 
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) Okay. In that c~ note I just 
referenced, it's a conversation between Ms. Kale and 
Patrick, he has the question of whether the insured is 
paying his entire payroll. That question to me: 
indicatos that your fum didn't kDow ~ well, let me 
rephrase that. : 
What did you think they were dOfug with the 
payroll? Did you have any understanding as to whether 
payroll was only actual payroll incwred or whether 
the payroll was supposed to be paid tn its entirety -
MR.. NICKELS: Objection; fol.1n(llltion. 
Q. (By Mr. Bistline continuing) - whether or not the 
people had earned it, I guess? ! 
A. My understanding was that we were calculating 
schedules showing actual pa)'roU in~ulTed. 
Q. And WIllS there any diSCUSSlon with Ms. Kale about """"_ ..... _._u' .... _IIf~ft· .. , 
6 (Pag~s 18 to 21) 
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l. whether or not the employees of Lakeland actually had 1 
:2 to work to earn that payroll? 2 
3 MR. NICKELS: Objection; calls for speculation, 3 
4 rom. 4 
5 A. I don't specifically remember a conversation like 5 
6 that, but it would h2l.ve - it would make sense that Ii 
7 those would be details that we would have ironed out 7 
a with Julia in the course of a conversation with her. 8 
9 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) When you first received the 9 
~ 0 March - early March information I'll call it, on the 10 
1:1.. balance sbeet, there were items for liabilities for ~l 
~2 True Value Hardware EUld for Wells Fargo. J..2 
:1.3 Did you at all wonder what those wore associated 13 
].4 with? 14 
~5 MR. NICKELS; Objection; foundation. 15 
1. 6 A. In general, it's not something that we would·· that 16 
~ 7 we would consider in our calculation. So I think 17 
3. 8 beyond jU3t bC3ic tUlderstanding of it, we wouldn't ~ S 
:1. 9 have dug any further with it 19 
20 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) Okay. Did you have any 20 
~ 1 understanding as to how Lakeland True Value Hardwal 1:21 
2 2 purchased their inventory, whether it be with cash or :2 2 
2 3 credit? 23 
24: A. 1 would think there was a basic utldel·standing. 24 
2 S Q. And what was that understanding? 25 
Page 23 
1. A. I would say mostly what we were understanding was th t 1 
2 they were purchasing their inventory from True Value, 2 
3 and tha.t thoy had an ongoing relationship with them. :3 
4 Q. And did you undeT$tand there was a debt service 4 
5 associated with those purchases? 5 
6 A. I t:l:J.ink only tangentially. I mean, I don't think it 6 
7 was of ma.jor - it wasn't a part of our calculation. 7 
e Q. And you and I at one point went baCK and forth about e 
9 tbi3 i:s,suc ofwhctber OT not t!1is liability to True Sl 
1. 0 Value was in fact Q continuing operating expense. And 10 
1 ~ - and J will try to do this slowly so it doesn't 11 
~2 completely confuse everybody, but here's how I'd look 12 
13 at that, is if, on a balance sheet·· OT on a profit 13 
14 and loss, 1 have revenue, and the neXI item is cost of 14 
1.5 gOQd:s sold, and then you have some expenee and you l.5 
1.(; have net income. 16 
17 And say revenue is $60,000, which means 17 
18 there's - assuming $60,000 in cash was paid by 18 
19 customers, but then you have cost of goods sold at 19 
20 $35,000. Now, that $35,000 figure, IfI undCI1ltand 20 
21. it, llil not l10tually cash out the door; is that 21 
22 correct? 22 
23 MR. NICKELS: Objection; foundation. 23 
24 A. On an accrual basis profit and loss statement, yes. 24 
25 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) So, yes. So if! have a cost of 2S 
, 
I 
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goods of3S,OOO doesn't mean 1 wrote a check for 
35,000 that month? 
A. Potentially, no. 
Q. Okay. So even though my net inco~e wouldn't, say, 
show $2,500, my actual cash, in our ~cenario, would 
have been $37,500, less perhaps som'e payment to Tru~ 
Value; does that sound accurate? 1 
MR. NICKELS: Objection; foun~ation -
A. Yeah, I'm not following you. I 
MR. NICKELS; - calls fOT speculation. 
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) Well, if! start with $60,000 in 
cash. and you look at my profit and toss, it says, you 
know, you end up with 2,500, say, at the end of the 
day, net income, but on a cash basis,lthat $35,000 
didn't actually go anywhere. So eveh though it shows 
I only had 2,500 in income to work With, I ~tua.l1y 
had tl. whole lot more oash because Qf that accounting 
- the way the accounting principles in-eat cost of 
goods sold on an accrual basis; does! that make sense? 
MR. NlCKELS: Same objection. 
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) If! can sell S35,pOO worth of 
inventory but only have to pay five:: grand on 4 paymen 
to True Value, doesn't that leave 30,000 in cash? 
MR. NlCKELS: Same objectio~. 1 think we're 
compound now. : 
1 Pagt?- 25 
I 
A. It's not •• I mean, you can't really say that that's 
CJtactly how that numb or would wo;k out. 1 think I'm 
utlderstanding yow- theory behind what you're saying, 
but you wouldn't necessarily be able to say that that 
total number that's on the cost of gobds sold line is 
cash available. I 
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) Agreed. But YO),n- net income :tigur 
teAlly doesn't bear a rclation to - I mean. it bears 
a 1'elation to your available cash but!theytre 
different things. correct? i 
A. They may well be •• ! 
MR. NICKELS: Objection; fonP, calls for 
speculation. : 
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) So you hadn't -: you hadn't 
considered how the Lakeland True Value Hardware w 
going to service their •• what I refer to as a trade , 
payable to True Value? i 
MR. NICKELS: Objection; argUmentative. 
A. GeneraJly, that kind of a payment iwould come out of 
the bottom line number. So what we were repTesentinB 
as the lost income. that would have'been the finances, ' 
the cash, however you want to look at it, that a 
business would pay its liabilities m.tt of. So to that 
extent, that's what we were calCulating as lost. 
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) Okay. Those 3~hedules that are 
7 (Pages 22 to 25) 
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:L Exhibit 3, to your knowlede;e, were those ever providec 1 
::l to a gentleman named Chris Olenister? 2 
3 A. I don't know what was provided to Chris Glenister. 3 
4 (PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. 4 WAS 4 
.s MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 5 
6 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) I'm going to hand you Exhibit 4. 6 
7 Vou can ha.ve a look at that 7 
e A. (Witness peruses document.) Okay. 8 
9 Q. And do you recognize that docwnent? 9 
l. 0 A. {recognize that this was in our file. This was in 10 
~ 1 the MD&D file. 11 
l.. 2 Q. What is that? Do you know what that is? 12 
::1..3 A. I believe that it was represented to US that it 13 
14 related to amounts due to True Value by Lakeland Trm 14 
15 VW~. 15 
l. 6 Q. Okay. And that - do you recall receiving that 1£5 
~ i information? 17 
3. 8 A. I don't rocull receiving it. 18 
:1.9 Q. Okay. Do yourecaU considering. at that point. 19 
2 0 amounts due to True Value'? 20 
21 MR.. NICKELS: Objection; form. 21 
:2 2 A. Items set up as liabilities on the balance sheet would 22 
23 not have been items we would have considered in cur :2 3 
24 Qa.loulation - 24 
25 Q. Ok~. 25 
Pago 27 
~ A. - beyond that the lost income we were calculating 1 
2 would have serviced any debt on the balance sheet. 2 
3 Q. And did you inform either Mike Frit2 or Kathy Fritz () 3 
4 Julia Kale that you didn't view the True Value as 4 
5 something that - at that point that you •• not you, 5 
6 but would be a conditioning expense of the pOlicy? 6 
7 MR. NICKELS: Objection; form. 7 
8 A. I don't remember a speciflc conversation. It would e 
.9 make: 3ense that we would have had some conversation 9 
1. 0 about this. 10 
1.J. (pLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. S WAS 11 
;L2 MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 12 
~3 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) And I'm handing you Exhibit 5. AI cJL3 
1. 4 do you recognize that document? l .. 
:1.5 A. (Witncss pCrU3es document.) Yee, T do. 15 
1. 6 Q. And that document seeks additional information. Is 1 G 
1. 7 any of that information necessary to calcu1ate the 17 
~ 8 projected loss of business income, or is it all 18 
19 related to adjustments of the projection based on lSI 
20 what's actually going on at the time? 20 
21. MR. NICKELS: Objection; speculation. 21 
:2:2 A. It would be Toutine for us to ask for ongoing profit 22 
23 and Joss statements even through the period of 23 
24 restoration. So, yes, that would be information that 24 
25 we would require to calculate our business income 2 S 
" .. " .. 
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loss. We W9uld need to include any dctual revenue. 
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) What's Item 2? Afctual payroll 
paid? i 
A. That's right. : 
Q. Okay. . 
A. To the extent that you consider that part of the •• 
yes, then we would need actual payroll expense 
information. : 
The rest of this, I believe, applies 10 
understanding the e1l.pcn!lcs on the pront and loss 
statement. So, yes, that would be ro~tine information 
we would want to have to make sure10ur calculations 
were incorporating e\lerything that sl10uld be 
incorporated. And current expenses,: additional 
expenses to mitigate their loss, rent ~ the current 
location·· I'm sorry, that's sales, ongoing sales. 
That's all information we routinely urould ask for not 
as adjustments based on information'that we had 
.) . d. I preVIous y receIve : 
Q. Okay. Did you ever receive that information that you 
were requesting in there in Exhibit 1? 
A. I believe we did receive: all of it. : 
(PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT Nds. 6 THROUGH S 
WERE MARKED FOR IDEtffiFICA TION.) 
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) I'm going to hanp you what's been , 
, , Page 29 I 
i 
marked Exhibit <5. Do you recognize f:bat doc;umcnt? 
A. (Witnc33 peruses document.) Yes, I ~o. 
Q. And that'll a letter from that Chris Glenister where he 
oOOmes the amount of their claim, and it references 
some attached schedules. And T'm going to hand you 
what's marked as Exhibit 7, which is five pages of 
schedules, ask you to look at tnose. : 
A. (Witne99 peruses document.) Okay. : 
Q. Do those appear to be what was attached to that letter 
if you can recall? I 
A. I don't ~- this additional information ~n this page I 
have not seen befaTe. ' 
Q. Okay. Tbe fifth page with the table th~t's •• or the 
fotlrth page with the table, and then itlalso has a. 
handwritten table next to it? I 
A. That's right. 1 have never seen that \),efore. 
Q. Ok~. ' 
A. Sut the rest of it is familiar. It does ~ppear to be 
what we received from Chris Olcmster. 
Q. And l'm going to bAud you PJaintifP¥ !i)thibit g and 
have you look at that. I 
I 
A. (Witness peruses document) Yes. ; 
Q. And what is that? 
A. This appears to be what was In the MD&D 1'lle with some 
additional notes. I 
I 
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1. Q. And are those notes your handwriting? ~ 
;;1 A. Yes. 2 
3 Q. And Ms. Kale's claim notes indicate that she had sent 3 
4 you this from Mr. Glenister and asked that you all 4 
5 evaluate it. And I'm guessing that that - your 5 
6 handwriting on EAAibit 8 is your evoJuation of his 6 
7 report - Of not even evaluation, but some ? 
e ealc.ulations related to that •• 8 
9 A. Yes. 9 
~ 0 Q. •• analysis? ~ 0 
~1. A. Yes. 11 
~:z Q. And did you in m<;t analyzo what he had presented? :1.2 
J..3 A. We ran some calcubitions on what we received from 13 
14 Chris Glenister. 14 
1.5 Q. And what was your opinion ofms report, I guess? ~s 
1. 6 A. That we were coming to similar places, just from 16 
1. 7 different directions. :1. 7 
J. e Q. Different methodology maybe? 1.B 
J. 9 A. Somewhat. Mostly the same idea., just a few different 19 
2 0 numbers that he would include that we didn't include 20 
21 and vice versa, but our numbers were coming out very 2~ 
22 close. 22 
23 Q. Okay. And part of that in his letter, though, 23 
24 rc:ferCrtocs amcthod by which to provide a partial 24 
:2 5 payment on the business personal property aqpect of 25 
Pagc 31 
1. the claim dealing with lost inventory. 1 
2 Did you do anything with that, evaluate thal at 2 
:3 all. di:st;U:5:5 that with Ms. Kille at all? 3 
4 A. We did not. It was ol.tUide the scope of our work to 4 
5 do anything with the inventory or business personal 5 
6 property piece. 6 
7 Q. Okay. Did you tell Ms. Kale that his calculations 7 
B regarding lost business tncome were kind of what you e 
.9 just told me, very 3imilar •• 9 
1. 0 A. Reasonable, yes. 10 
11 Q. Okay. Regarding this - 1 guess this additional 11 
12 information that you were requesting during the period l2 
13 of loss, at any point did you tell Ms. Kale or advise 13 
14 berthat she shOUld not make an advance under the 14 
:1.5 policy until tha.t infonnlltion was reoeived? 1.$ 
1. 6 MR. NICKELS; Objection; form, foundation. 16 
1 7 A. No, we would not have said that. 17 
1. 8 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) Okay. Were you aware that she wa 1 a 
19 requiring that you be provided that information before 1.9 
20 she WOUlCl make an a.dvance to the insured? 20 
2:1. A. I think I We3 aware that she was communicating that t ~21 
:2 ::;t the insured, yes. :2 :2 
23 Q. And did you have an opinion about that position whet 23 
24 she - when you knew of it? I mean, I guess by 24 
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know, I don't know it's bad to make a! distribution 
pending receipt of this because we c~ adjust It 
later? i 
MR. NICKELS: Objection; speCUlation. 
A. That wasn't our place -
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) Okay. 
A. •• so no. : 
Q. If Ms. Kale would have asked you, ~'Should I withhol 
this distribution pending receipt oftq'is 
infonnation," wlmt would ho.ve been;your response? 
MR. NJCKELS: Objection; specUlation. 
A. I •• it wasn't our place to make that call, so 1 
probably would have put it back on J.?er. 
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) And there's numerous references 
throughout this case of you tJylng toicomplete your 
schedules, and what does that mctU'l? If I say that to 
you, "f have to c:omplete my sehedW;e for July. II what 
would that mean to you? , 
A. In my memory, the maID piece that we were continually 
trying to obtain was related to the payroll 
disbursements. ' 
Q. 50 from what I unclcTstand before, 'Plough.. you could 
have completed your schedule other'than payton, and • 
payroll could have been treated sep~telY as far as, 
you know, Here's your business income claim and here 
, 
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I 
the payroU pan of it, two separate ite~s? 
MR. NICKELS: Objeotion; fOllTl, foundation, and 
speculation. ' 
A. I suppose it could have been done that way. That 
wasn't the way we were asked to do it. 
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) Okay. And who asked - when you 
say "it wasn't the way we were asked'to do it," who 
told you how to do it? I 
A. In our conveTsations with Julia., we would have ta1ked 
over how she would want to see schedules, what 
information she needed to have. ' 
Q. There's a claim note from Ms. Kale 'that •• it's an 
e--mail she wrote me. And she says that you all had 
not rcocivod any ~djtionBl doc:ume~tation for June OT 
July and has been requested muhiple times. 
Do you recall requesting addition~ 
documentation for June or July multiple times? 
A. I remember multiple e-mails going pack and forth wher 
we would attach our previous document requests. I 
believe thero wore dooument requests iG$lued in June 
Ql1d I believe again in July requesting the lnformation 
that we were still missing. ' 
Q. And were those·· JUSt to the best of your 
recollection, were those attachments: ofprlor 
oouespondenc;c, were those c·mailed to me? 
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:1.. A. 1 believe so. 1 
:2 Q. SO do you have any independent recollection of sendi g2 
3 these requests to a gentleman named Tim Van Valin 3 
4 besides the letter we've already admitted? 4 
5 A. Yeah. In my memory, that's the only letter that I 5 
6 sent to roo Van Valin. 1 do not rcmQmber whether he 6 
7 might htlyo been oo'd on some of those e-mails. 7 
e Q. The e-tnails, who were those sent to? e 
9 A. I believe you and 1 were communicating via e-mail·- ;1 
l- 0 Q. Okay. ),,0 
:1.1 A. - related to documents that we were needing. 1 J, 
.1.2 Q. on July 30th, you sent me an e-mail whioh says that 1.2 
J.. 3 "Thank you for the documents I sent." and you indicate 13 
l.4 tha.t I sent you bank statements, a summary detail 14 
1. 5 report, and a demand letter from True V Blue. And I lS 
:1.6 believe this is the first time that you had started l6 
:1. ? requesting bank statements. 17 
1. B Was there anything that prompted MD&D to start u 
l. ~ requesting aotual - andJor you requesting actual bank 19 
:2 0 statements? 20 
21 . MR. NICKELS; Objection; foundation. 21 
22 A. I don't remember iflhat is the fll'st time that we 22 
2:3 requested bank statements. 1 know that for a period 23 
24 of time that we:: were rccoiving routinely, from the ::! 4 
2 5 insured, their check registers out of their 25 
Page 35 
1 QuickBooks. and we were relying on that. And then 1 
2 there came a point in time -. 2 
3 (Cell phone interruption.) ~ 
4: MR. BISTL1NE: Oh,I'm sorry. 4 
5 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) Anyway. go ahead. I'm sorry. YOt 5 
6 said you were relying on the QuickBooks cash or the 6 
7 Qu,ickBoo.ks check register. ? 
8 A. Right. And then we received confllctlng lllformation 8 
5) from the insured initially thil.t a ocrtain pn)' .9 
l. 0 period - paychecks for a certain pay period were 10 
l. ~ disbursed at a particular time. and then found out 11 
~2 later that that was not the case. And that was when 12 
~:3 we decided that receiving - it was also the point at 13 
14 which the insured was indicating that they were baying 14 
15 cash flow issues with paying piI.)'l'olL And so we ~5 
~G dcoided we needed to also obtain bank statements 16 
1. i documenting actual disbursements when they bappenej .1 ? 
~ e Q. And do you recall receiving a correspondence from 1 a 
J. 9 Lakeland True Value, either through me or whoever 19 
:2 0 their agent, that infonnet! you tllat the checkS were 2 0 
2 1 being written and being held beofluse they didn't have :n 
22 the oash to pay them? 22 
23 A. Yes, I did. 23 
24 MR, NICKELS: Objection; foundation. 24 
25 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) And did that cause you any concen ?2 5 
i 
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A. Not concern so much, just that would b~ one of those 
instances where we would adjust what w~ were asking 
for. Going forward, we would want to h~vc cl()(lJ' 
dOCumentation of what did happen in. tb~ event that it 
was going to be different from what had previously 
occurred. I 
Q. And did you do a final calculation ofth~ business 
income loss in this case? ; 
A. As in tenns ofwbat would na.ve been c~led our final 
Q. Yeah. , 
A . •• MD&D's final ca1culations? ! 
Q. Yeah. Let me rephrase it first. At som~ point, did 
somebody from Hartford Sedgewick say, We're viewing 
this claim as ending on this date; calculate the loss 
up to that date? i 
A. Not while I waG working on it. I 
MIt. BISn.1NE: All right. Could vi,e go off the 
record for a second. Bryan? 
MR. NICKELS; Sure. 
(RECESS TAKEN FROM 9:51 A.M. TO 9;58 A.lW.) 
(pLA.lN1'IFF'S Ex.HII3IT NOS 9 TIiROUOH 11 
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Q. I'm going to hand you Plaintiff's E~bit 9. If you 
canjust kind of quickly look -- that's a letter. If 
you could _. requesting infonnation'·- kind oflook 
down through the iru:ormation requested. 
A. (Witness peruses document.) Okay. 
Q. And did you have eny input on th~ oompilation oftha: 
list; do you recall? I 
A. This, no. I did 110t. 
Q. And I'm going to hand you Plaintiffs Exhibit II, have 
you take a quick look at that. ! 
A. (Witness peruses document.) Okay. 
Q. Do you know what th&lt is? : 
A. I believe that these are departme:n~ sales reports. 
And MD&D received copies of these from Mike Fritz. 
believe it came out of his point of sale system. 
Q. And did you use those for anything; do you recall? 
A. J believe it was one of the types of docume::ntation of 
hi$ l5al~S that we revtewed and analyze<i in our 
calculations to determine which w~s going to be the 
best piece of infonnation for the calculation. 
Q. Okay. And,lastly, you already h~ve in front of you 
Exhibit J 0, which is an affidavit fr6m a gentleman 
narnet! Dan Harpc::r? I 
Central Court Reporting 
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:l. A. Yc::s. 1 
2 Q. Have you ever seen that before? 2 
:3 A. Yes. I have. 3 
4 Q. Have you reviewed it before today? 4 
S A. Yes, I did. 5 
6 Q. Okay. And he has IDS opinions in thcre. Do you have , 
7 any disagreements with - I don't know if 7 
e disagreements' the right word. but I guess do have any 8 
9 professional differences in how he performed that 9 
1. 0 evaluation in that affidavit? 1 0 
11. Iv1R. NICKELS: Objection. Ms. Kohler has not ~ 1 
1.2 been designated as an expert by us, (lnd so ahe'll not J.2 
J.:3 at present - we haven't requested her to offer any 13 
~ 4. opinions with respect to Mr. Harper's affidavit. 14 
1. 5 A. This is one way of doing it. That's what I would say, 15 
'16 is mat I don't disagree with his method of coming up 16 
1. 7 wIth his calculation. 1. 7 
1. e Q. (By Mr. Bistline::) And part of his oaloulatlon was to le 
J. 9 service the trade payables; is that correct? 19 
2. 0 A. He includes •• it does appear he inc1 udes that in his 20 
~ 1. calculation. 21 
22 Q. And that would be one place where you might agree Wi ~ 2 
23 •• 23 
:2 4 A. Yes. Tnat was not how WI; would do it. That wu not ;24 




Amy Koh~er, 9/21/2009 
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. Value. 
Q. Was there anything that you can 1:hU1k of that you 
recall seeing that is not in those PDPs'f 
A. The only thing that I didn't see in th~ POFs were our 
schedules that I can recall. : 
Q. And these schedules would have be~n •• there would 
have been a monthly schedule that was created, 
correct? i 
A. Not necessarily. , 
Q. Not necessarily, okay. And now just some general 
stuff. At any point in your convers:ations with Ms. 
Kale, did you ever develop the opinion from speaking 
with her that she, T guess, thought the Lakeland True 
Value people were being less than fdrthright in their 
presentation of information to evalutle this claim? 
MR. NlCKELS; Obje::ction; speculation to the 
extent it calls for Ms. Kale's beliefs. : 
A. I can't say that I ··1 can't say what ~he was 
~. I 
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) But you never got that impression? 
1 mean. if 1 walked up and said, "These idiots have 
just submitted au this junk, and I tbiDk it's really 
fl bunoh of nonsense, can you look it through?" that's 
what I mean by did she ever·· did ypU ever sense 
that, that she thought something wrui not right about 
Page 41 
1. Q. Okay. And I think: what I'm going to have you do now 















have four PDPs, and I'm just going to reduce them doWll 
80 thllt - you know, pretty mucb a page each on the 
~c:reen and just have you flip down through them. 
These four PDFs are MD&D's file as provided to 
me from opposing counsel. And what I'm after is just 
tor you to look through it and basieally JUSt give me 
your opinion, if you think tbcro's some things that 
are not in there that .hould be in there or some items 
of infonnation that may be missing from it. And you 
may not have any knowledge at all of it. Just I 
wanted to have you flip through it if that - you 
understand what I'm a.fier? 
2 MR. NICKELS: Same objection. 
3 A. No, I wouldn't say that there was a sense from her 
4 that sbe thought the infonnation we wer~ getting from 
5 the insured was incorrect. i 
6 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) And at no point did !l.nybocly ask: you 
7 to do any sort offorenslc analysis to dct~rmine if 
e tho information beins provided wQS in fact accurate? 
g :MR. NICKELS: Objection: fonn. . 
10 A. No. : 
11 Q. (By Mr . .Bistline) When did you leave:the employ of 
12 MD&D? I 
I 
13 A. I believe mat it was Ol;tobcr of200&. ' 
14 Q. And did you have II.lly discussion~ about who would be 












MR. BISTLINE: Okay. We. can So off the record 
for a second. 
16 A. The only conversation I had was that Patrick would be 
17 1alcing over the work from me. i 
(pause in the proceedings.) 
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) And you just reviewed fout PDPs 00 
18 Q. And since you left MD&D, did anybody itom MD&D conta .' 
you regarding qUC5tion:s or conccms they ha4 about rbe 
my computer, and they were Bates sl.amped MDD 1 throu,!: 20 
Page 552. And did you reoognize thOBe: document!i you 21 
reviewed? 22 
A Yes . 23 
Q. And what were those? 24 
A. Those were from our file, MD&D's file on Lakeland True 25 
prior sohedules: or oth~ information )IOU had 
developed? I 
A. No. i 
MR. BlSTLINE: Well, unless Bryan can think ot 
something I left out, I don't think I hil.v~ any other 
questions. I 
II (Pag~s 38 to 4l) 
I 
I 
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I 
:l. MR. NICI<BLS; 1 just have a couple Quick l Q. - you haven't yet developed an opiniop as to whether 
:2 fonow-up questions. 2 or not his calculations for lost prOfits and 
3 continUing expenses are correct, h~""c y~u? 3 EXAMINA nON 
4 BY MR. NICKELS: q A No, I h~ve not. I 
5 Q. In de\'eloping your schedules, did you have any role i S Q. And you're not aware a.t present wbat documents 
6 the determination of what the period of restoration 6 Mr. Harper would have used in determining those 
-; would be? 7 numbers? 
S A. No. That would have come from the adjuster, from 
9 Julia Kale. 
6 A. That is correct. i 
9 Q. Okay. And With respect to continuing' payroll, you 
10 don't have 1Ul opinion, a.5 you sit here ~day, IU1 to 1. 0 Q. And any calculations or projections you would have 
:1.1 made would have been dependent on that period of 11 whether or not those numbers are correct? 
::L 2 restoration? 12 A. No. I do not. : 
l. :3 A. That is correct. 13 Q. Okay. And 1 guess generally with respect to Schedule 
~4 Q. I want to refer you real quick to Exhibit No. 5. 
:1.5 A. S? 
14 1 then, at least as you sit bere today, you haven't 
lS yet developed an opinion as to whether or not these 
1 G figures arc corrc~? : 1.6 Q. Yes. 
1. 7 A. You're looking at 6. l' A. That is correct. . 
l. e Q. Why don't 1 put 6 over here. 
::L 9 A. Okay. 
19 MR. NICKELS: Okay. (think that's all I have. 
19 MR. BISTUNE: I don't have any ~Uow.up. 
20 Q. I'm looking at No.5. 20 MR. NICKELS: Okay. : 
21 A. Okay. I'm with you now. 21 (OFF-THE·RECORD DISCUSSION 
22 HELD.) I 22 Q. When you were testifying .- just for purposes of 
23 clarification of your testimony, when you initially :23 THE COURT REPORTE.R: Did you want to put on the 
24 testified a.bout this dooument, you indicated tbat you 24 record when you're going to be sending these? 
25 had rec:eived all of the information requested on this, 25 MR. N1CKELS: Are we still on the record at all? 
Page 43 
1 but in your later testimony, you identified additional 1 
2 information that did you not receive during the course 2 
3 ~~~~ 3 
-4 So it's my understanding then that with respect 4 
S to Exhibit S, you didn't actually receive all of the S 
6 items requested in here; is that correct? 6 
7 A. Okay. To clarify, we didn't receive all of these 7 
e items over the entire span of the .- e 
9 Q. Okay. 9 
:1.0 A. Yes. 10 
:11 Q. All riebt. And the items that you didn't receive, 11 
12 those would be identified in your testimony, in your 12 
23 correspondence to the various representatives for 13 
~4 Lakeland? 14 
:1.5 A. That is correct, yes. 15 
],6 Q. Okay. All right. With Tespect to Exhibit 10, Mr. 16 
1 7 Harper's affidavit? 17 
19 A. Yes. 16 
19 Q. And as you're sitti~g here today, Hartford has not 19 
2 a asked you to render an opinion on Mr. Harpc:r's 20 
21 affidavit and schedule; is that c01'reet? 21 
2 2 A. That's correct. 22 
23 Q. Okay. So at this point, looking at Schedule 1 of his 23 
24 affidavit, which is attached towards the back - 24 
25 A. Yes. 25 
Central Court Reporting 
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MR. BISTLINE: Yeab. I think we just maybe just 
will .say that I'm goiDg to e-mail her'tbose four PDPs. 
MR. NICKELS: Okay. ! 
MR. BISTLINE: And I'll cc you the e-mail. 
MR. NICKELS; Okay. : 
(PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NQ. 12 WAS 
MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 
(DEPOSTTION CONCLUDED AT 10:23 A.M., 
(SIGNATURE RESERVED.~ I 
I , 
12 (Pages 42 to 45) 
I 
800-442-DEPO , 
4782eeac·6Dt!1 ~ea.D'1 c~79b01 Otdaco;' 
~eland True value v. Hartfo~d Fire Ineuranc~ 
:I. CHANOt;:S IN fORM ANtl S'UBS1'ANCE REQUESTED BE MADE 
fNTIiE fOREGOJNC OIW.. EXAMINATION TRANSCRIPT: 
2 
(NOTE: If no chanecs desired, plense sign and date where 















PAGe LINE CORRECTlON AND REASON 
1. AAfYKOHLlSR., hereby d~oIlS1'C u.odQr ponalty of p¢JjIlf}' 
1.9 that 1 have read tho foregoing deposilion and that !he 
testilnollY contain cd tl1erein is a true and correct 





23 See: Wash. Reports 34A, Rule 30(e) 
USCA 28, Rule 30(e) 
24 PLEASE ReTURN TO; Central Coun Reponing, 







CERTIF leA TE 
STATE OF WASHINGTON) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF KING ) 
This is to certifY tllatI, Eva P. Jankovits, 
6 Certified Court Reporter and Notary PubJic in and for the 
7 State of Washington, reponed the within and fOTQlgOing 
a deposition; said deposition being taken before me as a 





witness was first by me duly swom; that said examination 
waS taken by me in shorthand and thereafter under my 
supervision transcribed. and that same is a full. true 
and correct record of the testimoJlY of said Witnc33. 
1.4 inoluding all questions, answers and objections. if any. 
15 of counsel. 
16 I further certify that T am not a relative or 
17 employee or attorney or counsel of £IIl)' oftbe parties, 
1 a nor am I financially interested in the outcome of the 
19 cause. 
:2 0 IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have set my hand and affiXed m 




EVA P. JANKOVITS, CCR 
ceRNO.19)5 
Notary Public in and for the State 
of Washington 
Central Court Reporting 
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13 (Pag$s 46 to 47) , 
800-442-DEPb 
I 



















" PAlDlEftSHII' 0ItLlJDIN0 
,ADAiSSItlNAL txIIIJ'ORA"DQKS. 
Fchruazy 2.1. 2DO& 
MikeFli12 
lakdami'l'ruc Value ft.c:uVware 
P.O. :Box 160 
R.elhdrum,lD 83858 
It£: CIaimj/.A818400416-0001-02; DateoILoss: Jarmm:y22.200i 
As 'W8 disCUS9ed in ourJ)bone call yesterday, we are wrlting wi1h,a.Jist of docurDCDls we will JJCed til ~ the 
business intcaup1i01l1QS!l you hIIve SOS1niaed whenyour roof.coJlapscd. PlCBSe provide me tbDowmg; , 
1. MoadlJ.1 alQl ~"d c:mt Clf'3l1t~ infonaMioA by depllJ1mol;ll for IACt IlmoRlbs, iDeJw!irle !MIIAI)' 2.008 (or. a. many 
months AS-YOU WI pull OlSt of yom: point-of'-sale system), ! , 
2". MDD1hly aatea lllr_Micm frDm T,.. VaNe ~1I11e and 3 clage$t surrotmdina True VaJue Sl'OteS ror JlUlumy 
2.001 dwouahFebnllllylOOa, i 
, I 





4. Monlbly l'Io11t It. Loss SUumt:Jlti JIIDIUII'J' 200S Ihrough february Z003 (oIdl6 each mODtb thcm:aftz:r: thlIl you. aTe 
closai dollln, ., they antJ'l'flPllJ\2l). I 
5. Y~~Dd BalanGe ShCCIS for 2005,2006 IUId 2007. 
Wbile we may have additiDnal documeat reqaes\S we SDticipat.e 111= ~ will allow us to analyze any 
potential busiDess iDtetmption lass:s. We apprecill1e yoar assisIanc:e in IlUs IllIdr.e:. and please let uskDow if You 




CC; Julia Kate, Jd O'Briml 
AIbrD ....... CIII/kIIe.~.1IaIls .DIItait.llu!rGll. ~.I\IIIIZIIl.""" OH .. t-. ..... AIIjsPoI·14i<IoD .~" ......... 














"l!LG:U.4'S.~a: PAX CC.~3JlQn . w..I1IIIUt 
Morch 28, 2008 
Tim Van Valin 
P.O. Box 1228 
Ratbdnun, m 83858 
' J ' 
1m: lakeland true Va1l.1e·Hardware,. Claim #A818400416!.oOOl-02; Date· of to,s: lanuary 28,2006 
l?eurMr. Van Vellil, , 
I 
We are writing to you on behalf oEyour c1ieut, MhFrltt Iud Lakeland Tmc'VWeIDrdwate. As we e:pt8.med ill 
our doo;unentrequest to Mr. pritz d1Ittd Febrwuy 21. 2008, W~  ongoing dotmnents over the course Oftha 
period the bWliness is closed to complete final celClllallons ofthct busiaeas intCllUption loss. Pleas~ provide'the 
n,UDwmg information: . . i 
, I 
1. Monthly Profit. &; Loss Stmcm= iDr Iaatlary 2008·M.ardJ 2CJ()8 (and fOj each month thsreafterlhstthe 
business is closed) : . I 
2. The adIlal payroll expenses paid (Le. wages. taxeS, ben~) overthe period the business is cJ06ed ; 
3. Any additional ex.penses paid related to the tempaM location. (apart from. the rent already documCDted.) 
and how tbe loc::ation is beiDgused. : 
4. Please advise whether- Mr. Fritz 1m t:Oatinued to· pay offiCe .pmCllt leases and gtIliI'anteed Paym,But9 
dmmg the loss period and t£plain what these. eosrB' are for : 
s. Please iDdtea1& '(!Vila the company a.nticip&lIlS retIlrIli1Ig to opara1:iOG5 i 
6, Please advjse if any sales 8.t'e currently tIIldDg p)sc~ aut of& &emporuy location. .: 
I 
. I 
WlliJe we may ha.w addrtiooal dOCllIlleat request!: we anticipate ~es8 records will allow U3 to·atWyze any : 
potential business imenuption losses .. We appreciate yoor assistance in this matter, and p)ea~ let us know if you 
lmve B1l¥ quesQons, . : 
Sineercty. 
Amy Kohler CPA 
akobler@mdd.nst 





STAT~ OF :U/l}jU ',. } SS 
COUdT'{ i ~ i'\! 
ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
BISTLINE LAW, PLLC 
1423 N Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 665-7270 
(208) 665-7290 (fax) 
abistline@povn.com 
ISB: 5216 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
FILED 
I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIJL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNT~' OF KOOTENAI 
I 
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE, 
L.L.C., 
I 
ase No.: CV-08-7069 
OTION TO RECONSIDER (AMENDED) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation, 
Defendant. 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11, Plaintiff moves this Court for an Order reconsidering its prior 
order dismissing Plaintiffs bad faith claims in this matter, and its order limiting the testimony 
pertaining to damages to the period ending January 281h, 2009. This motion is based on the 
supporting memorandum and every affidavit in the file, and all memorandum filed by Plaintiff in 
support of any motions before this Court. Oral argument is requested hereon. 
DATED this 6th , day of April, 2010. 
ARTHUR M. BISTLiNlf"= 
PLAINTIFF'S THIRD MOTION TO RECONSIDER - 1 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I 
I 
I hereby certify that on the _ day of February, 20 to, I served ~ true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the followi~g; 
Keely E. Duke 
Bryan A. Nickels 
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton. P.A. 
P.O. Box 1271 
Boise, ID 8370l 
PLAINTIFF'S THIRD MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
US Mail 
__ Ovemight M~il 
Hand Delivered 








ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
BISTLINE LAW, PLLC 
1423 N Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 665-7270 





Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDIClft\L DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF KOOTENAI 




THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation, 
Defendant. 
I 
ase No.: CV-08-7069 
laintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion 
o Reconsider Dismissal of Plaintiff's Bad Faith 
Jaims. . 
Hartford delayed payment because of information that had not been provided to their 
accountants - not because of " ... unsupported, inconsistent and changing claim 
demands ... " and it was error for this Court to dismiss Lakeland's bad faith delay claim 
on thm;e grounds. 
The following is not in dispute J 1) Hartford paid more than half of the totaJ value of this 
claim after the period of restoration had ended; 2) Hartford did not make any payment 
whatsoever for lost business income during the months of July. August. September or October 
2008; 3) Hartford made one payment in November 2008; 4) Hartford did not make another 
payment until March 2009; 5) Hartford did not pay for the damaged inventory until June 2009, 
I All from the Affidavit of Melany Copley In Support ofHllrtford's Motion for Summary Judgment (Copley 
affidavit) at Paragraph 2. 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Suppon of Mation to Reconsider 





more than a year and 16 months after the collapse. The delay in making these payments causes 
I 
severe financial hardship to Lakeland and prevented the timely operiing of the store.2 
Lakeland must prove that Hartford's delay in making the required business income 
payments and inventory loss payments was not objectively reasonable.) On summary judgment, 
Hartford offered no evidence justifying its decision to delay payments to Lakeland. Although 
presented facts surrounding the communications between Lakeland's agents and Hartford's 
agents, Hartford never argued that this communication issue was the cause of this delay_ There 
is not now and has never been any explanation from Hartford for this delay. It is not in the 
record. Hartford on more than one occasion has been invited to cite to the record to show any 
explanation for this delay and Hartford has never once responded because the point was simply 
not raised on summary judgment. 
This Court found the delay claim was addressed - that Hartford did explain why it 
refused to pay -- but this finding has no support in the record. The objection to the consideration 
of that claim is renewed here and not waived. Hartford did not raise the delay claim, so 
Lakeland was under no duty to present any evidence to defend it. In any event, Lakeland did, 
" ... prove coverage to the point that, based on the evidence the insurer had before it, the insurer 
intentionally and unreasonably withheld the insured's benefits." Robinson v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company, 137 Idaho 173,178,45 P.2d 829,834 (2002). 
The policy in this case provides, "We will pay for the actual loss of Business Income you 
sustain due to the necessary suspension of your "operations" during the period of restoration." 4 
2 Bates Stamped Affdiavit of Dan Harper filed February 101h, 2010 (Harper Bates Affidavit), at bates 23; Affidavit 
of Mike Fritz in Opposition to Summary Judgment filed paragraphs 10, and 13 through 22. 
J As this Court bas recognized, negligence is sufficient to support bad faith. "In Selkirk Seed Co. v. State ins. Fund, 
the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that an action against one's own insurer (first party bad faith), independent of 
breach ofcomracr, is limited to intentional or negligent denial or delay of payment." Roylance v. John Alden Life 
Ins. Co. 2008 WL 4202018, 4 (Idaho Dist.2008) 
4 Copley affidvail at Exhibit A H405. 
Plainlifrs Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider 




(emphasis supplied). The policy does not specify when these payments must be made. "When 
I 
I 
no time of performance is expressed in a contract, which was so in t~is case, it will be implied 
that the contract must be performed within a reasonable time. Bot! v .. Idaho State Bldg. Authority, 
122 Idaho 471,477,835 P.2d 1282, 1288 (1992) citing Obray v. Mitchell, 98 Idaho 533, 567 
P.2d 1284 (1977) and McFarlandv. Joint School Disl. No. 365, 108 Idaho 519, 700 P.2d 141 
(Ct.App.1985). 
As this Court pointed out, the payments should have been made when Hartford had 
sufficient information before it to make a payment, i.e., when Lakeland had proven its claim to 
the point that it would be unreasonable for Hartford to withhold payment. Robinson, supra. 
Hartford had the information it needed to calculate the payments in early March 2008, calculated 
those payments and then refused to make them. The only explanation as to why the payments 
were not made was because the accountants did not have enough information. Not because of the 
inconsistent claim demands as this Court has found. 
Lakeland provided sufficient information for Hartford's accountants to calculate the 
payment due for each month of lost business income and Hartford's accountants calculated due 
for the lost business income in mid-March 2008.5 The accounting finn hired QY Hartford's 
adjuster received the required financial information from Lakeland in early March 2008 
including profit and loss statements. 6 In mid-March, the accountant developed schedules from 
which to make advances to Lakeland and called to discuss those with Kale, the adjuster. Those 
schedules were for making advances over the next four months. The schedules estimated payroll 
expense $18,622 but the accountant was very clear that the numbers did not include amounts for 
payroll other than for Mike and Kathy Fritz. Kale called Mike Fritz and was told they were 
paying the entire payroll. not just their own.' There is no evidence that Kale ever communicated 
S CopeJy affidavit al Exhibit CHI 7. . 
6 Affidavit of Dan Harper filed in opposition to Hartford's Summary Judgment Motion at paragraph 5. 
7 Copley affidavit at Exhibit C H 17. , 
Plainliff's Memorandum in Support of Molion 10 Reconsider 







this fact to the accountants or in any way directed that they recomp~ted their schedules based on 
this information. As a result, the accountants' schedules underestimated Lakeland's payroll 
I 
expense by approximately 330%. The total payroll expense from the four months of the prior 
year was $61,5038, which is roughly 330% higher than the Hartford's payroll estimate used to 
pay Lakeland during the months of February through May 2008. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the adjuster had sufficient information from this first set of 
schedules to make an advance through the end of May 2008, no advance was made. This 
resulted in the under funding of the claim for the months of February, April, and the first 23 days 
of May 2008 and caused cash flow stress on Lakeland.9 
In May 2008, Hartford received an updated set of schedules (the second set of schedules) 
from the accountants. The second set of schedules revealed that Lakeland's claim had been 
under funded by over $73,000 and a payment for that amount was mailed May 23 rd , 2008. The 
second set of schedules also reflects a funding requirement for June of $30,000 but this amount 
was not mailed until mid-July. 10 On July 16"\ 2008, Kale the adjusLer Lold Lakeland that she was 
now able to issue the loss of income for June, 11 however, she had sufficient information to make 
that payment since May 20th, 2008. 12 Thereafter, Hartford/Kale did not make any business 
income payments until November 2008, even though they had all the information they need to 
calculate those payments. This resulted in a deficiency in payments of $111 ,000 for those 
months. 13 
It is not in dispute that Lakeland proved its claim to the point that it was unreasonable for 
Hartford to delay payments. Hartford's accountants received Lakeland's financial infonnation 
8 Affidavit of Arthur M. Bistline at 7 
9 Harper Bates Affidavit at bates 23. 
10 Harper Bates Affidavit at 23. 
II Copley Affidavit at Exhibit C II146. 
12 Harper Bates Affdidavit at 23. 
13 Id. 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider 
Dismissal uf PlllilllilT's Bat! failh Claims -4 
??fllfll --) ) 
I 
and calculated the payments. Hartford withheld the payments and tHis Court has excused 
Hartford because "This Court bas found tbat when Lakeland stJted the ball rolling by 
making its claim, Lakeland made unsupported, inconsistent andichanging claim demands 
upon Hartford.,,14 This a fmding of fact which has no support in the record, but more 
importantly, the" ... unsupported, inconsistent and changing claim demands upon Hartford" is 
not why the adjusters withheld payment according to their own testimony. 
Hartford withheld payment and Hartford's justification for doing so is that the 
accountants did not have all the information those accountants required. 
By Mr. Bistline to Ms. Reynolds, the supervising adjuster: 
Q: Let'sjus say right after the suit was filed, before you talked to an attorney, 
did you inform anybody at the Hartford, other than your lawyer, that no 
business income payment had been made for July August or September? 
A: Personally, no. 
Q: And why hadn't a payment been made for those months? 
A: Lack of documentation and financial infonnation. 15 
At no point did the adjusters testify that the "inconsistent, unsupported and changing" demand's 
from Lakeland was the reason that payment was withheld. This Court's finding of fact that 
Lakeland's "inconsistent, unsupported and changing" demands justified Hartford's delay in 
making payment is not only not supported in this record, it is contrary to the only evidence in the 
record on that subject. 
On summary judgment, Hartford at no point raised or argued why it had withheld the 
periodic payments due under this policy and it was and is error to consider the delay claim on 
14 Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Hartford's Motions in Limine at 4. . 
15 Deposition ofReynoJds at 29:20 attached to the affidavit of Arthur M. Bistline in support of motion for a 
continuance filed 3/19/10. 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Mation 10 Reconsider 
Dismissal orPlainlitrs Bad faith Claims - 5 
99(-'" __ J. 
! 
summary judgment. In order to explain this delay, something had Jo be in the record from 
I 
I 
Hartford's accountants because the accountants are the ones who, according to Hartford, did not 
have enough infonnation to calculate these payments. 16 There is no~hing in this record from any 
of Hartford's accountants, therefore. there is nothing in the record to explain the delay. 
However, Lakeland did prove coverage to the point that it was unreasonable for Hartford 
to withhold payments under the policy. Lakeland provided the required financial infonnation, 
the accountants calculated the lost business income (albeit incorrectly at first because ofthe 
negligence of the adjuster) and then Hartford withheld regular payment of the amount calculated 
for lost business income. Hartford did this because of as-of-yet w1identified missing infonnation 
- not because of inconsistent claim demands. It is for the jury to decide if this "missing 
information" justified Hartford withholding payment and causing Lakeland, its owners and 
employees severe financial distress. 
Lakeland should he allowed to present evidence of damages incurred after January 28th, 2009, 
because the policy pays lost business income during the period of restoration and that the legnth 
of that period is a question of fact. 
The policy here provides that it will pay lost business income during the period of 
restoration. 17 The period of restoration is not limited to any specific time, but is detennined 
based on the existence of a set of facts pertaining to the reasonable ~o time repair, replacement or 
rebuild the property at the damaged store or when the insured opens a new store elsewhere. 18 A 
different section of the policy provides that Hartford will only pay lost business income for 12 
months. 19 These are two different limitations on the time frame during which lost business 
16 See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for a Continuance at pages 3 and 4 wherein the adjuster state 
that the accountants are the ones who were claiming to be missing information. 
17 Copley affidvait at Exhibit A H405 paragraph 0, (1) 
IS Copley affidavit at Exhibit A H419 paragraph G, 12. 
19 Copley affidvait at H405 paragraph 0, (3). 
Plaintill's Memorandum in Support of Motion 10 Reconsider 




income will be paid and this renders the insurance contract subject ito conflicting interpretations 
which must be resolved in favor of Lakeland. 
In Farmers Ins. Co. oj Idaho v. Talbot. 133 Idaho 428, 987 P.2d 1043, 1044 (1999) the 
Idaho Supreme Court considered a policy containing inconsistent limitations on the coverage 
provided. Farmers argued that one part of the policy can grant coverage and another part can 
clearly limit that coverage. The Court responded, 
The Dear Policyholder" language attempts to limit Talbot's UIM 
coverage in one manner, while the limitation of liability clause 
attempts to limit Talbot's UIM coverage in a different manner. 
Because the provisions attempt to limit Talbot's VIM coverage 
in two different ways, ambiguity exists. Because ambiguity 
exists, the traditional rule of construction applies- i.e.! the 
insurance contract must be construed strongly against the 
insurer. 
133 Idaho 428, 435, 987 P.2d 1043, 
1050 (1999) (emphasis supplied) 
In this case, coverage for lost business income is granted in one place and then limited in two 
different ways - one by a time of 12 months and a second that is related to when the business 
could reasonably resume operations. 
Given the two different limitations on business income coverage, the policy is ambiguous 
as to the limitation and, as matter of law, that ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the insured. 
Farmers Ins. Co. oj Idaho v. Talbot, 133 Idaho 428, 435, 987 P .2d ] 043, 1044 (1999) Therefor, 
the Hartford should be required to provide coverage during the "period of restoration" whatever 
the jury determines that date to be based on the definition of that term in the policy. Hartford 
utilized the limitation in the "period of restoration" and cannot complain about being held to it. 
Plainliff's Memorandum in Support of Motion 10 Reconsider 
Dismissal ufPlllimilTs Bini Failh Claims -7 
----------- --------
??fll() -- )" 
This O>urt should and allow Dan Harper to testifY to all roBoL v.ithin his area of 
I 
i 
expertise and for which he is competent and not limit his testimony t? damages incurred before 
I 
the expiration of 12 months. 
DATED this 6!b, day of April, 2010. 
ARTHUR M. BISTUNE 
CER'OFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certifY that on the _ day of February, 2010, 1 served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Keely E. Duke 
Bryan A. Nickels 
Hall, Farley, Oberrccht & Blanton, P.i\. 
P.O. Box 1271 
Boise, lD 83701 
I'lninlill' sM~lllorontlum ill Support of Motion f(l ROCi)lL~idcT 




X Facsimile (2mh 395-8585 
Email 
.. 
.... _ ..__ .. _--_._-_ .. __ •.......•..•• -. ----------~--... -- ............... . 
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ARTtnJR M. BISTLlNE 
BISTLINE LA W, PLLC 
1423 N Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 665· 7270 
(208) 665-7290 (fax) 
ISB: 5216 
Attorney tor Plaintiff 
SMTE or~ ![JJiC-Iu l SS 
COUNTv J 
FiLEr' 
?Olr rpf:( -6 Prj 4: '5
J -e IJ\ 
ClEFii< [JiSl fil~T COURT 'rI 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICI L DISTRlCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN }\NO FOR THE COUNT' OF KOOTENAI 
"'ase No.: CV -08-7069 . 
:replaCl;:5 motion filed 3-8- J 0) 
1HE HARTFORD FIRE TNSURANCE 
Plnintifl: 
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE, 
L. L.c., 
VS. 
COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation" I" 
Defendant. 
---------- --------------~ 
Plaintiff moves this Court lor an Order consolidating this case~nto Kootenai County Case 
CVIO-774. pending in front ofthe Honorable Lansing Haynes. This Motion is based on Ute. 
P. 42(a), and the Amended Memorandum in support ofthi5 motion and the Affidavit Dan Harper 
filed this date, as wen as the aftjdavit of Arthur Bistline March 5lh, 2010, and all other affidavits 
and memorandum in the record in thjs case. Oral argumenl is reqlle~ted. 
DATED this 6111 d.-ty of ApriJ, 20'10. 
?-' ---~ -
ARTHUR M. BIST.LINE 
PLAINTIff'S AMENUHU MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE -) 
----.--------------------------------------------------------------------------
2271 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I V- ~C":\ , 
I hereby certify that on thel.Q\_ d ay of~20JO, I served a:true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Keely E. Duke 
Bryan A. Nickels 
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1271 
Boise,ID 83701 
us Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
---JIand Delivered 
~acsimile (208) 395-8585 
Email 
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE - 2 
ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
LA W OFFICE OF ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
1423 N. Government Way 
Coeur d'A1ene, ID 83814 
(208) 665-7270 
(208) 665-7290 (fax) 
ISB: 5216 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a COJUlccticut Corporation, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
ase No; CV -08-7069 
FFIDAVIT OF DAN HARPER IN SUPPORT 
F MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE 
I, Dan Harper, having been first duly sworn, upon oath depose and state tbat: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen (18) and a resident of Spokane County, Washington; 
2. I am familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding this matter and am 
competent to testify as to the matters herein contained; 
3. I am employed at Harper, Inc.; 
4. Attached is a true and correct copy of my ana1ysis of True Value Hardware's 
EmpJoyees' claims. 
DATED this 5±b-day of March, 2010. 






SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 5:0- day of!March, 2010. -- -
NOTARY BUC to and for Washmgton 
Residing at: ~Dtv.N... ,: 
Commission Expires: (0/20/2.01 ( 
I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAN HARPER 
-2 
I 
±L ~~\ ! 
I hereby certify that on the \0 day ofMktr, 2010, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated beJo~, and addressed to the 
following: 
Keely E. Duke 
Bryan A. Nickels 
HaJl, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A. 
PO Box 1271 
Boise, ID 83701-1271 
















March 5, 2010 
Mr. Arthur Bistline 
Bistline Law 
1423 N. Government Way 
Coeur d Alene, IV 838J4 
Re: LaJ,eiand v Hartford 
Dear Mr. Bistline: 
INCORPORATED 
1'\lIemic Acc[lulllan!\ 
\i~\luatjuH ."d\'is(fr~ \~ 
"k~lifyillg Erlln(lmic E.<pen ... 
1 have reviewed the documents and con'espondel1ce produced in tbis case as it relates to 
the on-going Lake1and True Value staffpayroH, which excludes tl~e Fritz's wages/draws. 
Based on this review of the records 1 have reached the foHowing opinions. 
Opinion l-Har((ord was Timely Pr01,ided the Necessary Information to Reasonably 
Estimate and Fund the Staff Payroll on a ConJ(!mporaneolis Basis. : 
Harford had received the monthly Lakeland statements of income iby fax dated March 5, 
2008. These statements listed the actual monthly staff payroll and : payroll taxes for 2007 
(MDD000428-MDD000449) (Exhibit A). In my opinion the same month prior year 
actual staff payroll expense provided a reasonable basis fOJ Hartford to fund these costs 
on a contemporaneolls basis. Any over or short funding, when compared to the 
subsequent actual, could have been adjusted for in the next month. : 
Opinion 2-The Actual Amounts Paid to the Store Staff were )\iaterially Less than the 
Prior Year Due to Hartford's Lack of Timely Funding. 
Hartford had been informed by Mr. Fritz on March 13, 2008 that he was planning on 
continuing the entire payroll during the period of restoration (HOOO 17) (Exhibit B). 
Hartford had been timely provided the infoffilation they needed to not only estimate and 
fund the staff payroJ] currently but also flmd the monthly lost store income. I 
Hartford's delinquent funding of t1u:: continuing staff payroH and monthly lost store 
income caused Mr. Fritz to make financial cuts or reductions to {hc normal continuing 
staiT wages (Exhjbit C). 
I E-mail from Ms. Kale indicating she had received rhe MOD report of loss (HODOO 18) . 
.... . -.•... -......•.•.•......• " ... " .•.. , ... ,.... . ... '.... _ .... ,"'" .. -. ! 
SjJllkfllll'. 11';1 992IJ/ 
I' -Inllii: Ittlrpr rinr(il' (t;:ol1eJllt?rl. ('nl/! 
wc/Jsilc: W),'II'.rCli/I('.tfJt:r1. ('1)111 
5i}')' 7-17. 5850, IA X SM. 7-17. 585') 
."."",(a --- ) 
Mr. Arthur Bistline 
Re: Lakeland v Hartford 
March 5, 2010 
Page 2 
i 
The employees that would have otherwise received their nonnal v(,ages were damaged to 
the extent they were not able to fmd a replacement job. ! 
I have computed the difference between what the Lakeland employees were actually paid 
in 2008 and 2009 and what they likely would have been paid if the store had remained 
fully open and each bad remained employed at the store during those time frames. These 
amounts total $121,173.24 (Exhibit D). 
Very truly yours, 
HARPER INCORPORATED 
~-~\~ 
Daniel 1. Harper, CPAIABV, ASA. MBA 
djh/sjh 
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Hartford Payment of Nonnal Continuing Staff Payroll Costs 
I Per Insurance Policy··Continulng Nonnal Payroll Exp~nsell WiD Be Reimbursed 
! 
I 
Actual Staff Payroll from 2007 
Jan $ 11.812 
Feb $ 13.566 
( March $ 13.:l47 I April $ 18.896 , .• 
i MaV $ 15.880 
i June $ 15.877 I 
I July S 15.518 Hartford Received this Normal PayroJllnrormation 
S by Fax on March 5, 2008 ~ 
n August S 17.042 . _. _ _ _ : ______________ .. 
I: . - - - . l .. --r Sept $ 15.152 ~ 
~. October S 22.337 I 
" ~ . i NovemtJer $ 14.084 l 
~ December S 12.658 i
l t L .. ______ "_~_=~" __ " ________ ~ 
12 
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A81G400416-0001-02 03/14/2006 en JKALE 
Spoke vi Mike at insd he advjsed tbey are 
continuing paying the entire payroll durin9 
tim~ of construction. 
{Time Note Created :12:54 PH J 
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. ----.. -.. -- -------. - '-' --.. ------. ---~.- -- $10;000 
$-
&xrulu+ C./ 
Hartford Payroll Payments Were Delinquent in all but 2 Months after the Roof 
Collapse From Feb 2008 to Oct 2008 
f--- -.. ~~~-~ :------:~:=---~:,---=' - - ~=~:=~ ~'~='~-Yf=~~~"~-~51 
.•. .. __ .. _._--._ .... :.- ---.-~- . -\ 
I 
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., .. ~ --_. __ .: , . .. ' " . _._-_ .. ....... ,- ~ 
---'-.... -.-~- .. ' . - - . -.' ~ ---_._ .. __ . 
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Jan Feb Mar Ap May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
:-Payroll Cost -Hartford Payrrents for Payroll · 
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EKJu·b.+~ 
Hartford Computed Combined Lost Income and Payroll Costs 
Compared to Actual Hartford Payments Reveal a $80,000 Deficiency 
Preventing the Store from Opening In October 2008 
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Shortage Shortage 
Employee Name 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009 
James Ahlman $21,090.75 $12,516.00 -$8,574.75 $6,912.63 -$14,178.12 
Carolyn Beard $30,511.93 $16,327.00 -$14,184.93 $6,672.83 -$23,839.10 
Jason Jacobs $12,901.51 $10,102.38 -$2,799.13 -$12,901.51 
Pam McMaster . $26,646.90 $13,21B.76 -$13,428.14 $8,743.34 -$17,903.56 
Jerry Moreau $13,271.25 $7,565.25 -$5,706.00 $S,61~.25 -$7,658.00 
-$44,692.95 -$76,480.29 -$121,173.24 
ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
BISTLINE LAW, PLLC 
1423 N Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 665-7270 
(208) 665-7290 (fax) 
abistline@povn.com 
ISB: 5216 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST nJDICfAL DISTRlCT 
.:!:'.I}SS 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTr OF KOOTENAI 




THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation, 
Defendant. 
ase No.: CV-08-7069 
EMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
o CONSOLIDATE 
FACTS 
Lakeland True Value Hardware, LLC, operated a hardware store and the roof coUapsed. 
Lakeland had an insurance policy with Hartford which promised to pay continuing operating 
expenses incurred during the cessation of operations, including payroll. Lakeland filed suit in 
this case for breach of the insurance contract. The employees of Lakeland filed suit in Kootenai 
County Case CV 1 0-774 based on the same transaction and occurrence because they did not 
receive the payroll they would have had the store been operating. l 
I Affidavit of Arthur M. Bistline at I. 
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOnON TO CONSOLIDATE 
22U:I 
ARGUMENT 
"It is the policy of the law to limit the number of trials as far ~s possible. When claims 
arise out of the same accident and one trial is sufficient to determine all the facts, separate trials 
would be a waste of time and expense." Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 597, 768 P.2d 1321, 
1330 (1989) citing Nelson v. Inland Motor Freight Co., 60 Idaho 443,92 P.2d 790 (1939). The 
basis for the suit in Kootenai County Case CV 1 0-774 is that the employees of Lakeland were 
entitled to be paid what they would have earned if the store had not been destroyed during the 
period of time the store was not operating. The issue in that case is the same as this - whether 
Hartford reasonably performed its duties under the insurance contract. The only additional item 
of proof that is required on the issue is a simple calculation of the difference between what each 
employee was paid in 2008 and 2009 and the estimated amount each would have been paid jf the 
store was fully operational. 
A. The adjusters handling this loss have admitted the employees of Lakeland were 
entitled to full payroll during the time the store was not open. The employees 
are third party beneficiaries of the contract and entitled to enforce it in a 
direction acton. 
The policy in question provides for the payment of continuing operating expenses, 
including payroll, during the period ofrestoration.2 This provision provides a direct benefit to 
lhe employees of Lakeland - that being that those employees are paid what they would have 
2 Affidavit of Melany Copley In Support of Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgm~nt (Copley affidavit) at H419, 
Paragraph 0, (J) and 0, (4) , 
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE -2 
i 
been paid ifthe store had been fully operational. 3 The adjuster handling the claim as well as her 
! 
supervisor have admitted that this was the proper interpretation of thd policy language.4 
I 
In order for a party to be a "third party beneficiary". the parties to the contract must so 
intend, and that intention is a question of fact to be determined by the' facts and circumstances. 
Downing v. Travelers ins. Co. 107 Idaho 511, 525, 691 P.2d 375, 389 (1984) "That intent must 
appear from the contract itself or be shown by necessary implication." Id. 
In Williston on Contracts (Third Edition) § 369 the rule is stated: 
In practically every jurisdiction, a beneficiary to whom the insurer 
has promised the insured that the insurance money shaH be paid is 
given a right to enforce the policy, and generally by a direct action. 
This result has been reached injurisdictions adhering to the strict 
doctrine of privity of contract by statute; but in most SUites without 
the aid of a statute. 
Ordinarily, a beneficiary of such an insurance contract'may 
maintain an action thereon, though not named therein, when it 
appears by fair and reasonablc intcndment that his rights and 
interests were in the contemplation of the parties. and were being 
provided for at the time of making the contract. 
Id 
A provision in a contract which provides that employees will be paid the full amount they 
would have earned if the store would have been operating clearly was, intended to benefit the 
employees. "A third party may only enforce a contract "if he can show he is a member of a 
limited class for whose benefit it was made." Sharp v. WH Moore. Inc. 118 Idaho 297, 305. 
796 P.2d 506,514 (1990) citing Stewart v. Arrington Construction Co .. 92 Idaho at 532,446 
P.2d at 901; Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462, 464, 583 P.2d 997, 999 
J Furthermore, Hartford's argument that Mike and Kathy should not have been paying themselves from the 
insurance proceeds, which this Court touched on in dismissing their bad faith c1ajm~, is not even supported by 
Hartford's own agent's testimony. On this point also see below where the adjuster knew all along thc income 
payments were intended to cover the Fritz's draws/payroll from the company. 
4 Affidavit of Julia Kale attached to the affidavit of Arthur M. Bistline at 38: 15 to 39: 1. 
PLArNTrFF'S AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE - J 
22U5 
(J 978). The policy sets forth it will pay "payroll" during the period ~f restoration, and the 
I 
adjusters admit that the employees arc a member of a class of indjvi~uals who are entitled to 
receive payment under the policy and are third party beneficiary of the contract. At a minimum 
it is II question of fact. 
If HarUord is responsible 10 pay lost business income up until the point the store opened 
in August 0£2009, then Hartf()rd is responsible to pay the full payroll the employees would have 
eamed as that is a component o1'l.ost business income according to the policy. The difference 
between what the employees eamed in 2008 and 2009 and what they would have earned is in 
excess of$l2],000.5 
CONCLUSION 
The issues in this case and CVlO-774 arise out of the same occurrence and are identical 
in aJJ respects. Not consolidating these cases would result in two trials with identical issues 
which woul.d be a waste of time and which could result in inconsistent determinations on the 
same issues, which is also to be avoided if possible. Culnelics Corp. v. Volkswagen vfAmerica. 
inc. 531F.2d 674, 690 (C.A.Cal. ] 976t also see I.RC.P. 19(a)( 1) \\!hich requires the joinder of 
a party who could be subject to inconsistcnl liabilities. 
The only additional evidence the consolidation would require would be the diflcrcncc 
between what was paid to the employees and what should have been -during the years 2008 and 
2009. That is a simple ca1cu'lation and will not delay tills trial 
DATED this 61h day or April. 2010. 
ARTHURM. BrSTLlNE 
~ Atlidavi( Danl'[aper filed herewith III page 2 ofthe attachment. 
Pl.AfNTIFF'S AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 









CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ! 
i 
! 
I hereby certifY that on the _ day of February, 2010, I served ~ true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Keely E. Duke 
Bryan A. Nickels 
Hall, FarJey, Oberrecht & Blanton. P.A. 
P.O. Box 1271 
Boise, ID 83701 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
~and Delivered 
~ ~acsimile (208) 395-8585 
Email 
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE - 5 
, 
" , ,.\ ...... ,.,. -.. , ....... .. 
ST~~LOF)['J\iiCJ; 1 
F
C01Ji'11 Y I)F 1<:uurEN~; f SS 
ILEO ! ~~r} 
2aw APR 14 ~H 2: 07 
CLERt< DISTRict COURT 
Keely B. DuJce . 
ISB #6044; bd@hallfarley.com 
Bryan A. Nickels 
ISB #6432; ban@hilllfarley.com 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRBCHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
post Office Box 1271 
~~~-
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) J95v 8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W:\3\3-47Z.9\MSJ-tiAR110RD\Rc:consJoeratlon 411'1 Opp.aoc 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN nlE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
TIlE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE. 
L.L.C., 





HARTFORD'S OPPOSITION TO; 
PLAINTIFF'S FOURTH MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION : 
THE HARTFORD FIRE lNSURANCE 




COMES NOW the defendant Hartford Fire Insurance Company (,·Hartford"), b~ and 
through its counsel of record, Hall, Farley, Obcrrceht &,' Blanton. P.A., and hereby SUbm~ its 
i 
opposition to Plaintiff's Fourth Motion for Reconsideration, filed April 6. 2010 ("p1airftifrs 
I 
Fourth Motion"). For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff's Fomth Motion should be denied. ' , 
BACKGROUND 
I 
Without any newly discovery facts, but rather simply anotbc:r rchuh of puJtiff's 
! 
Wlfounded arguments, Plaintiff's Fourth Moliol' agam seeks l'econsideration of this COurt's 








dismissal of plaintiff's bad faith claims that were dismissed by this Court's Order Granting 
, 
• I 
Defendant's Motion to COmp~l and Order GnU1~~~~ Defendant's s~ary Judgment in Part i d 
Denying Summary Judgment Jll Part (,"MSJ Ord r ). ! 
, 
PIaintitf previously filed a Motion for Reconsideration, on Decembet 15. 2009. w$ch 
this Court demied. In that motion, pl.a.intiff ar~ed three points: :first, that the Court faile~ to 
consider its claim as a delay-ill-payment claim; lsecond, that the Court erred in finding the c~ 
at issue was fairly debatable; and third, its UPdJed damages calculation outlined extracon~l 
damages in support a bad faith claim. These ar~ents were rejected by the Court at llearin~ on 
I ! 
.January 13, 2010, when the Court affirmed its dr'smissat of plaintiff's bad faith claims. i 
Plaintiff thereafter filed a Second Motio for Reconsideration on February 4,2010, .Juch 
1) argued that the Court emd in finding re bad faith claim fulrly debatable; 2) tied. 
ina.dmissible opinions by its expert, Dan Halper; 3) argued that Hanford was oblignted. to tttfct a. 
I 
"but for''' test on its summary judgmmt claim; and 4) arguing that the Fritz's draws consti~ed 
·'pa.yroll." This Court, again, denied the 10 tion for reconsideration in its Order Dcrlying 
I 
i 
Plaintiff's Second Motion for Reconsideration, led February 26, 2010, / I 
Thereafter, following this Court's'Memorandum Decision and Order ~: Hartfbrd's 
Motions in Limine, filed March 8, 2010, Plaintiff sought a third motion to rocon3ider, L an 
anempt to salvage the U:iQ of it3 ~ert Dan karper, at the' time of trial. Although the ~ourt 
grantoiI the motion in part based upon new dirosures by Mr. Harper, the Court still limi~ Mr. 
Harpe~'S te~timony and affinned its prior NlinfS, including those on bad faith: ; 
, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 4tat plaintiff's Motion to R.econsider this ~ 
Court's Memorandum Decision and q:>rder Re: Hartford's Motion.s in Limine, 
ftled March 8, 2010, 1s bereby GRANTED IN PART, fOT those Teasons as stated 
I 
by the Coun at the hearing of Marob ,2010. Specifically, the Court will allow 
plaintiff's expert, Dan Harpel', to te 'fy regarding plaintiff's damages in this 










'. , . 
~ . 
-----~--.----
..... n_· ... 
action total no more than $19.052. w ich amount will be subject to cross-
exanrination by defendant at the time oftHa!. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDeRED th all other aspects of plaintiff's Motion to 
Reconsider are DENIED, and aD prior ec1sloDs of the Court, including those 
relating to bad faitb, consequential d mages, and the scope of Mr. Harper's 
testimony at tbe time ottrial (oxeept a deseribed ahove), remain uDchanged. 
, I 
, i 
Order Rc: Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider (fil . March 8.2010). at pp. }.2 (emphasis added). 
Nevertheless, plaintiff again seeks recoJideration on the Court's prior ru1in.gs, advanbing 
arguments that have either already been addresLd by the Court or are otherwise mcrltless, ~d, 
as such, none support reconsidera:tion of the cot's MS] Order: , : 
• Plaintiff's "delay" argument - Plain first indicates that it is "renewing" is objection 
regarding the Court'.liruHng re4e "delay," Th"., this argument has previ+SIy 
been raised - and rejected - by the (Court. In summary, plaintiff claims that the ~ourt 
I 
failed to address its claim as a "delay" in payment claim, which ar~ent 
I 
I 
mischaracterlzes Idaho law on the 5ubj~ct of "delay" as a. bflSis for bad faith,~ and 
I: i 
.ilSuvtes the e'Yideftcc in tho rooord Thie argument aha ignores the other e)~entR 
: i 
I :::: :::o~,:::;~t:::: ;::e:~::;~::1: 
also predicated on the unfounded ( d previously argUed) contention that the phliCY 
requires advance and/or C3timat¥d plymcDts prior to proof. . ! 
• Plaintiff's ambigui;!y argyment is lllLtleS$ - Plaintiff also argues - apparently fJr the 
tirst time in a ''recoruUderation'' m+oD - that the "Period of Restoration" as o~ 
in the Policy is ambiguous as to] gth of time. However, the plain language of the 
I 
Policy caps that coverage at 
, . 

















For these reasons, and as discussed' more detail below, plaintiff's Fourth Motion 
should be denied in all respects. 
A. 
ARG NT 
Standard for Motions for Reeo ideratioh. 
Rule 1 1 (11)(2)(B) Of the Idaho R.ules ofCi il Proce~ provi<ies inperti:nentpart: 
A motion for reconsideration of fillY int locutory 'orders of the trial lAJurt may be I 
made at any time before the entry of fin judgment but not later than fourteen (14) 
days Bfier the entry of final judgment. 
I, I 
14. When considering a motion for reconsider . on, the Court may take into account any new or 
I. ! 
i 
additional facts presented by the moving party. Coeur d' Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'! Baxilc of 
I , 
North Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 824, 800 P.2d 1 26, 1038'(1990). See also NOreen, 135 Id~o at , 
. I 
819, 25 P.3d at 132. In submitting a motion ~ r reconsideration pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2)($) of 
I 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the movi g party has the bu;rden of bringing to the cOurt's 
i 
attention through affidavit, depositions or sions, new facts'bearing OIl the corrcottless of an 
interlocutory order. Devil Creek Ranoh, Inc. J Cedar Mesa. Re~ervoir & Canal Co., 126 I~O 
I 
202, 205, 879 P.2d 1135, 1138 (1994); Coeur 'Ale 118 Idaho at 824, 800 P.2d at 
1038 ('''The burden is on the moving party to bring the 1ri~ court's attention to the! new 
I 
facts.") Where a moving party does not presIt any new facts, it must still demonstrate ttchrors 
, I 
of law or fact in the initial decision." Johns:n v. T..ambro 143 Idaho 468, 147 P.3d 106 (Ct. 
App.2006). 
B. The COun !hould disregard re:fqcnees 
As pJaintiff's Motion seeks reeonsid 
subj eet to the eVidentiary requirements app 
party against whom a summary judgment is s 
.' 
inadmissible evidence. , 
i 
non of this Court's MSJ Order, it would still be 
" , 
I 
• ~ . I 
enant to 'a sumn:~ judgment opposition. : "[A] 
'I i 
ght emmot merely rest on his pleadings but, :When 
I 
faced with affidavits or depOSitions suppa . g the: motion, must oome forward by ~Y of 
HARTFORV'S OI'J"OSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S uam MOTION FOR RECONSIDERA nON - 4 
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:. ... .." .. _ .. ,. .. 
. affidavit, deposition, admissions or other do 'enLation to estaor h the existence of matepal 
issues of fact which preclude the issuance of s I ary judgment.,':II~lG' Nelson, A.lA. v. stber . 
. 111 I 
118 Idaho 409) 410, 797 P.2d 117, 118 (1990). "To withstand a ~~ tion for summary jud~nt, 
." ' 
the [non-mo~g party's] case must be anch0r9 I something mor~1 olid than speculation; a ~ere 
scintilla of evidcncc is not enough to create a enuine issue." ld~ H[TJhere is no issue for inal 
u:nl ... there ;. .wrlclent evidence favoring til non-moving ~ for a Jury to IeIUm • ~CI 
for that party." ld. (emphasis added). "Summ, judgment shot be granted If lbe eVide~ in 
opposition to the motion 'is mere1y colorabJe' or 'is not Significltly probative.'" Id. "When 
·d....-l..·d --d' f .. '/11'. ~ . d I COTlSl ~wg 0Vl once JlI"'cn~ lUOupport 0 o. OPPOSluon '" a "'ton ..... summary jU 1lDl"F' a 
oourt can ouly consider material which w d be admiSSi1 at trial." Montgomed v. 
Montgommy. 147 Idaho 1. ~ 205 P.3d 650~ _ (2009). :cc~fr I·U·B Engineers. Inc .• ! 146 
Idaho at 318 (summary Judgment granted to rurer on breach J~ contract and bad faith claim 
" 111 i 
w~ere insured failed to present "admissible eVi,o.QPce in the f~Or4 r support such Ii claim i.~ this 
, ,II I 
case.") Under Idaho law, damages must be pI ven with a "reaSfable certainty," which oourts , 'II i 
have determined to mean that the existence' f damages musi/ taken out of the reahh of 
; ",. i 
speouIation. Trilogy N etwoIk Systems. Irui v. JobnsoJl.' J j Idaho 844. 172 P 3d 1119 
(2007)( emphasis added). 
, i : 
Despite this, however, plaintiff cites to two glaringly inalUn.isaible portions of teswnony 
.c.. Mr F' d M u......... . f' M' F'" :I,ijl. 'ff . th Affid!' f ,uom . ntt an r .......... .!:'er In support 0 1, S onon. ~~t, ~~rmtl CItes to e art 0 
Mike Fritz (at n2) for the proposition th~ the delay '~cau8~s severe financial hardshlp." 
Plaintiff's Memo at 2. However, as Hartfo'd has previO~lr' ~oted.1 Mr, Fritz's amda~t is 
, i : 
replete with inadmissible damage claims, iden:' iOB both undo' cnt.cxJ damages. end d~ages 
al Mr F · (. 1 ..1:_", ~ , 1 . a}: d· l / I ) s d. I' 'ff i , person to . ntz InO Uu..u'6. 40r exam e, omonon IS ess. econ p amu ! Cltes 
I Amended RepJy in Support ofRanford's MOt1Oll for maTY 1Udgme~t, ~J~~ October 28, 2009, at pp. 12.1~5. 
. '! :,[111 i 
HARrFORD'S O~smON TO PLAlN11FF'S FURTH MOTI?'N ,~'R RECONSmERA ~ION • i 
". .. " r [ I 
,I" , 
;. 
.. .' ............ . 
, 
rcpcotedly to the bates-stamped Affidavit of D Harper in ~upport of Motion to Reconsider, 
1 ' ; 
, t • I 
filed February 10.2010 (at n. 9, 10, & 12), whi hare actually citations to Mr. Harper's JanUary 
I 
I ! 
25~ 2010 report (bates page 23), for the propo lion that Ha#ord had "suffioient infQ11nati.?n." 
i I I 
Again. as has previously been ruled by this Co' "while the :lfin~l amount of the claim' is *hat 
,I , 
is at disputo, 'reasonableness' of Hartford's 'ons is no! longer relevant" (Memorandum 
1 I 
Decision and Order Re: Hartford's Motions in Limine, ~led March 8, 2010, at p. ~o.) 
I i 
Moreover, [iJf there is any relevance, Harp' himself has! admitted he cannot testify as to 
;easonableness.'; (Id) Indeed, Mr. Harper agr~d in his d~j~ition that he laaks the lmOWIJdee, T :. I 
lIa1ning, and cmpaiise to o£fc:r any opinions as' 0 the reason~leQess of Hartford's adjustment of 
I I .' , 
the olaim or any intetpretations of the subj t Policy prorisions at issue in this litigation. 
J i 
SpecmcaJly, Mr. Harper testified it was beyon bis ability J redder any such opinions and that 
i i 
be would not be rendering such opinions at tri·! i 
I 
18 J:! 
5 Q 'W'hat about a claim related to laims handl' ~ : 
7
6 praotiQes, are you somebody that h handled thosie types of 
cases? ! 
8 A No, I don't think my opinions e on a ~- thaf: would 
9 come more from an insurance exp or adjuster ~pert. 
10 Q Sure. And thars what I want to get to is there's 
11 no doubt, at least from what I can t' 11 in looking at your 
12 curriculum vitae you're certainly w. 11 qualified ~ a ~P A 
13 and a. forensic accountant. But as I understand it.,l. your 
14 role as an expert is not ~ a claims dling expe~ . 
15 COIl'cct? 
16 A That's oorrect. I ~ ; 
17 Q You would leave that to cla; -handling fopes to 
18 address? : 
.19 A Yes. : 
20 Q Okay. And you would do . because you don't have 
21 the education., training and experie ce that woul~ be 
22 necessary to render those opinions' correct? You like to 
23 stick with what you know. i 
24 A Sure, that's felt. 
25 Q And based on that., I would l'umo then j YO,U have ! 







1 not sen/ed as an expert for any client' whether It s: .i 
2 Lakeland or any other client that yoti and your company have 
3 assisted since 1993, with respect to providing an ORr' iini~Jl alS 
4 to whether a claim was appropriately adjusted and nndled, 
5 is that fair? !, " 
6 A Yes, we wouldn't ha.ve opinionl as to the adj: tetS' 
7 actions or :inactions. ; 
; 





I : I I 
(Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant s Motion in 'imIne Re: Expert Dan Harper; and 
" I 
Memorandum in Support, filed February 8,20,0, ("Counse1iAtt;"). Exh. A.11. 18:5-19:7.) !Mr. 
. , 
H&per went on to state: 
, 136 " 
13 Q In providing these opinions, 'oush.. you ~Y 
14 acknowledge that you do not feel C,I mfortable ~esftiYing as 
15 to what the insured's obligations Wlder the i ce 
16 poliey. correet? :, 'I 
17 A Yes, that's probably getting 16 into the p' lic}f 
• , I 
18 mterpretation arena. :' 
19 Q And you certainly, again, in e po!tcy I ; 
20 interpretation arena you certainly ~ Dot fecI you~o :: 
21 qualified to nmdcr any opiniomt Q.s;~o whether th' Frl~ 
22 actually complied with the teJ:1llS of the insuranc 'poUcy? 
23 A I would agree that that's be)'o,~ my scope. : ,1 






Instead, Mr. Harper clarified that the s ope of his op . oD was far narrower and would be 
I ' 
limited to only what documents were provided and what inti ' a:tion they contained: 
: 144 I:: 
21 Q Certainly you're not goms to : der any op" . o~ 
22 regarding interpretation of the poll y? ': 
23 A No, I'm not. ' u 
24 Q Okay. And therefore, you'rel f going to r: nd~r an 
25 opinion as to Whether or not the 7 .. page report " plied 
I : ' ~ 
.1 145 
1 with the terms of the policy, cor.rc::d ? 
2 A No, not with the tenns of the !policy, 1 mi t wi! 
3 the jury what it consisted of and h it might be I 
.J i 
HAR.TFORD'S OPPOSITION TO PLAlNTIFF'S N FOR RECONSIDERATION - V I . 
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4 Q What the report consisted of? 
S A Yes. : I 
6 Q Okay. AIe you going to be rendering allY opiJlio~ as 
7 to whether an insured is limited to the coverage aff~rdCr' ' to 
8 the insured under the policy? i ~ , 
9 A I donlt have any opinions about coverage. i' 
10 Q Are you go1Dg to render any opinions regar . g f.t 
11 lDsured's duty to QOoperate regarding an invcstisa on ~ 
12 settletnQIlt for ell claims made under the policy?, I: I 
13 A I'd defer to the insurance expert. '; 
14 Q Okay. Are you !Ioing to render any opinionS as to 
15 whether or not the insured has a duty to provide I ~ 
16 documentation to substantiate its claims? I think at's 
17 one youlre referring to the insurance expe:rt, as we i 
18 discussed. ' I : 
1.9 A My opinion would be limited to what waa , r ,"ded and 
20 what infOrDlatioD it conveyed. I 
21 Q Correot. But you're not doing that in tenns 'f i' 
22 whother it eomplied with the policy or not? ' 
23 A No, just commullicatine the COD tent and 'ow' t could 
24 be used. ' I, 
25 Q Are you going to be rendering any opinions t~i 
146 : Ii 
1 whether an insured has a duty to mitigate their los wh,'en 
2 they're making a. claim with their insurance polioy' or #der 
3 their i.n5uranoe polioy? , ~ 
4 A No, l'lllea.ve that to the insurance expert. : f, 
S Q Are you going to render any opinions as to : ,hetfler an 
6 insured bas a duty to take reasonable steps to pro t the 
7 covered propertY from further damage? '~ 
8 A Wouldn't disagree with that but I would lea~ t~t 
9 for the insurance expert. ' II 
147 i!' 
'12 Q Undc~tand. Okay, And based on that, it's, ot ,::at 
13 you're saying the policy covers these things, it's j, Sf tll,is 
14 is the dan,tage, you guys sort out what the policy oVf:S and 
15 what it doesn't, is that fajr? . I ~J 
16 A This is the eeonomic result of the coDaps' aDa the 
17 court ean decide who's responsible for it. i, ,: 
j: 
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I 
As such, 1his Court should disregard plaintiff' s ~ferences 
~dmissible testimony cited in support of its Follrth Motion. j~ 
I 




C. The Court did not err in findin laintiffhad !aile: to establish a bad fai 1 · I caun. I 
I 
In granting Hartford's motion:for summary Judgment,: e Court primarily focused on: the 
I 
: 1 
inability of plaintiff to prove that its claim was run fairly ebatable. In particular, the C~urt 
I 
focused ~n plaintiff's wholesale inability to support, confirm,; d value its own claim, a protllern 
, 




Despite this, plaintiff argues that Hanford·offered "n, ovidence jU3tifying its decisidn to 
I i 
dc:lay paymen~ to Ltl.keland," and that the Court's MSJ Ord' is unsupported. Plaintiff's Memo 
i I 
at 2. In doing so, plaintiff appears to ariUe that in all circt.10l tances where an insured contends it 
I : . , 
I 
provided adequate documentation but was not paid at a spee to jts likmg, a bad faith complaint 
I 
arises. This is an incorrect characterization of Idaho law on 
r 
I 
As Hartford has previously argued; and as this slteady oxplained tWice, 
! 
, ! 
Lakeland puts the cart before the horse. To support a dai' of bad faith under Idaho laW, the 
! 
, ! 
insured must show: "(l) that coverage of [the] claim was not fairly debatable; (2) that! [the 
, : 
insured] had proven coverage to the point that based on the I' dence the insurer had before i~ the 
1 ' 
insurer intentionally and unreasonably withheld [tIle ins . d's) benefits; (3) that the dol~)' in 
I 
payment was not the result of a gOOg faith mistake; and (4) at the resulting harm was notifully 
oompensable by contract damages." Robinson _. Automobile Insui-ance 
CDnwa~. 137 Idaho 173. 178, 4S P.3d 829, 834 (2002)(C) "ng Simper v. Farm Bureau Jurual 
I 1 
: I 
Insurance Co. of Idaho, 132 Idaho 471, 474, 974 P.2d 11 0, 1103 (1999); see also White v. 
! , 
I I 
Unigard Mutual Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94,98-100,730 P.2d 1,' 4, J018-20 (1986). 
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1 
il 
1 1 1 
Again, plaintiff has continuously failed t6 address .j e critical elements of the to~ of 
I ,I I 
bad faith in opposing Hartford's summai'Y rl dgment ; otion, on its first motion !for 
reconsideration, on its second reconsideration, and! now on . fourth reoonsideration. 
a. . ~I th ' ,I b d the . Plaintiff bad not roven coVent c to e lDt at ase on e 
bad before: 1: Hartford intentionall"1 and unr '1 bI e d benefits. 
"':£1: d ' h d ~II 'r th· tthatb d Ith First, plainw;J,. cam:tot ernonsttate 1t a ~oven COV, rage to e pOll1 ase on e 
evidence the insurer had before it, the ins~e~i intentionJ and unreasonably Withheld ![the 
1.1 ' 
insurecFs) benefits," despite its bare assertiOl1 rt it had. :llaintiff'S Memo at 2, Here,! the 
correctness of the Court's granting of swmnarYi~Udgment t'! Hartford on Lakela.nd'~ bad taith 
.:1;1 I 
cJaim is demonstrated by pla:in.tifPg own fail~e to value j"ts own claim.2 and its failure to 
.iil 1 I 
demonstrate that it had fully documented its c$,im for Bus
1 
ess Income (or, indeed, Bus~ess 
! I i 
Personal Property) ~'i ,; i 
Ii ,I i 
Plaintiff points to the provision of pr{ r year pro I. t and loss statcmctlts, "estmlated 
./ 1 ' .q 1 
payroll," and '"lpdated schodulos," mt1king ~e bare oct ention that thiS! was "su:ffi~ient 
. iiI. I' : 
information." Plaintiff's Memo at 3. Plaintiffj'does not e11plain how these provided Hartford 
iii I 
with all needed infonnation, and, yam. ~~ argument;/ appears to be predicated o~ the 
, ill .' i 
assumption, as above, that Hartford was obligated to make /' stimated and/or advance payr:bents 
:11" , 
under the Policy, and was expected to pay fO~. e.g.,' acm~ expcnSOB nnd paytOll for Ocbber 'l 1 I I. 1 
2008 in March 2008, beforc any such aIDO. ts 'Wel'e • curred.3 A review of the Ifacts 
d th TT_~J:': d 'd th B" IiI J I, 1 . . . d inti !. emonstrates at r.:""I.n.,or p8.1 e usmess ncome c aun as It receive onn'atlon 




;l I' I 
'I. ' 
Z See, s.g., Memorandum in support of Hartfon;l's Moti~ ft)1- Summary' 'udgmont, filed August :20. 2009 ("HJrtfOrd 
MS1 Memo"), atpp. 14-Ui. ~ I' ! 
3 'The Policy provides, for example, in relevant part. ~t Business Inc me in~ludes: "Conrinumg normal ! 
operoling expemea incurred, Including payroll." AffidaVit of MelanJ 1 copley. flIed August 20, 2009, I'lt 
Exb. A, H 40' (emphasis added). ;i 1 
;! ·1 
': , 
;1 " i! . 
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documenting items clnimed under the Business I~ me cover' ge. See generally, Memorand-pm 
'I I ; 
" ',. i 
in Support of Hartfard's Motion for Summary Jurent. filed ugust 20,2009, at pp. 11~12. ; 
Plaintiff also feigns ignorance of w~t documJ were requested by Hsrtfo~d's 
,i:1 I : 
accountants, citing, instead, 4 lines ftom the deJ)4ilsition afM onie Copley. Plaintiff's Memb at 
.I' . I ! 
'I ' 
S. Plaintiff, in fact, has prcviou.sly deposed Am~ Kohler (ani &D accountant) ,in this maher, 
j! / I 
which deposition inoluded, as two deposition exJh"bits. letters/ o~ Ms. Kohler to Mr. Fritz €one 
of plaintiff's o~ers) and Mr. Van Valin (p1"Jtrrs a~oml y, for a time) requesting spe~ifiC Jfr I I 
documents in support of the claim. (See Defendant's Memo' dum in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
~ I i 
Motion to Continue Trial, filed March 22, 2010;: attaching T' anscript of the Deposition of ..imy 
!i 1 I 
II 1 
Kohlc;r, September 21. 2009, and DePOSi-tiOD EXhibits 1 Indeed, Hartford's swnrhary 
. III I i 
judgment motion did include infonnation regar;mg the kin I of infonnation requested (an~ not 
'II I ; 
provided) by plaintiff, including corrlact with 'Rlaintitl) a' arne~, Mr. Bistline, outlining the 





Mr. Bistline, ,. I 
Thank you for the documents you e-:inanl today. W' received the following: 
i; I, 
t. Lakeland True Value's bank statement tOr June 2008·' 
2. The Summary and DeWl reports. from l!the QuickB: oks bank reconciliation for 
June 2008 III I . 
3. The Demand letter from True Value Company : 
Ii/ ' 
The provided documents are not the sJuc: as the d' cumeuts provided for prior 
periods. There are a coupl~ of addition~' pieces of' 1 ormation that we will need 
!q. I 
. to update our schedules, as we stated in Pur docume request sent to you on July 
28, 200tt The insured is familiar with ~~ documen / that he bas been sending us 
each month since February 2008: we ne~lr the same I ocument types reflecting all 
July 2008 activity: :: I 
Ii j, 
(1) check register detail out of QuickDo~ s for the c ! h account 
(2) a note from Mr. Fritz detailing, aIly!/payroll dis I rsc:mc:nts for July that have 
nOl yet been made that he intends to milli!e I 
'i , 
~ , I, 
1! I I 
'/ · , ", , 
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(3) a print-out from. the True Value bani!: account ': ough the end of July to 
support the previous two items ,! l 
In our letter dated July 28. 2008, we also requested Ie' payment documentation 
for the JAR and Oreat American Leasing ~eases. Pleal,e provide 'this also at your 
earliest convenience. :; I: 
'I i 
Thank you for your assistance. Please dO-' not hesita' to contaet us if you have 
any questions. 





'/ ,: , 
.1 
(Affidavit of Melanie Copley, filed August 20, ;~009, at C, at ROOSl-52 (July 30, 2008 
'I, i 
email from Ms. Kobler to plaintiff's counsel,Mr. Bi:rt1ine» .. ' Other en1ri~s also reflect spe~ific 
:/' i 
document requests. (]d. at 1-100054-55, July 31, +008 email om Ms. Kobler to Mr. Bistline, in ; I i 
relevant part: "It is our 'understa:oding that ODe :br more e ; loyces have quite since our most 
recent schedules were issued for June 30, 2008Jr We will Jed to know who these individUalS 
'I I ' 
:: I ! 
are, if it is not clear from the documentation of dis' ursemcmt forthcoming from! Mr. 
fritz:j(H00060-61, August 18, 2008 email frO~ Ms. KoJ: to Mr. Bistline. in relevant ~art: 
,I, I: I 
"Also, please telnember that we are still awaiting the J :y 2008 QuickBooks cash account 
r .11 I 
register report. and/or something in writing froIh. Mr. Fritz' dicating the payroll disbursements 
for July that he is intending to make as well asihccOWlt de I:. from his bank in order to ubdate 
!I I' ; 
our schedules."); see also Affidavit of Arthur Ml;Bistline, t;d September 4, 2009, at Exhibit K 
I! I 1 
(November 20, 2008 lettoT from Mr. Bistline!lto Hartford s counsel, "The above docuthents 
II I; : 
should satisfy any current and/or previous requdts from yo I' office, as well as the office of The ,I : 
Hartford prior to your representation." & a~ching We i s Fargo account activity be~g 
I" , 
,i. I i 
January 1, 2008; business computer a.ccount ,~ctivity it ,'-zing Hartford payment disbulrsaJs; 
i:! : 
,I' I 
copy of temporary office lease; and list ofinv~tol')" prior to' 














Mortlover, plmntiff's failure to plovide documentation of its claim or correctly value;its 
: , 
claim is even further home out by plaintiff's expert Mr. Harp~r, who has generated a numbe~ of 
I , I 
additional reports with. cliffering values and methodologies. n~ne of which arc consistent with!the 
; 
: , 
last. For example, Mr. Harper, in addressing the Bllsiiless Personal Property valuation. 
previouSly relied heavily on tho Inventory ValuatioD Report: that was reQ.uested from Lakeland 
, I 
on nUJtlerous oecasiQDS by Hartford that Lakeland failed to d~eate until November 10, 2008. !two 
months after Lakeland had filed suit against Hartford. See A~fidavit of Dan Harper in support of 
Motion to Reconsider, filed February 4. 2010, at Exh- C (January 15, 201 0 ~ort), "rnb 6. 
, I 
Accordingly, Lakeland again cannot contood it had: "proven coverage to the point I that 
i 
based on the evidence the insurer had before it, the insurer intentionally and unreasonably , , 
t • 
withheld [the insured's] benefits." Lakeland's bare complaint of delay provides no basis tor a 
I , i 
,bad faith claim, as ''the mere fallure to immedjately settle what later proves to be a valid ~aim 
" , , 
does not of itself establish' bad faith. "" See Greene v. Tru~k Ins. Exchan"ge, 114 Idaho 63; 67. 
, 
" , 
68, 7'3 P 274, 278-79 (Ct. App. 1988). Thus, plaintiffs ~ontention tha.t "Hartford at no feint 
, i 
raised or argued why it had withheld the periodic paymentS" ignores both Idaho's bad faith law 
" " I 
and the fucts in the record. and presupposes a "delay" by Hartford, when the record reflectS that 
, I 
1) Hartford paid the portions of the claim documented to:'it, and 2) ad<titional claim ambunts 
were not "delayed" by Hartford) but were the result of p',iaintifr13 inability/refusal to pr~vide 
,', I 
infonnation requested by Hartfcrd. The Court should affirm its prior decision dismi~sing 
plaintiff's bad faith claim. and deny plaintiff's Fourth Moti,?n. 
b. flamtiff's claim was fairly debata.ble~ 
Second, intertwined with the question of whether the insured had proven cOVCItl.ge to the 
I 
point the insurer intentionally and UDrCMontlbly withhelij benefits. the burden also falls on 
, 




















plaintiff to ~onstrate that the claim was I!Q1 fairly de~ble. 'Critically, unrecognized! by 
plaintiff is the fact that lithe insured has the burden of sh~wing that the claim was not f~lY 
i:. . ; 
debatable." Robinson v, State Farm Mm. Auto. Ins. Co .• 137 Idaho 173, 177.45 P.3d 829, ~33 
" , :, 
:.~ 
(1999)( emphasis added). 
Agaul, as the Court has now recogJlized on at least twb prior: occasions, plaintiff is un~ble 
I, , 
::, ' I 
to do because of its own. failure to provide requested documepts in support of its cl~ its failure 
'J ' I 
\ I 
to value its own claim throughout the course of the claim~\ process and the litigation, an4 its 
, 1 ~ 
failure to provide the Court with competent evidence that I1mtford WWj engaging in "dela.y' for 
:', I ' 
delay's sake," For trus reason, Lakeland CllIl1lot demonstrat~: that there is some genuine issJe of 
, : I 
materia! fa.ot that, if proven at trial, would demonstrate thaiihe c1~m was !!Q! fairly debaulble, 
'. ' I 
" ' 
See, e.8 .. Q:reene y, Truck Ins. Exchange. 114 Idaho at 68 (s#mmary judgment granted to indurer 
" I : 
on bad faith claim - "Although the investigation consumed ~erat:months, and might well have 
j; I I 
been conducted more expeditiously. the record is devoid of t2D.y: indication thot the com~any 
',: ; I 
, ' , 
intended to achieve dolfl)' for dela.y's sake. Rathel, the ,!ecord~includin8 extracts from I the 
~' : ' 
.. ' I 
company's elaim file-demonstrates beyond dispute that lfie company's representatives ~ere 
:'; : ! 
concerned about the unique nature of the claim and about i~he sp~seness of verifiable facts to 
, , 
','. I • 
support Greene's theory that a cougar attack produced. his ~airy ~erd's mastitis .... In our ~C'W 
I' I : 
Greene's claim was, and is, "fairly debatable" within the memting of WhIte."); S.9~e v, , , , 
, :'; 1 I 
Exchange W. Co., 116 Idaho 251, 775 P.2d 143 (Ct. App. i~989)(su:mmatY judgment grant~d to 
r. t I 
insurer on bad faith claim. based on "fairly debatable" ~ature ;of dispute over valuatidn of 
, " i 
insured's claim for an x·ray machine and for business intemlption)~ 
: : 







E' 1 , 
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...... ..... ...... • " ••• ,'" •• • ••••• _ •• 0 ._ ......... 0 • 
ad "I I fb d" , 'th c. Plaintiff fails to dress the rematnmg aements 0 a ial .' 
f d ' 'th 1· f I, d' d b l.,,~ ... J~ff Further, the remaining elements 0 a ba tal c al~ remam un lscusse y p ... I..u~ : 
first. plaintiff must demonstrate that any improper dela.y 1
1
, as !!.9.i the result of fI. gooa f~ith 
I ' I , I 
mistake, an element of the cla:im of bad faith that has (Still).! never,! been addr~ssed by plain:iff. 
Second, plaintiIT has not advf,I,l\ced exttaoontractual damasJ such as would admissible at trHll -
in fact, plaintiff's damages at the time of mal are expressly Jmited~to $19,052 (subject to crbss-
examination. which may further dramatically reduce that nbber):. Absent sufficient conJary 
, 
I 
proof on these issues. Lakeland cannot survive summary ju ent; and certainly cannot su.pport 
I 
a request for reconsideration. R.O, Nelson, A.I.A. v, Steer, I lIS Idaho 409, 410, 797 P.2d 117. 
. ' I , ! 




pleadings but, when faced with affidavits or depositions supporting the motion, must cbme 
I , I 
forward by way of affidavit, deposition, admissions or 0,' er documentation to establis~ the I . I 
existence of material issues of fact which p~lude the is~uancc: of surnmAt')' judgment .. : .. To 
withstand a motion fur ~ary judgment, tb~ [non-I1loviAs P~'sJ case must be ancho~cd I 
! ~ : 
something more solid than speCUlation; a mere, scintilla lfi evidence is not enough to cre~te a 
semDne issue, ,,' [T)here is no issue for trial ;"'Iess ther ! is sumd""t evid"" •• favo~ !be 
non-moving party for a jury to letum a verdict for that p .... Summary judgment shoJd be 
~ted if the evidence in opposition to the motion 'ia lUcllY coloroble' 01' 'is not Signifioktly 
II I i ~ , , 
probative,"')(cmphasis added); Mont8omerx v. Montgomery. 141 Idaho 1. _, 20S P.3d: 650, 
. ~ ,. i 
_ (2009)("'When considering evidence presented in SUI'ort Of;OI opposition to a motit for 
'summary judgment, a ~urt can only consider material w . ch w,ould be admissible at tdal.); 





I : ) 
HARTFORD'S oprOSITJON TO YLAINTIFF'S FOURTH ·MOT OJ'l FOR R.ECONS1DERA..TION - is 






...... .... _..... .-
I I 
breach of contract and bad faith claim where insured failed 0 l'redent "admissible evidencd in 
the record to support such a claim in this case. '1 
, i 
I , 
Thus, in short, plaintiff's Motion fails to adequately addro~8 the key el~ents of 9. ~ad , , 
'I i 
faith claim, such as to permit that bad faith clft.~ to 9:ive
j 
s~ary judgment. Accordin~lY. 
I I 
this Court should deny plaintiff's Fourth Motion_ : : 
" , 
D. Plaintiff's ambi2Ui1y argument fails in light of the lankge bfthe PoliW- i 
Plaintiff's second argument on reconsideration! (actkuy) ~pparent1y raised for tho bt 
time) is that the "Period Of Restoration" provision ~ the roner! is ombiguow:, and, ~, 
plalnti1l'should be gi_ the benefit of the onibjgui~'1h ~ the "Period of Restora~n" 
effecti .... cly continues indefinitely beyond the 12-mohth ~aximUm outlined in the Policy -
i 4 I I perhaps even for months, years, or even decades: This ~g cnt is Jmeritless. ; , I 1 ' ' 
As an initial matter, plaintiff's intent in maldU,' g th~ ar~ent is to apparently astf- the 
II I I 
Court - again - for reconsideration of the scOpe of/Mr. lHarper,'s teitimony. See Plaintiff's 
Memo at 8 ("The Court should 8lld allow Dan Harper! to tl:fY tJ all matters within his aria of 
I T" I : 
expertise and fat' which he is competent and not limitl his Jstimo~y to damages incurred ~fore 
the expiration of 12 months."). This should be ~jectecl, as tCh a ~otion to reconsider is bC~ 
the scope previously permitted by the Court. o~ Mardh 9, 101 0, ~e Court entertainod pwJtiff's 
I j I I 
MOtiOD to Reconsider on the subject ofthc sco~e of~. H~er's testimony_ At that hearint the , , r I , 
Court notcd that "I will extend DO deadlines. ~d thete is ~ NotiJe of Hearing a to a moti/on to 
, I , 
reconsideration, but there's no motion, and that is the last thing liwill bear from anyone prior to 
, ~ I ! 
the trial [.J" Transcript of Mareh 9,2010 hearing, at 11.42:12-16. At the March 24, 201P, the 
, I ~ I : • I I 
COurt :reemphasized: "[.M]y recollection, Ms. ;Dukc'l is a:~ the time of the hearing on thb last 
II I ; 
motion to recon:;idcr there was another motion to r~nsilcr tha~ was in the file but not noticed 
I II! i , I I 
I , I 
: I ' I i 
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up. and my IUling at the last hearing was anything that'~ filiff righJ now can be heard, not tkt 
~ I ' 
day, but can heard between now and trial." Trans'cript 0 MJch 24,12010 hearing, at II. 23:6.~ 1. 
The motion present at issue, which was filed on ~arCh Is, 2 10, in1cates that is that it "moves I I ' 
this Court for an Order reconsidering its prior ord~T dismissi PlaiJti.ffs bad faith claims in bus 
~ Ii, I matter." It does not indicate that it is seeking reconsi! eration of ieither the.1imitations of Mr. 
Harpe,' th ail b'l' I fd' I Tfl I i tiff· . l r s testimony, or e av a J Ity scope 0 amages. , s. p am 18 attempting to ar~le a I I I ' 
motion for reconsideration not on me pn'or to March 9, 2010) despite the fact that the Courtihas 
I I ' : 
twice indicated it would not entertain any s\lch rno~on. As sJcb, the Court should reject 
, , I I 
plaintiff's Fourth Motion on that ground. I ! 
, I i 
~ ! I 
Even were the Court to entertWn plaintiffis Motion, l'iowever, the claim is meritless, as no , I l I ., .. '. ..:. I .! 
amblgulty eXlsts m the Pohey In proVldmg Busmess lome poverage for the 'Penod of 
R. " F' the P I' ) th p,1 '00' f n! . ; estorallon. 1!st, 0 ley grants coverage Jor e en 0 .n.estoration: : 
: ' 
I 
o. Business Income : 
suspension of your tr operarion.s" during rhe ''p~riod I if resloration ". ! 
, ,I ' 
(Affidavit of Melanie Copley, filed August 20) 2009 "Copley 4t.l1), Exh. A, at H 405.) ! The 
12. trPeriodofRestoration" means th~perio o/time Thor: ! 
a. Begins with rhe date of ~ireC( ~hy.Jcal 10)S or physical damage i 
caused by or resulting from a eovere I C;Jse of Loss at the "scheduled 
premises, II and I / 
b. 
I I , , 
Ends on the date when: I ,I 
(1) The property af. the "sc du/ed /premises JJ should be 
repalred, rebuilt, or rcp!aced with I easonahle speed and similar 
quality; ; I 
, 
I 
I , I I , 
HARTFORD'S Ol'POSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S FQURT1MO , ON F~R RECONSIDERATION - ~ 7 
I I . , 
I : ' ! 
. i I I 
" . 
~~ 
.. , , 
I . 
I I j' ; 
ocation. . i : 
(2) The date when yOW' bUSineSj is r 'Sume ;at a new, permanenl 
1 . j I 
(Id. at 419.) The Policy then expressly limits the len~ of Ie PerjJd of Restoration to no ro~re 
~ J 
I 
than 12 months: ) I 
(3) We will only pay for loss 0/ Business ncor,u: th)u occurs within 12 
consecutive months after the daJe of direct physical loss !or physical damage.. ' 
This Additional Coverage is not ~ject to the LX" itSf.lnsurnce. ... ; 
(Id at 405.), Plaintiff attempts to argue that the defi, ina, of "lleriod of Restoration" llini1S 
I I ! 
coverage by, essentially, providing no limit on covel'agc, whic~ results in an ambiguitY in 
I 
I 
coverage by conflicting with the Policy capllimit of 12 mon 51. This argument is nonsensical -
I : 
plaintiff's argument, at its core, is iliat the mere defInition 0 enns fuereby provides the 'limii· of 
hi h, rail ' d .l:-: • ,I 1 ul I, .. _1' • d ; F coverage, W c Datu y, m a e.w,unons section, TOU res ~ In u.w1flllte coverage.: or 
example, the Policy also defines "Money" as f'(a) "Morey" ~t its fape value". (Copley Afr., ~xh. 
A, H 416,) However, the Policy goes on to limit cover ge fJr uMohey" to $10,000 in other Jreas 
of the Policy (fa. at H000384 and H000402). PtaiJitrs argUlJent, applied in this sceJano, 
would mean that the mere definition of "Money" in 4e de 'tioJ section of the Policy cr~ated 
unbounded coverage, irrespective of the express lilDita~ons [' fthe J01iey. ! 
I' I 
Thus, there is no ambiguity in the Policy> in light j f the rerms of the Policy. See,; e.g .• 
Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. y. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. dq" 1 1 Id~b 660, 663, 115 P.3d 751", 754 
(2005) ("In construing an insurance policy, the Couh m it look to the plain meaning df the I I ' 
words to determine if there are any ambiguities. ~s trmiJtion is a question of lair. In I I I . 
resolving this question of law, the Court must construe e P9~icy "as a whole, Dot ~y aD 
i,olated pbrase,")(empbasis added), Moreover, flaia 'ff's lortured reading of a ~OIiCY 
definition. in an attempt to create essentially UnlimitjclJ co rage, ~iSregardS clear Idaho la~ that 
I ; 
to be deemed ambiguous, a tenn must be ccreaSjO ably su~er 'to diffilring iDterpreratns," 
, , 
HAR"fFORJ)'S OPPOSlrION TO PLAINTIFF'S fOUR MOrON FOR. RECONSIDERATION· l8 .' . . . . I. i ; 
I ' 
. , 
. I ' 
A,1:l'g51rong v. F!mPe!s Ins. Co. of Idaho. 143 :Idaho: 135 137, 139 P.3d 737, 739 (2006) 
(_phasi. aclded)( "there is no obligation on courts to ~UIl1ance a tortured consauction o~ en 
insurance contract's language in order to create an ambig' and thus provide an avenue: for 
. ! I 
coverage where none exists:" Id. (quoting Mutual of Ehum aw Ins, Co. v. Roper!&- 1281daho 
232,236,912 P.2d 119, 123 (1996». 
, 
Notably. plaintiff cites no authority holding ili,~l p icy language regarding "PerioQ of 
" i 
Restoration" is ambiguous. Indeed, in cases previousfy di ussed by the parties, th~ c;ourtia in 
i 
those matters expressly found Period of Restoration colvcra to be limited to a maximum cjf 12 
,: 
" , 
months. See, e.g., trearnline Ca ita LLC v. Hart ord'Cas: ru:. Co. 2003 WL 22004888, a~ n.l 
I 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)("The business income insurance Ullder e Policy is limited to the lois of 
busciness income that occurs 'within 12 consecutive m1nths' after the date of direct physical; loss 
dam '1) T_, ; II I or age. '" - same policy anguage; .L...ava TradiD &l.c. v Hanford Fire Ins. Co. 365 F. Supp. 
2d 434, ~47 (S.D.N.Y. 2005){"Lava reli~ on ~anguJ,ge i the Policy itself that provide~. for 
i' ' , I 
example, that there is DO dollar limit for busi1l6SS intezfupti n coverage, which is limited only by 
h 1 
a maximum of twelve months plus thirty days,!' - sitPiiar olley language where the Period of 
Restoration ,,~s on the date when the property at Je cribed premises should be rep~red, , J ' :: ::;:: :, ::e 1::3~;D:~~. !o:J:~; ;::::~u:: 1: 
, I: 'f ' 
t>usin<:ss inc<J"", loss during the 'period of reStorali~n. it to exceed twelve (12) cons~utive 
months''', where the 'period of restoration' .was "d~fined as the period of time necess~ to 
repair. rebuild or replace the damaged property ~th Jason ble speed and similar quality. ,,)l 
I , 
. I, 
Plaintiff's citation to Farmers Ins. Co. ,¥, Talbot, 33 Idaho 428, 987 P.2d 1043 (11999) 
I' , , ' 
offers no assista:Dcc; to its position. Talbot invol ed conflicting damage calcUlation 
/' 
, t . i 




















methodologies in a single Underinsmed Motorist provi~ion. ;!One provision limited coverag~ to 
···'the difference of the total amount paid by that 'verls l~ility. in_ and tho amounl of 
yaur damage, up to the limils of the coverage,' hterJ. the 'endorsement then mcl.deiI a 
second, different limitation: 'O[tJhe <1jffercnc~ bjl oen tHe anlunt paid in damages to the ins.Jred 
I' ' ' 
person by and :fur any pc1'son or organi:zation who may ge leJany liable for the bodily injury, ~d I , '. 
the limit of the UNDERinsured Motorist Cove~e." Itt at fO' The Hartford Policy at i~ in 
this matter contai.n.s no such patent ambiguity, an~, thus I TalBot offers no guidance. : 
As such, plaintiffs Fourth Motion shOulfe deted. il ' 
I '; ; 
CONC SIO ': : 
Aooordingly, for the reasons stated abovr
" 
PI&!nitr} founh Motion for Recon.sld~1ion 
.bo>1ld be denied. Iii 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMIrrED this ,~ 1(iay Jf A~tu, 2010. ' . I II r,. 
HALL, F ~:! • OBER.RJiCHT & 
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